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Introduction

Following a successful launch of the first issue of *Populo*, the team are thrilled to be able to showcase even more of the excellent work the Political and Cultural Studies Department has to offer.

Due to the vast number of submissions for this issue, we have been able to select high quality material from all corners of our department – works vary from the film ‘The Graduate’ to an analysis of the French and Russian Revolutions.

Previously, our featured piece was a final year dissertation, however, in this edition the editorial team decided to feature a third year report. Not all of the students in the PCS Department write a dissertation in their final year and so we believe this highlights the variety of work we are able to produce.

The current editorial team consists of four dedicated students; Benjamin Armitage, Heather Harvey, Vickie Neal and Alex Roberts, with guidance and support from Eugene Miakinkov.

'While it remains accurate to say that the vast majority of the American public supports the death penalty, at least under some circumstances, it is also true that support for the death penalty is highly conditional'. Critically analyse the political and social arguments that have led to fluctuating support for capital punishment.

Shaun Bendle - AM-232

In the U.S., debate continues to rage over the use of capital punishment. Since the end of the moratorium which was implemented following the case of *Furman v. Georgia* (1972) and overturned by *Gregg v. Georgia* (1976), support for the death penalty has been highly conditional upon specific social, political, racial and cultural debates. The modern debate in the U.S. has taken a greater focus on the advancement in technology which has led to an increased number of DNA exonerations. Additionally, widely reported cases of the botched executions of individuals, such as Clayton Lockett in 2015, has brought renewed pressure on the institution of capital punishment in the U.S. While the Supreme Court has not ruled the death penalty to be unconstitutional over these issues, the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer in *Glossip v. Gross* (2015) did bring this into question, taking issue with the reliability of capital punishment, the arbitrary nature of sentencing, and the “undermining” of its “penological purpose” due to the long delays between sentencing and execution.¹ Even so, the fluctuating nature of support for capital punishment can be attributed not only to particularly high profile and shocking crimes, which can generate a great deal of support for capital

¹ Death Penalty Information Center, ‘Two Supreme Court Justices Chronicle Death Penalty Flaws in Glossip Dissent’, 2016 <<http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6184>> [accessed 27 April 2016].

punishment, but also to the factors such as “botched” executions and DNA exonerations which are helping to push many states towards the abolition of capital punishment demonstrating support for capital punishment is not only linked to social, cultural, financial and political factors but also to the smoothness of the process by which the death penalty is implemented.

In *Furman v. Georgia* the Supreme Court ruled that the use of capital punishment in America at that time could be said to constitute cruel and unusual punishment due to the arbitrary nature of sentencing. This decision led to a four-year moratorium on the use of capital punishment. In the run up to the decision support for capital punishment had dropped to record lows of less than 50 percent.² Hugo Adam Bedau highlights a link between the Supreme Court decision and the Civil Rights Movement, stating that the lawyers who pushed for abolition of the death penalty were a feature of the wider movement for the rights of African Americans.³ Similarly, David McKay highlights the argument of Civil Rights activists who believed that the capital nature of rape was designed to prevent sexual contact between different races.⁴ David Von Drehle highlights that the execution of African Americans for rape was so common that it was often

² Gallup, ‘Death Penalty’ <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

³ Hugo Adam Bedau, ‘*An Abolitionist’s Survey of the Death Penalty in America Today*’, in *Debating the Death Penalty: Should America Have Capital Punishment? - the Experts on Both Sides Make Their Best Case*, by Hugo Adam Bedau and Paul G Cassell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 31.

⁴ David McKay, ‘Capital Punishment the Politics of Retribution’, in *Controversies in American Politics & Society*, by David McKay, David Houghton, and Andrew Wroe, ed. by David McKay, David Houghton, and Andrew Wroe (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), p. 143.

described as “the usual crime” in print.⁵ Historically, as Von Drehle notes, capital punishment has been used as a tool to repress the threat of a slave uprising with capital crimes having included dispensing medicine to their master or striking them hard enough to leave a bruise.⁶ This racial bias can be seen in execution statistics, with one study showing that 49 percent of those executed between 1608 and 1972 were African American despite making up a smaller percentage of the population overall.⁷ This clearly demonstrates the racial bias before 1972 in the application of capital punishment. The drive for abolition in the 1960s and 1970s could be linked to the Civil Rights Movement, which had an effect on public opinion which is something the Supreme Court rarely goes against. This clearly demonstrates one aspect of why there has been fluctuating support for capital punishment in the U.S.

It is also important to note that the 1972 decision did not strike down the death penalty as unconstitutional, rather the justices took issue with the arbitrary nature of sentencing.⁸ This paved the way for *Gregg v. Georgia* which led to the court lifting its moratorium and providing clearer sentencing guidelines which would make the application of capital punishment less arbitrary where applied.⁹ Part of these new

⁵ David Von Drehle, ‘*The Death of the Death Penalty: Why the Era of Capital Punishment Is Ending*’, *Time* (TIME.com, June 2015) <<http://time.com/deathpenalty/>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

⁶Ibid.

⁷ Death Penalty Information Centre, ‘*Executions in the U.S. 1608-2002: The Espy File*’, 2016 <<http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-us-1608-2002-espy-file>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

⁸ David McKay, ‘*Capital Punishment the Politics of Retribution*’, p. 143.

⁹ Ibid.

guidelines included taking mitigating circumstance, such as the character of the defendant, or aggravating factors, such as additional felonies being part of the murder that was committed, into account.¹⁰ Walter Berns argues that these were designed to make the sentence fairer but should still be “unusual” in the sense that it is rarely applied for the worst crimes.¹¹ However, these guidelines still allowed for arbitrary treatment because they permitted juries to take the “cruel” nature of a crime as an aggravating factor. Vague terms such as this meant that prejudice could still be introduced to the system, which cannot be accounted for.¹² This is partly to blame for current racial disparities on death row: 42 percent of those on death row are African American.¹³

Additionally, a study conducted between 1973 and 1979 by David Baldus found that the race of the victim played a major role even after the implementing of these new guidelines. It revealed that the victim of a homicide was white the killer was 20 percent more likely to get the death penalty than a case involving a black victim.¹⁴ Paul G. Cassell

¹⁰The Harvard Law Review Association, ‘*The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment*’, *Harvard Law Review*, 114 (2001), p. 1605-1606.

¹¹ Walter Berns, ‘*The Morality of the Death Penalty*’, in *Major Problems in American Constitutional History, Volume II: From 1870 to Present*, by Kermit L. Hall, 1992nd edn (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1992), p. 536.

¹² The Harvard Law Review Association, ‘*The Rhetoric of Difference*’, p. 1607-11

¹³ Death Penalty Information Center, ‘*Race of Death Row Inmates Executed since 1976*’, 2016 <<http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-executed-1976#defend>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

¹⁴ Amnesty International, United States of America: The Death Penalty (London, U.K.: Amnesty International Publications, 1987), p. 59

accounts for this by arguing that cases of black-on-white homicide are more likely to involve additional aggravating factors such as other felonies committed at the time of the crime.¹⁵ However, Stephen Bright does argue that this disparity may be more to do with income, as many who face the death penalty are often unable to fund their own defence, meaning they are often given state appointed lawyers who have been, on occasion, completely inadequate to represent their client.¹⁶ Despite this, a Gallup Poll conducted in 1999 found the majority of Americans, while acknowledging that inequalities in the use of capital punishment linked to wealth and race existed, “they [did] not view such discrimination as a reason to oppose the death penalty.”¹⁷ This suggests that issues linked to race and wealth may not have the same impact on the fluctuating support for capital punishment as they have in the past.

Despite issues related to the fairness of the sentencing process, most Americans still support the death penalty. The most common reason given for this support is as a punishment fitting the crime, with 35 percent of those in favour citing this as their reason.¹⁸ It is this tough-on-crime attitude that has added to the politicisation of the death penalty over time and

¹⁵ Paul G. Cassell, ‘*In Defense of the Death Penalty*’, in *Debating the Death Penalty: Should America Have Capital Punishment? - the Experts on Both Sides Make Their Best Case*, by Hugo Adam Bedau and Paul G Cassell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). p. 203

¹⁶ Quoted in Michael L. Radelet and Marian J. Borg, ‘The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates’, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26 (2000), p. 49. Some lawyers have been recorded as attending court drunk or high on drugs. Some have slept through trials or even been racist towards their own client

¹⁷ Radelet and Borg, ‘*The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates*’, p. 49

¹⁸ Gallup, ‘*Death Penalty*’.

can account for the fluctuating support for the death penalty among politicians. The most famous example of politics and the death penalty debate becoming intertwined is that of Michael Dukakis who stated in a presidential debate that he would not support the death penalty even if his wife was murdered. His views are widely considered to have been detrimental to his presidential bid.¹⁹ Four years later Bill Clinton made a point of returning to Arkansas to oversee an execution during his presidential race.²⁰ At this time also, support for the death penalty among the American public was at its highest levels, largely due to high crime rates.²¹ In 1991 New York City witnessed 2,245 murders. However, by 2011 the crime rate dropped by approximately 76 percent, representative of a nationwide trend.²² This drop in crime coincidentally saw a decline in support for the death penalty, demonstrating how support for the death penalty may be linked both to a fear of crime and to a belief that it offers a solution to deal with high crime rates. Another factor to take into account is that 13 percent of those who supported the death penalty in 1991 cited deterrence as their reason for doing so compared to just 6 percent by 2014.²³ This view is

¹⁹ Frank R. Baumgartner, Emily Williams and Kaneesha Johnson, 'Americans Are Turning against the Death Penalty. Are Politicians Far Behind?', *Washington Post*, 7 December

2015<<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/07/americans-are-turning-against-the-death-penalty-are-politicians-far-behind/>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

²⁰ Bamgartner, Williams and Johnson, 'Americans Are Turning against the Death Penalty'.

²¹ Gallup, 'Death Penalty'.

²² Chris McGreal, 'America's Serious Crime Rate Is Plunging, but Why?', *The Guardian*, 21 August 2011

<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/21/america-serious-crime-rate-plunging>> [accessed 27 April 2016].

²³ Gallup, 'Death Penalty'.

supported by a 2008 Amnesty International study which found that the fourteen states without the death penalty had a murder rate at or below the national average.²⁴ While high crime rates may increase support for the death penalty, the shocking nature of some crimes may also boost support and further politicise it. Despite having not carried out an execution since 1963 New York reinstated capital punishment in 1995, coinciding with a period of high crime wave and following several high profile incidents.²⁵ At the signing ceremony Governor George Pataki made the point of inviting the families of two murdered New York police officers to the signing. Pataki also made reference to the 1994 Brooklyn Bridge shooting where a bus of Jewish school children was attacked.²⁶ Major incidents such as these demonstrate how support for the death penalty can be highly conditional and fluctuate dependent upon the circumstances. In this case it is clear several high profile incidents led to the passage of a new death penalty statute in New York, which, nonetheless, remains unused. This demonstrates how public opinion can fluctuate and how this can have a direct impact on the actions taken by politicians.

Similarly, demonstrating how quickly public opinion can change, just five months after the high profile bombing at the Boston Marathon in April 2013 a Boston Globe poll found that 33 percent of people in the city supported the death

²⁴ Amnesty International, '*U.S. Death Penalty Facts*', 2016 <<http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/death-penalty/us-death-penalty-facts>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

²⁵ James Dao, '*Death Penalty Reinstated in New York after 18 Years; Pataki Sees Justice Served*', *The New York Times*, 8 March 1995 <<http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/08/nyregion/death-penalty-in-new-york-reinstated-after-18-years-pataki-sees-justice-served.html>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

²⁶ Ibid.

penalty for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.²⁷ However during his trial this dropped to 19 percent, with some attributing this to the intervention of the victims' families who stated they did not wish to see Tsarnaev executed.²⁸ Other issues, including the belief that execution would make him a martyr; the opinion that a life sentence would be a worse punishment; and also that details about the influence of the Tsarnaev's brother, may have influenced people to feel less supportive of the death penalty in this case.²⁹ Despite this, it is important to note that of the people polled by the Boston Globe approximately 30 percent of people stated they generally supported the death penalty for heinous crimes, clearly demonstrating the highly conditional support that capital punishment receives. It also shows how easily and quickly support rates can fluctuate and how unique factors in any situation may impact upon this.³⁰

Contemporary polls suggest that Americans may be turning away from this justice-driven view of the death penalty, with the Death Penalty Information Centre indicating that, when given the option, the majority of Americans favour life imprisonment (without parole) over the death penalty.³¹ Similarly, in their poll, Radelet and Borg discovered that

²⁷ Evan Allen, 'Few Favor Death for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Poll Finds', Boston Globe, 26 April 2015 <<http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/04/26/globe-poll-shows-diminishing-support-for-death-penalty-for-tsarnaev/S3GMhFIGj5VUkZrmLzh1iN/story.html?event=event25>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Death Penalty Information Center, '*AMERICAN VALUES SURVEY: Majority of Americans Prefer Life without Parole over Death Penalty*', 2016 <<http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6309>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

many Americans do not realise that life without parole is an alternative, or how long a murderer would spend in prison under such a sentence. Furthermore, they also found that many do not trust the authorities to keep killers in jail and will eventually release them.³² These factors demonstrate how support for the death penalty can easily fluctuate and also how its highly conditional nature can be influenced by crime rates and particularly shocking events. Yet, when presented with an alternative to the death penalty support does drop suggesting a lack of support for arguments of deterrence and punishment.

The modern death penalty debate no longer focuses on moral issues that were previously used by abolitionists. Instead, today the focus is far more on procedural issues, which appears to be having some success. Since 2002 national support for the death penalty has dropped as much as 10 percent.³³ Since 2007 ten states have either abolished or imposed moratoriums on the death penalty.³⁴ Interestingly following abolition of the death penalty in New York neighbouring states including New Jersey and Connecticut also abolished the death penalty demonstrating how states can view each other as policy labs.

One of the contemporary approaches taken by abolitionists is to focus on the use of DNA in exonerating those on death row. Between 1989 and 2014, 318 people were released from long term prisons sentences, with 6 percent of

³² Radelet and Borg, *'The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates'*, p. 47

³³ Gallup, *'Death Penalty'*.

³⁴ ProCon.org, *'31 States with the Death Penalty and 19 States with Death Penalty Bans'*, 2016

<<http://deathpenalty.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=001172>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

these being freed from death row.³⁵ One notable state where DNA exonerations played an important role in the death penalty debate is Illinois. George Ryan served as governor of Illinois between 1999 and 2003, and upon entering the Office Ryan described himself as a “firm believer” in the death penalty.³⁶ However, before leaving office he commuted the sentences of all 187 people on Illinois’ death row.³⁷ McKay notes DNA exonerations played a major role in Ryan’s decision to impose a moratorium on the death penalty,³⁸ with Ryan himself accepting that innocent people may have been executed given the rate of exonerations brought about by new technology.³⁹ Support for the death penalty is therefore highly conditional and can lose support from its strongest supporters when presented with the overwhelming evidence of wrongful convictions.

Following on from this, another major issue raised in the modern abolition debate is that of botched executions. Up to 2014 around 3 percent of American executions were

³⁵ Ben Plven, ‘DNA Exoneration: Redeeming the Wrongfully Convicted’, *Aljazeera America*, 27 May 2014 <<http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/ajam-presents-the-system/articles/2014/5/8/dna-exoneration-wrongfullyconvicted.html>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

³⁶ George Ryan, “I Must Act”, in *Debating the Death Penalty: Should America Have Capital Punishment? - the Experts on Both Sides Make Their Best Case*, by Hugo Adam Bedau and Paul G Cassell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 218.

³⁷ Stephen B. Bright, ‘Why the United States Will Join the World in Abandoning Capital Punishment’, in *Debating the Death Penalty: Should America Have Capital Punishment? - the Experts on Both Sides Make Their Best Case*, by Hugo Adam Bedau and Paul G Cassell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 154.

³⁸ David McKay, ‘Capital Punishment the Politics of Retribution’, p. 148.

³⁹ George Ryan, “I Must Act”, p. 230.

considered to have been “botched”, with lethal injection having the highest rate at 7.1 percent.⁴⁰ While some, such as Ernest van den Haag, argue that the brutal nature of some executions is justified given the crimes these people have committed, Herb Haines does not believe this is the view held by most Americans.⁴¹ Instead, Haines believes that the American public do not wish to see a particularly cruel death penalty.⁴² This would appear to be true as all states that use the death penalty have now moved to the lethal injection as their preferred method.⁴³ However, this has not necessarily proven to be more humane and has led to several notable cases which have impacted on the support for the death penalty. Executions such as that of Angel Diaz in Florida led to a temporary moratorium after the drugs used were injected into the skin rather than a vein.⁴⁴ Issues with the use of lethal injection are further complicated by the unwillingness of medical professionals to take part in the procedure with many professional medical associations threatening to take actions against its members if they take part in an execution.⁴⁵ In addition to this, some states are now facing a shortage of

⁴⁰ Debbie Siegelbaum, ‘*America’s “Inexorably” Botched Executions*’, by BBC Magazine, *BBC News*, 1 August 2014 <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-28555978>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

⁴¹ Ernest van den Haag, ‘*The Ultimate Punishment: A Defence*’, *Harvard Law Review*, 99 (1986), 1667

⁴² Herb Haines, ‘*Flawed Executions, the Anti-Death Penalty Movement, and the Politics of Capital Punishment*’, *Social Problems*, 39 (1992), p.126.

⁴³ David Von Drehle, ‘*The Death of the Death Penalty*’.

⁴⁴ Frank Romanelli, Tyler Whisman and Joseph L Fink, ‘*Issues Surrounding Lethal Injection as a Means of Capital Punishment*’, *Pharmacotherapy*, 28 (2008), p. 1432.

⁴⁵ Romanelli, Whisman and Fink, ‘*Issues Surrounding Lethal Injection*’, p. 1433.

execution drugs due to a European Union ban on the export of the necessary drugs.⁴⁶ This has led to the use of new experimental drugs such as in the Oklahoma case of Clayton Lockett, who died of a heart attack and in severe pain 43 minutes after the execution began.⁴⁷ As a result there is currently a moratorium in the state until a new drug supply is found.⁴⁸ As such, the use of capital punishment is conditional upon it appearing to be a smooth a painless procedure, leading to an Appeals Court Judge stating that Americans must either accept the cruel nature of the death penalty or abandon it.⁴⁹

Opposition has also begun to emerge over the cost of the death penalty, with each execution in California costing \$308 million, considerably more than life imprisonment.⁵⁰ This has led to many conservatives such as David J. Burge a senior member of the Georgia Republican Party viewing it as an expensive and intrusive government program contrary to

⁴⁶ Ed Pilkington, 'European Boycott of Death Penalty Drugs Lowers Rate of US Executions', *The Guardian*, 6 October 2014 <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/19/death-penalty-boycott-drugs-execution-new-low>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

⁴⁷ Katie Fretland, 'Scene at Botched Oklahoma Execution of Clayton Lockett Was "a Bloody Mess"', *The Guardian*, 15 December 2014 <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/13/botched-oklahoma-execution-clayton-lockett-bloody-mess>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

⁴⁸ Amanda Sakuma, 'Oklahoma Won't Be Executing Death Row Inmates Anytime Soon' (msnbc.com, 2015) <<http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/oklahoma-wont-be-executing-death-row-inmates-anytime-soon>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

⁴⁹ David Von Drehle, 'The Death of the Death Penalty'.

⁵⁰ Ed Pilkington, 'Death Penalty Costs California More than \$300m per Execution', *The Guardian*, 15 January 2016 <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/20/california-death-penalty-execution-costs>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

conservative values.⁵¹ Mary Kate Carry, a speech writer for George H.W. Bush, linked her new found opposition both to the cost, which she believes would be better spent on a victim's family, and to the right to life debate, arguing that the innocent life lost cannot be compatible with a pro-life stance.⁵² Issues related to the cost of the death penalty are therefore having a direct effect on some conservatives who would traditionally be capital punishment's most staunch supporters. Overall, these factors demonstrate the highly conditional and fluctuating support for the death penalty and help to explain its declining support and the increased rate of abolition amongst the states.

When considering all of these factors it becomes apparent that support for the death penalty is highly conditional upon social, political and cultural factors at any given period of history. The case of *Furman v. Georgia* demonstrates the direct impact the cultural, racial and financial matter can have on support for capital punishment. However, it is also evident that particularly shocking crimes can lead to a large jump in support for the death penalty something politicians, such as Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential race, can often use to their own advantage to appear to be tough on crime. This attitude has been undermined in modern times by the financial concerns due to the spiralling cost of the death penalty, demonstrating the conditional nature of support among conservatives who are usually seen as strong supporters of capital punishment. Additionally, the modern debate surrounding the death

⁵¹ David Von Drehle, '*The Death of the Death Penalty*'.

⁵² Mary Kate Cary, '*The Conservative Case Against the Death Penalty*', U.S. News and World Report, 2011
<<http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/03/30/the-conservative-case-against-the-death-penalty>> [accessed 24 April 2016].

penalty has brought the focus of abolitionist on to the growing number of exonerations brought about by new DNA technology, additionally botched executions such as those of Clayton Lockett and Angel Diaz, have brought new pressure onto states which operate the death penalty, demonstrating the desire in the U.S. for a smooth application of the death penalty. Overall demonstrating that support for capital punishment is highly conditional upon political, social, cultural and financial factors at any given time in history.

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Is terrorism best approached through military or policing policies?

Alex Cebula - PO-392

Introduction

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. From the Sicarii of Palestine and the Assassins of Persia, to more contemporary examples of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), terrorism has plagued society in some form for the last two millennia.⁵³ However, recent events have compelled a revived importance to the study of this phenomenon.

Terrorism, as an academic discipline, has received much attention in the wake of September 11, 2001. According to Andrew Silke, a book related to the subject of terrorism was published every six hours in the five years following 9/11.⁵⁴ Almost overnight, the subject of terrorism had moved from the fringes of academic literature to becoming a central theme of the foreign and security policies of Western states. The events of 9/11 had such an impact within the field of terrorism studies that it led scholars such as Ronald Crelinsten to describe a fundamental shift in understanding taking place. All terrorist-related discourse prior to 9/11 was labelled

⁵³ Brigitte L. Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 5th edn (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016), pp. 45–46.

⁵⁴ Andrew Silke, 'Research on Terrorism: A Review of the Impact of 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism', in *Terrorism Informatics: Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security*, ed. by Hsinchun Chen and others (New York: Springer Verlag, 2008), pp. 27–50, p. 28.

“September 10th thinking” and radically differed from the beliefs that took hold on “September 12th”.⁵⁵.

The subsequent ‘War on Terror’ and the prioritising of terrorism within the security field proved that much had changed, at least in perception, as a result of the attacks. As the study of terrorism underwent a reassessment, so did the




Figure 1. How Terrorist Groups End

discipline of counterterrorism. Militarised policies replaced

⁵⁵ Ronald Crelinsten, 'Perspectives on Counterterrorism: From Stovepipes to a Comprehensive Approach', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 8.1 (2014), 2–15, p. 2.

the conventional policing measures that governed the thinking of September 10th.⁵⁶ The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq showcased this new approach to counterterrorism. The conflicts' supposed failure can be seen to have cast doubt on the efficacy of the new policy and has since compelled extensive discourse on the most effective strategy to negate the threat that terrorism poses.

This essay will assess these debates through a study of both counterterrorism approaches and their respective strengths and weaknesses. Prior to this analysis, an attempt to define terrorism will be undertaken and the complexities and discrepancies in doing this will be noted. The purpose of this will be to draw light to the contextual difficulties facing both military and policing approaches of counterterrorism. The essay will continue by highlighting the ways in which the military and policing models both possess their own unique benefits and setbacks that are, in part, deepened through the lack of a consistent definition within the subject field. In response to this analysis, this essay will then address the considerations of the similarities between the two models. The work will conclude by acknowledging the interdependent relationship that exists between these two models whilst also associating this understanding to the enduring need to strive for consistent understandings and policies within the field of terrorism.

Defining Terrorism

In order to fully comprehend the possible benefits and drawbacks of the policing and war models of counterterrorism, we must first understand the phenomenon in

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 2

which these frameworks were created to combat. Terrorism is a highly debated topic within the realm of security studies, especially in regards to what it constitutes. There is, however, a certain degree of accord amongst scholars in regards to what terrorism entails.

The definition by which this essay will address the concept of terrorism is compiled through Alex Schmid's research of the over 250 different ways in which terrorism has been defined in both a professional and academic sense.⁵⁷ These proposed definitions are put forward from a range of actors; from academics to government organisations. In acknowledging and assessing this range of varying definitions; terrorism may be defined as "an act in which the perpetrator intentionally employs violence (or its threat) to instil fear....in a victim and the audience of the act or threat".⁵⁸

This definition can be said to encompass a wide range of differing views of the terminology behind terrorism. It should be understood that such a definition fails to flawlessly define terrorism in every aspect, however, it does give a foundation from which to build an understanding. Moreover, it recognises what could be argued to be one of the most distinctive attributes of terrorism; its intended purpose. The understanding that the violence (or threat of) has a greater intended impact than simply upon the direct victims of the act can be argued to help distinguish an act of terrorism from that

⁵⁷ Alex P. Schmid, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, ed. by Alex P. Schmid (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011), pp. 99–157.

⁵⁸ Michael Stohl, 'State terror: the theoretical and practical utilities and implications of a contested concept', in *Contemporary Debates on Terrorism*, ed. by Richard Jackson and Samuel J. Sinclair (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012), pp. 43–50, p. 45.

of political violence, as Stohl suggests.⁵⁹ The idea is to instil fear in the audience of the attack. It is what 19th Century anarchist terrorists referred to as “propaganda by the deed”.⁶⁰

This consensus can be seen as providing a good step to understanding terrorism and counterterrorism, however, we must also acknowledge the debates that exist within the defining of terrorism.

Issues Related to Defining Terrorism

Agreement within terrorism has, as has been seen, attributed to at least a partial definition to aid in understanding it. Nevertheless, there is also a great deal of disagreement within the field. Schmid’s compilation of the 250 varying conceptions of terrorism can be seen as an example of the inconsistencies that exist within the field in attempting to define the term. The volume of literature on the subject area is undoubtedly high, but consensus upon what terrorism means is very difficult to come by. The foremost area of contention can be suggested to revolve around two key areas that directly relate to the policing and military models of counterterrorism. These two areas of contention involve debates regarding state terrorism and whether such a thing as ‘new’ terrorism exists.

Advocates of state terrorism align to the belief that terrorism is a strategy that can be carried out by both state and non-state actors. Scholars such as Martha Crenshaw and Geoffrey Nunberg have alluded to the state’s capacity to carry out terror-related acts.⁶¹ Others that argue in favour of the

⁵⁹ Stohl, p. 46.

⁶⁰ Rosemary H. T. O’Kane, *Terrorism* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), p. 14.

⁶¹ Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, pp. 35–36.

notion of state terrorism recollect the origins of the term in 18th Century France when the government carried out its 'reign of terror'.⁶² Terrorism has, therefore, historically been seen as a potential strategy for both state and non-state actors. Evidence of state terrorism can be seen in the events of Stalin's USSR during the 1930s, in which the state enforced repression upon the population.⁶³

The emergence of the Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) school can be seen as having encouraged debate as to the reliability of such a belief. These scholars argue against such a conception. Colin Wight, for example, suggests that the "state's claim to the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force" allows it to lawfully employ acts of violence and evade the labelling of a 'terrorist organisation'.⁶⁴ This attempt to reject the notion of state terrorism can be said to symbolise an attempt to view terrorism through a more contemporary lens.

One of the more recent developments within terrorism studies has been the notion that the post-Cold War environment has seen a fundamental change in the operations of terrorist organisations. These arguments range from assumptions of their heightened lethality and risk to their transitioning to more decentralised organisational structures.⁶⁵ Statistical evidence does indeed suggest that terrorism is

⁶² O'Kane, pp. 9–11.

⁶³ Paul Rogers, 'Terrorism', in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. by Paul D. Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 221–234, p. 224.

⁶⁴ Colin Wight, 'State terrorism: who needs it?', in *Contemporary Debates on Terrorism*, ed. by Richard Jackson and Samuel J. Sinclair (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012), pp. 50–57, p. 54.

⁶⁵ Matthew J. Morgan, 'The Origins of the New Terrorism', *Parameters*, 34.1 (2004), 29–43.

becoming a more common and fatal strategy.⁶⁶ Proponents of the view of ‘new’ terrorism include scholars such as David Rapoport who sees this supposed transition to a modern form of terrorism as another element in the phases of the phenomenon.⁶⁷

However, there are those scholars that dispel the notion of a new form of terrorism. Ronald Crelinsten, for example, suggests that it is the lenses in which terrorism is now seen that has been the most impactful factor in the post-Cold War.⁶⁸ The Cold War framework of capitalism against communism meant most terrorism-related rhetoric in the West revolved around left-wing terrorism and refrained from the concept of terrorism committed by states. Although the level of terrorist attacks has increased, it could be argued that this has been facilitated more through the ending of the bipolar world order than by a rudimentary transition in activities by terrorist groups. The end of the Cold War took the bipolar power agenda off the table and the threat of terrorism has since filled the void. This notion is in part supported by Paul Pillar who sees interest in terrorism “waxing and waning” dependent on whether a larger ‘threat’ exists.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Brenda Lutz and James Lutz, 'Terrorism', in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. by Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 273–288, pp. 278–279.

⁶⁷ Tom Parker and Nick Sitter, 'The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It's Not Waves, It's Strains', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28.2 (2015), 197–216, p. 198.

⁶⁸ Ronald D. Crelinsten, *Counterterrorism* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 18–19.

⁶⁹ Paul R. Pillar, 'Counterterrorism', in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. by Paul D. Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 457–470, p. 458.

These two areas of contention within the study of terrorism can be argued to have played important roles in the development of the debate between the military and policing models of counterterrorism. In the absence of a coherent understanding of terrorism and what it constitutes, it has enabled and exacerbated the misconceptions that can be seen to have produced certain (supposedly detrimental) elements of both models.

The Efficacy of Policing Policies

Policing policies of counterterrorism are framed around the notion that terrorism, as an act, is carried out in contravention of national laws.⁷⁰ In this sense, it is classed as a criminal offence and subject to the legal enforcement of the state in which it is committed. These policies are elements of the larger criminal justice model of counterterrorism, as Ronald Crelinsten suggests⁷¹, and are seen as a more traditional approach to combatting terrorism.⁷² They can be exercised in both reactive and proactive approaches to fighting the threat that terrorism poses. The capture and detention of terrorist suspects, for example, may be seen as a form of reactive counterterrorism in that steps can only be carried out after an act has been committed. A proactive approach, on the other hand, can be evidenced in activities such as intelligence gathering. Both of these elements are said to serve as a form of deterrence to potential terrorist

⁷⁰ Alex P. Schmid, 'Frameworks For Conceptualising Terrorism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16.2 (2004), 197–221, pp. 197–199.

⁷¹ Crelinsten, *Counterterrorism*, pp. 48-49

⁷² Harvard Law Review Association, 'Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War', *Harvard Law Review*, 115.4 (2002), 1217–1238, p. 1224.

aggressors.⁷³ Policing approaches are suggested to appreciate the struggle against terrorism as one that is characterised by a long-term struggle with the aim of suppression rather than outright victory.⁷⁴ It acknowledges that terrorism is not a phenomenon that can be explicitly defeated. This method of counterterrorist approach has been both advocated as the most appropriate policy choice and criticised as being ineffective.

Those counterterrorist policies that prioritise the rule of law and the capacity of law enforcement to uphold it are beneficial in a number of ways. From a statistical perspective, employing these types of methods whilst combatting terrorist activity is more efficient. In studying the factors that contribute to the demise of terrorist groups; Leonard Weinberg acknowledges the benefits of the policing over the military approach, as shown in Figure 1.⁷⁵

The tendency for terrorist groups to be brought to an end through policing policies can be seen as an important and necessary benefit of utilising the approach. Furthermore, the importance of intelligence gathering in contemporary counterterrorism is increasingly being noted. Sara Daly suggests that the fight against terrorist groups demands more than mere military might. Instead, she argues that the most beneficial method of combatting the secret and introverted structures of terrorist organisations is through successful intelligence gathering.⁷⁶ The recent arrest of members of a

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 1231–1232.

⁷⁴ Lutz and Lutz, *Terrorism*, p. 274

⁷⁵ Leonard Weinberg, *The End of Terrorism?* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 40.

⁷⁶ Sara A. Daly, *Fight Terrorism With Intelligence, Not Might* (2003), <<http://www.rand.org/blog/2003/12/fight-terrorism-with-intelligence-not-might.html>> [accessed 30 November 2016].

suspected terrorist group by French police can be seen as evidence of the benefits and necessity of good intelligence.⁷⁷

The success of the criminal justice model is not just limited to statistical evidence. A theoretical assumption suggests that the model's use works to delegitimise the terrorist act. Crelinsten argues that by treating a terrorist attack as a criminal act, it acts to strip the events of their supposed political or ideological narratives, and treat them solely as the act of a criminal.⁷⁸ This can be argued to help limit the 'terror' effect on the population, as well as avoiding the overemphasis of the threat that the group or individual poses. Moreover, a criminal justice model can be said to help establish or reinforce societal views and beliefs regarding terrorism as a criminal offence. By treating terrorism as a crime, Crelinsten argues that it can help to transmit an understanding that terrorism is socially and legally unacceptable.⁷⁹ Additionally, it allows states to implement a form of rehabilitation to convicted terrorists in attempts to instil them with compliance to these norms. This can be seen as part of an attempt to recondition targeted individuals, as well as society as a whole, to the criminal nature of terrorist activity. In this sense, policing approaches can be seen to attempt to deal with terrorism through an acknowledgement of the long-term nature of the phenomenon. In all, criminal justice models of counterterrorism can be said to provide an

⁷⁷ Lucy Pasha-Robinson, *Isis: Terror plot targeting 'French theme park and police officers' foiled* (Independent, 2016), <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-terror-attack-plots-foiled-theme-park-police-targets-cell-arrested-strasbourg-marseille-a7433816.html>> [accessed 30 November 2016].

⁷⁸ Crelinsten, *Counterterrorism*, p. 52

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57

effective and detailed response to terrorism in a manner that seeks to avoid playing into the terrorist's hands.

However, employing a criminal justice model to counterterrorism also entails various drawbacks. James Lutz and Brenda Lutz argue that a trial in a civilian court could provide a terrorist with a platform in which to broadcast their political or ideological views⁸⁰. Evidence of this can be seen from the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui for his involvement in the attacks of September 11th, 2001. The trial was occasionally used by Moussaoui as an attempt to publicise his ideological beliefs.⁸¹ The fear is, as Brigitte Nacos suggests, that it might encourage similar attacks, or for groups to become inspired by the views and beliefs underlying the initial one.⁸²

In addition, there are increasing causes for concern in relation to how liberal democracies act to counter the threat that terrorism poses. Tamar Meisels discusses the notion of how counterterrorist policies are endangering civil liberties within predominantly liberal states.⁸³ The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 can be seen as an example of this undermining of civil liberties for the sake of security, as Jennifer Evans

⁸⁰ James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, 'Democracy and Terrorism', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 4.1 (2010), 63–74 (p. 64).

⁸¹ Suzanne Goldenberg, 'You'll die with whimper,' *Moussaoui told* (The Guardian, 2006), <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/may/05/alqaida.september11>> [accessed 30 November 2016].

⁸² Brigitte L Nacos, 'Revisiting the Contagion Hypothesis: Terrorism, News Coverage, and Copycat Attacks', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 3.3 (2009), 3–13.

⁸³ Tamar Meisels, 'How Terrorism Upsets Liberty', *Political Studies*, 53.1 (2005), 162–181.

argues.⁸⁴ Although this was enacted during the ‘war on terror’, it can be argued to be an element of a policing policy due to its legal nature.

A reliance upon policing and legal enforcement in counterterrorist policies also faces issues within the international sphere. The ‘new’ terrorism assumption of the emergence of increasingly global terrorist groups makes this a particularly important issue. Consensus within international politics on the topic of terrorism can be argued to be lacking in many areas. Moreover, the subject of state terrorism could be addressed by questioning whether legal conventions and treaties are effective in ensuring compliance by states. This can relate to either state terrorism or state sponsorship of terrorist groups. The debate is largely associated with realist rejections of the efficacy of international cooperation, and so is not in the interests of this essay to study in-depth.⁸⁵ Yet, they do shine a light on what can be argued to be one of the greatest failures of policing policies. That is, that those that are designed solely in regard to the powers of the law and legal enforcement agencies in international politics are limited by the efficacy of international cooperation.

Therefore, it can be noted that policing policies of counterterrorism can provide a range of benefits as well as drawbacks. They enable a long-term view of fighting terrorism to be held, whilst attempting to uphold traditional notions of law and order. However, they are held back in relation to alleged new developments within the field of terrorism.

⁸⁴ Jennifer C. Evans, 'Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001', *Loyola University Chicago Law Journal*, 33.4 (2002), 933–990.

⁸⁵ Joseph M Grieco, 'Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma Model', *The Journal of Politics*, 50.3 (1988), 600–624.

It is this supposed ineffectiveness in the contemporary environment that feeds into the creation of the military approaches to countering terrorism.

The Efficacy of Military Policies

The military (or war) model of counterterrorism can be defined as the process of framing “the struggle against terrorism in military terms of an enemy-centric war where the armed forces of a state are primarily in charge of developing counterterrorism strategy”.⁸⁶ It differs from the criminal justice model in that it prioritises the use of hard power through overwhelming force over persistent measures of intelligence gathering and traditional legal procedures.

The closest illustration of the military model can be seen in the declaration and subsequent elements of the ‘war on terror’ declared in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq can both be seen as elements of this shift towards the employment of hard power in counterterrorist operations. The ‘shock and awe’ strategy utilised in Iraq, might be regarded as evidence of the implementation of the military model by pursuing overwhelming force to subdue the terrorist threat. More contemporary evidence of the use of hard power can be seen in the escalation of drone strikes as a counterterrorism tool. The US government, for example, carried out 122 separate drone strikes in Pakistan in 2010 alone.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Jason Rineheart, 'Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 4.5 (2010), 31–47, p. 37.

⁸⁷ Aiden Warren and Ingvild Bode, 'Altering the Playing Field: The U.S. Redefinition of the Use-of-force', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 36.2 (2015), 174–199, p. 185.

The elements of the war on terror are built upon an understanding that traditional counterterrorism policies are no longer applicable in the post-9/11 environment, as the 2002 National Security Strategy suggests.⁸⁸ Policing policies can be argued to have been rendered ineffective due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and the effects and elements of globalisation. It is for these reasons that the military model develops a propensity towards pre-emptive policies and unilateralism. The increasing threat that terrorism poses requires “striking in advance of hostile action to prevent its occurrence and to avoid suffering injury”⁸⁹ whilst pursuing unilateralism to ensure a rapid and effective response.⁹⁰

By rejecting the efficacy of traditional policing policies, it may be suggested that the war model prioritises the killing of an intended target, over pursuing their detention. The assassination of Osama bin Laden can be argued to be evidence of this. In a sense, the military model understands the campaign against terrorist groups as having a finite end and one that can be brought about by military force.

The war model of counterterrorism does possess certain benefits. A notable consideration could be seen as the efficacy of a military approach against state terrorists or those sponsoring terrorist organisations. It could be seen as a more effective method of enforcing the rule of law than attempting to employ methods of passive coercion. This view relates to that proposed by structural realists, such as John

⁸⁸ White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: President of The U.S., 2002), p. 15 <<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>> [accessed 18 December 2016].

⁸⁹ Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, p. 262.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

Mearsheimer, who casts doubt on the efficacy of international rules (both formal and informal) in compelling states to abide by them.⁹¹ In this sense, it could be suggested that hard power coercion is required in order to discourage the violation of these international rules.

Additionally, military force may be argued to be more effective in countering the transnational nature of the supposed new form of terrorism. The apparent ineffectiveness of international cooperation is overcome through the calls for more unilateral action to be taken. This argument aligns with the opinions of Dick Cheney who remarked that the national security of the U.S. in the face of terrorist attacks was more important than the need for multilateral cooperation on the matter.⁹² However, it should be noted that not all operations within the war on terror were unilateral. The war in Afghanistan, for example, began as a result of a multinational military force comprised of troops from both the U.S. and the UK.⁹³

Moreover, countering terrorist acts with the use of military force has statistically been shown to encourage support within the state. Evidence has shown that the Bush administration's approval ratings surged to 90 percent in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and his declaration of the 'war on

⁹¹ John J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, 19.3 (1994), 5–49.
Eric Schmitt, *Cheney Lashes Out at Critics of Policy on Iraq* (The New York Times, 2003),
<<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/11/world/cheney-lashes-out-at-critics-of-policy-on-iraq.html>> [accessed 26 November 2016].

⁹³ Griff Witte, *Afghanistan War* (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016),
<<https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War>> [accessed 4 January 2017].

terror'.⁹⁴ This can be seen as successfully overcoming the attempt of terrorist groups to instil fear and division and encouraging a form of unity within the targeted state instead.

Moreover, if the contemporary form of terrorism does signify a significant shift from older forms, it could be argued that the war model possesses the best possible solution to combatting it. Richard Shultz & Andreas Vogt note the tendency of groups such as Al-Qaeda to move away from hierarchical organisational structure, to more decentralised and flexible ones.⁹⁵ This could be argued to make policing and monitoring supposed terrorist groups more complex. Instead, as Paul R. Pillar suggests; a military approach to counterterrorism facilitates an easier means of disrupting a group's operations by enabling the targeting of the upper echelons of the organisations.⁹⁶ The policing method, on the other hand, could be argued to be hindered by the transnational nature of the alleged new form of terrorism and the need for international cooperation to capture or detain these individuals. Leonard Weinberg argues that the capturing or killing of a terrorist group's leaders is one of the most common causes of the demise of terrorist groups.⁹⁷ Therefore, we can note the relevance of a state's ability to perform such a task.

The benefits of a military approach to counterterrorism can be noted as providing a harder and more focused approach

⁹⁴ James N Schubert, Patrick A Stewart, and Margaret Ann Curran, 'A Defining Presidential Moment: 9/11 and the Rally Effect', *Political Psychology*, 23.3 (2002), 559–583, p. 559.

⁹⁵ Richard Shultz and Andreas Vogt, 'It's war! Fighting post-11 September global terrorism through a doctrine of preemption', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 15.1 (2003), 1–30, pp. 9–11.

⁹⁶ Pillar, p. 467.

⁹⁷ Weinberg, p. 31.

to combatting the threat of a new form of terrorism. However, it must also be acknowledged that the model possesses numerous drawbacks; most notably its reliance upon the assumption of new terrorism.

A primary failing of military policies and their acceptance of new terrorism can be said to be their over-emphasis of the extent of the terrorist threat. Liberal democracies are particularly susceptible to doing this, not only through counterterrorist measures but through the mediums of the free media as well.⁹⁸ Scholars such as Mueller, for example, argue that contemporary terrorism does not pose a serious threat to states or the international community.⁹⁹ Therefore, employing military tactics to such a threat may be argued to be inflating the real risk it poses. Furthermore, this could then be seen as an issue in regards to the opportunity costs of devoting resources to terrorism as a primary security threat.

This argument relates to Crelinsten's suggestion that employing military measures risks "playing in to terrorist's hands".¹⁰⁰ By this, Crelinsten argues that using military power and repressive behaviour as a method of combating terrorism could simply increase sympathy for terrorist causes and the threats terrorism poses in the long-term. This is supported by both Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds who forewarned of the risk that the Iraq War could have instigated an escalation in

⁹⁸ O'Kane, p. 190.

⁹⁹ John Mueller, 'Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?', in *The U.S. vs. al Qaeda: A History of the War on Terror*, ed. by Gideon Rose and Jonathan Tepperman (New York: Foreign Affairs, 2011), pp. 158–166.

¹⁰⁰ Crelinsten, *Counterterrorism*, p. 78

terrorist activity in the region.¹⁰¹ Some could argue that this has occurred with the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. This is what Boaz Ganor defines as the “boomerang effect”.¹⁰² Employing a military model of counterterrorism may also, like the policing model, risk threatening the civil liberties of those within society. For example, aspects of the ‘war on terror’ have been considered in breach of these rights through aspects such as invasive intelligence gathering by organisations such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ).¹⁰³

Another frequent criticism of military approaches to counterterrorism is in the rhetoric used. O’Kane, for example, suggests that the ‘war on terror’ attempted to frame terrorism along similar lines to the fight against communism and fascism, and failed to recognise the distinction between them.¹⁰⁴ Terrorism is a strategy and thereby any attempt to understand it as an alternative to communism and fascism (political ideologies) is ill-conceived. Terrorism, unlike political ideologies, is something capable of being utilised by a wide range of groups and does not possess any political

¹⁰¹ Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds, 'Blowback Revisited: Today's Insurgents in Iraq Are Tomorrow's Terrorists', *Foreign Affairs*, 84.6 (2005), 2–6.

¹⁰² Boaz Ganor, 'Are counterterrorism frameworks based on suppression and military force effective in responding to terrorism?', in *Contemporary Debates on Terrorism*, ed. by Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 137–143, p. 140.

¹⁰³ Timothy H. Edgar, *The Good News About Spying* (Foreign Affairs, 2015), <<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-04-13/good-news-about-spying>> [accessed 7 January 2017].

¹⁰⁴ O’Kane, pp. 27–28.

motives on its own. Its fundamental issue, it could be argued, is the inherent belief within terrorist activity that its use can and will affect the change being sought. This is where the military approach, like policing policies, can be said to be inadequate. It is built upon a notion of providing a reactive policy to terrorist attacks, and providing some form of deterrence to any potential terrorist actors.

What military measures fail to do is seeking to understand and address the factors that breed terrorist sentiment, and sympathy for it. Andrew Heywood describes this as attacking the “manifestations of terrorism” rather than the underlying causes.¹⁰⁵ The war model, then, fails to appreciate the long-term nature of combatting terrorism. It seeks a short-term victory as a means of defeating the foundations of terrorism as a strategy. The Afghanistan war and the emergence and re-emergence of terrorist groups in the region can be seen as evidence of this failure. The need to recognise and implement long-term strategies within counterterrorism policies has already been noted by groups such as the Brookings Institution.¹⁰⁶

Therefore, we can now acknowledge and concede both the benefits and failures of military policies within counterterrorism. It is important to appreciate the fact that much of the justification behind the war model relies upon the viability of the notion that contemporary terrorism presents a fundamental transformation from previous iterations.

¹⁰⁵ Andrew Heywood, *Global Politics*, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) p. 306.

¹⁰⁶ Daniel Benjamin, *Strategic Counterterrorism* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2008), <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10_terrorism_benjamin.pdf> [accessed 2 December 2016] (pp. 1–17), p. 3.

Similarities Between Military and Policing Models

Despite the aforementioned debates on the efficacy of both counterterrorism models, there is also a school of thought that recognises them as interdependent, rather than entirely separate, approaches. Scholars, such as Chesney and Goldsmith, recognise a growing trend in the convergence of the two models.¹⁰⁷ They identify the failures of both models being mitigated through a merging that is taking place between the military and policing approaches. Evidence of this can be found in the increasing tendency of the militarisation of police forces around the world. Police departments throughout the USA, for example, have seen a shift toward the employment of more militaristic tactics and equipment.¹⁰⁸ This has shown a blurring of the distinctions between the traditional roles of the policing and the military in counterterrorism.

Other scholars within this school of thought have gone further than Chesney and Goldsmith in declaring the linkage between the two models. Laura Donohue has in a sense rejected this notion. Instead, Donohue advances the view that both approaches to counterterrorism are based upon the same principles and values; namely that the war model is simply a

¹⁰⁷ Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, 'Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models', *Stanford Law Review*, iv, 60 (2008), 1079–1133.

¹⁰⁸ Arthur Rizer and Joseph Hartman, *How the War on Terror Has Militarized the Police* (The Atlantic, 2011), <<http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/11/how-the-war-on-terror-has-militarized-the-police/248047/>> [accessed 14 December 2016].

product of the criminal justice approach.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, the two counterterrorism policies are to be seen as interrelated rather than separate. It could be argued that despite the militaristic nature of the ‘war on terror’, the US still passed multiple items of legislation that can be seen as related more to a legal enforcement model of counterterrorism. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, for example, granted vast surveillance rights to government agencies which facilitated a greater scope of intelligence gathering.¹¹⁰ Moreover, aspects of criminal detention were also used during the ‘war on terror’ where Guantanamo Bay, as well as controversial aspects such as extraordinary rendition, became key elements of the campaign. However, it is not simply the military model that depends upon the structures of policing approaches. The use of militaristic tactics in policing approaches can also be noted in the UK’s campaign against IRA terrorism, where British troops were a persistent presence, with numbers reaching a peak of over twenty-five thousand.¹¹¹

It is, therefore, important to understand that the military and policing approaches to counterterrorism are not independent models. They are instead two interrelated approaches that are often used interchangeably in the struggle against terrorism. Acknowledging this connection between the two models and appreciating them as complementary

¹⁰⁹ Laura K. Donohue, *The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 9.

¹¹⁰ K. Jack Riley, Jeremy M. Wilson, Gregory F. Treverton, Lois M. Davis, *State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 52.

¹¹¹ Esther Addley, *British troops leave after 38 years* (The Guardian, 2007), <<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/aug/01/northernireland.military>> [accessed 3 January 2017].

counterterrorist measures may be said to enable a recognition of the need to develop stable legal frameworks for the models to operate within. This is an issue that scholars, such as Kim Lane Scheppele, address as they criticise the failed attempt by the United Nations (UN) to implement consistent international legislation to govern the campaign against terrorist organisations after 9/11.¹¹²

A factor that is frequently noted as prohibiting international cooperation on counterterrorism matters is the lack of consensus amongst international parties. This can most notably be seen in the absence of a coherent definition amongst national and international actors. The lack of agreement can be argued to endanger the possibility of international collaboration as an “effective international strategy requires agreement” on what the nature and reality of the threat is.¹¹³ Therefore, it may be argued that, to a certain extent, the true challenge within counterterrorism relates not to the advancement of the most effective counterterrorism model, but to the creation and sustenance of a consistent and coherent international legal framework for them to operate within.

Conclusion

The lack of cohesion within the field of terrorism undermines the processes designed to combat the threat that it

¹¹² Kim Lane Scheppele, *From a War on Terrorism to Global Security Law* (Institute for Advanced Study, 2013), <<https://www.ias.edu/ideas/2013/scheppele-terrorism>> [accessed 4 January 2017].

¹¹³ Alex Schmid, 'Terrorism - The Definitional Problem', *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 36.2 (2004b), 375–419, p. 379.

poses. It is clear that both of the models of counterterrorism discussed possess their own unique benefits and drawbacks. The war model addresses the concerns of the heightened threat of terrorism through pre-emptive and unilateral action, whilst policing policies are seemingly more applicable in the case of more conventional terrorist threats. Therefore, to suggest that either model is explicitly more favourable than the other would be ill-conceived. Moreover, to suggest that both models illustrate distinct approaches to counterterrorism would also be mistaken. Instead, it can be seen that military and policing policies have empirically been employed as interrelated measures in attempts to more effectively combat the terrorist threat. As such, determining between two allegedly contrasting counterterrorism models would fail to appreciate the true nature of their use within the field of terrorism.

Consequently, by noting the relationship between military and policing policies, it allows for a reconsideration of a broader discussion than simply assessing the efficacy of the two counterterrorism approaches. The inconsistencies within the field of terrorism, most notably relating to the lack of a cohesive definition, are undoubtedly exacerbating the issues that exist within the discipline. The failure to implement consistent counterterrorist-related legislation in the international sphere is also noted as a significant factor within these inconsistencies.

The efficacy of counterterrorism models, therefore, is not the only issue within which definitive answers are required. Accepting the interconnected relationship between the models allows us to view the issues within counterterrorism at a broader and more appropriate angle. The true issue within the field relates not to choosing the most effectual policy with which to pursue counterterrorism, but to

rectifying the inconsistencies that exist and threaten the formulation and implementation of the military and policing models of counterterrorism.

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**The Failure of the ‘Public Sphere’ in Late Tsarist Russia,
Bolshevik Militarism and the Russian Civil War: A
comparative analysis of the French and Russian
Revolutions, 1789-1799 & 1917-1922**

Harry James Cochrane – HUA-309

In 1962, Jurgen Habermas published his thesis *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* in which he described the emergence of public opinion and the transformation of feudal societies into bourgeoisie liberal democracies during the eighteenth century. Habermas’ thesis was initially applied to the French Revolution of 1789 demonstrating the rise of non-industrial capitalism, and Enlightenment writers such as Kant, Locke, Rousseau and Montesquieu; similarly, there was a rough Russian approximation of the ‘public sphere’ known as *obshchestvo* or *obshchestvennost* meaning ‘society’ or ‘general public’. The development of *obshchestvennost* roughly coincided with the Gold and Silver Ages of Russian Literature following the emancipation of the peasantry in 1861, essentially a second Enlightenment in Russia. What this essay asserts, however, is that the form of public sphere that developed in Late Tsarist Russia was splintered into anaemic, non-homogenous cul-de-sacs that failed, in contrast to the French Revolution, to become fully autonomous of the state nor integral to promoting legislative change within it. As such these wider fragmentations and ideologies sought their political expression and desire for change in the form of violence in both the 1905 and 1917 Russian Revolutions. This essay will not follow a chronological order, but rather a conceptual order; first outlining the role of the middle and upper classes in the public sphere, peasant mobility and industrial workers in regards to political liberalisation, before outlining Populist and Bolshevik militarism, how violence shaped the Russian Marxists, and ultimately how the seizure of power by Lenin in

1917 was profoundly different from anything experienced in France.

Habermas' theory, in short, outlines that the state must be accountable to public opinion in order to be legitimised. However, Romanov's legitimacy stemmed from the crown itself, reflected in the coronation oath of the Tsars in which the Tsar swore to protect the ideals of autocracy, ruling with justice and impartiality.¹¹⁴ Orlando Figes in *A People's Tragedy* has described this autocratic society as being held up by 'unstable pillars'; a backward aristocratic bureaucracy, a backward society within the illusion of civilization, a feudal army, the transfer of religious power to secular Tsarist power, and finally a 'prison of peoples' a vast empire made up of divergent nationalist ideals and peoples.¹¹⁵ A number of these pillars will remain pertinent throughout this essay in order to showcase the divisive public sphere created through *obshchestvo*. Nicholas II himself expressed the backwardness of the first pillar in 1902, "I conceive of Russia as a landed estate ... of which the proprietor is the Tsar, the administrator is the nobility, and the workers are the peasantry."¹¹⁶ Despite the growth of the industrial sector, the nobility made up the vast majority of the civil service, dependent on a small number of elite families with a diminishing shortfall of expertise. This ruling elite, and indeed the Tsars themselves, was committed to an increasingly archaic view of Russian society outlined in the *soslovie* (social estates) system, which divided society into the nobility, the clergy, urban dwellers and rural peasants. This

¹¹⁴ R. Monk Zachariah Liebmann, "The Life of Tsar-Martyr Nicholas II" in *The Orthodox Word*, 26.4, (July-August, 1990), p. 200.

¹¹⁵ Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924* (London: The Bodley Head, 2014), p. 35-84.

¹¹⁶ Tsar Nicholas II, as printed in Figes, *A People's Tragedy* p. 35.

social rigidity ignored the ‘middle grounds’ of each estate, sorting different professions on the peripheries into a sort of social ‘cubby-hole’, failing to anchor the rising middle class to a social identity. The rising industrialists, professional classes and artists, the *burzhuaziia* (bourgeoisies), were perhaps defined by what they were not; “They were not gentry, not *chinovniki* (bureaucrats), not peasants. Their place meshed poorly, if at all, with traditional *soslovie* categories”.¹¹⁷ Social rigidity in this sense has been described as the foundation of a ‘sedimentary society’ in which the autocratic state system attempted to impose order to social fluctuations through a number of top-down reforms.¹¹⁸ Alfred Rieber argued that social reform in Imperial Russia was almost always initiated from above in an irregular, arbitrary manner that fluctuated depending on bureaucratic unity, resistance from the populace, the distraction of foreign wars, or the succession of rulers.¹¹⁹ This arbitrariness meant that social reform was hardly ever permanent; everything that was enacted could just as easily be overturned or ignored. One such example was the codification of the *Svod Zakonov* in 1832, which looked to reinstate and clarify the *Ulozhenie* of 1649 that had fallen into disuse. The codification clarified and systematised the *soslovie* system but also looked to eliminate repetition; whenever contradictory laws were encountered they were simply removed in favour of the most recently

¹¹⁷ Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow and James L. West, *Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 4.

¹¹⁸ Alfred J. Rieber, “The Sedimentary Society” in *Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 343-366.

¹¹⁹ *idem.* p. 364.

enacted.¹²⁰ The ‘sedimentary’ layers of this autocratic society perhaps stemmed from the lack of a central political ideology; the arbitrary laws and sweeping changes did little to instil a unified sense of political direction leading up to the 1905 revolution. Dena Goodman, in writing about the public sphere in eighteenth century France, argued that the most important factor in developing a platform for political criticism and debate was access to various ‘institutions’; coffee shops, salons, academies and masonic lodges.¹²¹ Joseph Bradley argues in Russia that similar ‘free associations’ were no doubt coming into existence, but that the diversity of their interests and contestation for the same political space meant that the developing public sphere was soon hijacked by revolutionaries.¹²² These anaemic and sedimentary political cul-de-sacs were unstable and lacked a central ethos, and thus would instead seek their expression in the form of violence in both the 1905 and 1917 revolutions.

If the middle classes were compartmentalised and the aristocratic bureaucracy were devoid of a political compass, the opposite had occurred in peasant society. Since the Emancipation of 1861, Russia had taken a large step forward in its transition from a medieval feudal society into the modern world. In post-Emancipation rural Russia, peasants owed a sort of debt to the *mir* (village council) and made payments to offset their former masters’ loss of land; peasants still worked their allotment of land, but were now hired by their former masters to pay this debt. This debt effectively

¹²⁰ *idem.* p. 364.

¹²¹ Dena Goodman, “Public Sphere and Private Life: Toward a Synthesis of Current Historiographical Approaches to the Old Regime” in *History and Theory*, 31.1, (Feb., 1992), pp. 1-20 p. 6.

¹²² Joseph Bradley, “Subjects into Citizens: Societies, Civil Society, and Autocracy in Tsarist Russia” in *The American Historical Review*, 107.4, (October, 2002), pp. 1094-1123, p. 1122.

prevented a mass migration of peasants from rural Russia into towns and cities, preventing the creation of a landless proletariat. The terms of Emancipation also prevented the consolidation of allotments, preventing a transition into independent farming and estate owning.¹²³ The potential for the peasant class to become neo-landed gentry was a worry shared by upper classes from Stolypin's Reforms to Lenin, and also a persistent image in contemporary literature. Most notably in Anton Chekhov's *The Cherry Orchard*, the overarching theme of which depicts the futility of aristocracy as a declining estate is sold to a former serf. Peasants were however, permitted to undertake 'seasonal work' in mining, agriculture or construction, with the money earned being sent back to the village, they were given representation in the local *zemstvo* (local government) and younger seasonal workers had a higher literacy rate than their village-tied counterparts.¹²⁴ The issue with this newfound peasant mobility lay in that the peasant class was evolving into something entirely unknown. On one hand, modernisation and industrialisation were transforming the peasants' lives into this seasonal, landless force, perhaps the foundation for the proletariat, but on the other hand, ties to the village remained strong. As such, various factions sought to take control, utilise or simply pacify the peasantry. One such example is the Stolypin Reforms from 1905 to 1911. A law passed on 9 November 1906 allowed the head of a peasant family to consolidate communal farming strips into private property; this was an attempt to create a new landed peasantry who, by owning property, might feel they had a bigger stake in the Russian system.¹²⁵ A landed peasantry was seen as a key step

¹²³ Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 17.

¹²⁴ *idem.* p. 18.

¹²⁵ Orlando Figes, *Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991*, (London: Penguin Publishing, 2014), p. 57.

in closing the divide between rural and urban Russia, this newly created class would be supportive of the regime and allow a tighter control over the rural *zemstvos*.¹²⁶ Stolypin's reforms failed, largely due to a lack of support from the peasants themselves, as such in the eventual revolution of 1917, "without a stake in the old ruling system, the peasants in 1917 had no hesitation in sweeping away the entire state ... Tsarism in this sense had undermined itself; but it also created the basic conditions for the triumph of the Bolsheviks".¹²⁷ Rieber argues that this was perhaps because the sedimentary layers within peasant society were thinner, in the result of the revolution the peasants receded back into archaic and more pragmatic socio-economic responses: they seized and redistributed land.¹²⁸ The peasantry remained a volatile class that factions sought to control from their Emancipation in 1861 to the outbreak of civil war in 1917, as political roads closed off to these factions violence prevailed, and the attempted militarisation of the peasantry and of politics perhaps caused the 1917 Revolution to erupt into war.

There were two sources, and two groups, that instilled this violent culture on Russian politics on the years leading up to 1917: the Populists and the Bolsheviks. The various Russian intelligentsia members including students, artists, writers, and journalists led the first of these groups. The Populist movement idealised the peasant *mir* and commune, seeing it as the purest form of socialism; Populists saw the rise of industrialised capitalism as the destruction of traditional rural communities.¹²⁹ Wishing to 'save' and educate the peasantry on the Populists' own attempts at political revolution against autocracy, a mass-movement to

¹²⁶ Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, (2014), p. 54.

¹²⁷ *idem*. p. 54-55.

¹²⁸ Alfred J. Rieber, *The Sedimentary Society*, (1991), pp. 365-366.

¹²⁹ Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, (2008), p. 24.

rural Russia was sparked in 1873-74. The Populist movement failed to integrate themselves with the peasantry; the peasants were suspicious and often handed their would-be teachers over to Tsarist police. Out of their failure, the Populists began to see their role as sacrificial, to serve the people in order to topple autocracy, they sought to avenge their arrested associates by turning to radical terrorism, with the group The People's Will succeeding in assassinating Tsar Alexander II in 1881.¹³⁰ As previously mentioned, the peasant political consciousness revolved around archaic and subsistence goals, and part of the failure of the Populists was perhaps due to the difficulty of the peasants too see themselves as a vessel of change in regards to toppling the autocracy of imperial Russia. As one British diplomat observed in 1917:

Were one to ask the average peasant in the Ukraine his nationality, he would answer that he is Greek Orthodox; if pressed to say whether he is a Great Russian, a Pole, or an Ukrainian, he would probably reply he is a peasant; and if one insisted on knowing what language he spoke, he would say that he talked 'the local tongue'.¹³¹

Despite the Populist mass-movement, four decades later the peasantry clearly still failed to place themselves socially or politically within the scene of a wider Russia. Furthermore, out of the failure of the Populist movement in the late nineteenth century, the seeds for radical and militant Bolshevism were sown. In Richard Pipes' *Russian Marxism and Its Populist Background: The Late Nineteenth Century*, the transition from dogmatic Marxism to violent Populism is

¹³⁰ *idem.* p. 25.

¹³¹ R. Suny, "Nationality and Class in the Revolutions of 1917: A Re-examination of Categories" in *Stalinism: Its Nature and Aftermath* ed. by N. Lampert and G. Rittersporn, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), p. 232.

charted, which had a major impact on the development of Russian Marxism. Pipes argued that Marxism, in the hands of radical Populists and notable leaders such as Adrei Zhelyabov (1851-1881), Georgi Plekhanov (1856-1918) and Petr Tkachev (1844-1886), transitioned into a movement primarily of terror with the end goal of the violent seizure of national power post-autocracy.¹³² Ultimately, where political liberalisation failed, violence prevailed.

A number of these, in effect, terrorists had a profound effect on constructing Lenin's own views of Marxism and political revolution. Lenin praised Zhelyabov, famed for devising the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, for his

¹³² “Instead of participating in the fight for political liberalization which gathered momentum after 1861, the Populists concentrated on the more or less immediate abolition of state power. This strategy came to be questioned in the late 1870's as a result of the revolutionary disappointment with the peasantry and the dismal failure of all efforts at a violent overthrow of the government. The People's Will organization represented a significant phase in the development of Populism by its recognition of the importance of politics and the political struggle. In particular A. I. Zheliabov, a revolutionary well-known for his part in the assassination of Alexander II but rather neglected as an original political thinker, first linked the Populist movement with the broad nationwide struggle for political rights. Henceforth all Populism was in some measure imbued with a political spirit. But by and large on the level of action Populist "politics" tended toward terrorism. The real assertion of the political factor, the rechanneling of revolutionary activity from buntarstvo and violent seizure of power to deliberate manipulation of forces on the political battlefield was the outstanding contribution of that offshoot of Populism which, under Plekhanov's leadership, went over to Marxism”; Richard Pipes, “Russian Marxism and Its Populist Background: The Late Nineteenth Century” in *The Russian Review*, 13.4, (Oct., 1960), pp. 316-337, p. 237.

dedication to the cause of revolution; Zhelyabov was perhaps the first to link Populism with a national struggle for political rights, shifting the Populist aim from violence to manipulation of other political parties by forming loose coalitions.¹³³ Tkachev's influence on Leninist theory was more Jacobin in nature, in the 1870s he argued in favour of the seizure of power by a highly centralised, disciplined vanguard capable of enforcing a dictatorship and defeating the richer peasants and landholders who he believed would naturally support the capitalist status quo. Plekhanov in a sense merged these two principles and created the so-called 'Two Stage Transition' theory, in which alliances would be created with liberal parties to install a western-style liberal democracy before transferring power from the landholding classes and bourgeoisies to the working classes. Plekhanov's theory was regarded as untenable to the Russian Marxists, at least in a peaceful environment, as such E.G Levit a member of the Veterans of the People's Will in 1897 surveyed Plekhanov's plan and wrote four lines stating how revolutionary activity should unfold in Russia:

1. The new party will direct its main effort against absolutism.
2. The new party will constitute a new compact organization, because the enemy is too strong to be fought by individuals or groups operating in isolation.
3. Since there is among us not a single politically mature class of population, the party will recruit its members in all the classes of society (at first, mainly from among the young intelligentsia).

¹³³ *idem.* p. 237-38

4. Since our revolutionary forces are not numerous, the party will have to have (as long as there is absolutism) a strictly conspiratorial character.¹³⁴

These theories of Russian Marxism and militancy can certainly be identified in Leninist policy. Most notably was Lenin's pamphlet, *What is to be Done?* (1902), which outlined the Bolshevik party's ability to arrest its own members if necessary, a precursor to the Terror and the creation of the VCheKa. 'Trimming the fat' of the Bolshevik party, so to speak, created the centralised vanguard Lenin desired; this centralised nature being one of the fundamental disputes that led to the Bolshevik/Menshevik split in 1903. Isreal Getzler discussed in his 1996 article, *Lenin's Conception of Revolution as Civil War*, Lenin's theory in regards to the fallout of the total collapse of Tsarism. In such an event, Lenin theorised a full-scale civil war between the bourgeoisies and the proletariat. Lenin theorised a further second civil war, in which the state would change hands and eliminate the revolutionary government; ultimately the proletariat would be defeated during this second war, primarily on economic grounds, left alone to battle against the liberal bourgeoisies, rich and middling peasants.¹³⁵ In short, Lenin was prepared for civil war and his doctrine emphasised this; Bolshevism, Leninism and to extent the Soviet State, were not born out of pure Marxist theory but from a radical and violent chapter of Russian history with Lenin instilling this violent conspiratorial neo-Populist tendency on his followers: "It was not Marxism that made Lenin a

¹³⁴ *idem.* p. 337.

¹³⁵ Isreal Getzler, "Lenin's Conception of Revolution as Civil War" in *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 74.3, (Jul., 1996), pp. 464-472, pp. 464-466.

revolutionary, but Lenin that made Marxism revolutionary.”¹³⁶

In the case of the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 themselves, this essay will conclude by combing the various conceptual aspects of this essay in order to understand just how and why the French and Russian Revolution were so substantially different. In the run-up the 1789, political discussion in the aforementioned salons and coffee shops was dominated by discussion of French national debt and crown spending; the state had been plunged into debt due to the Seven Years War 1754-1763 and the American War of Independence 1775-1783. Between 1771 and 1781, Director General of Finance Jacques Necker produced the *compte rendu* an annual summary of state revenue and expenditure. The *compte rendu* was published for the general public and had an enormous effect on increasing public interest into crown spending. By 1786, new Director Charles Alexander de Colonne understood that he needed to receive public support in order to enact his controversial financial reform programme.¹³⁷ A handpicked committee was drawn up in 1787 called the Assembly of Notables, seen as the true seal of approval for public interest; the Assembly shortly disbanded, citing they were not a true representation of France as a whole.¹³⁸ Both the Assembly and the public urged for a

¹³⁶ Orlando Figes, *Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991*, (2014) p. 23.

¹³⁷ “It is impossible to tax further, ruinous to be always borrowing ... the only remedy, the only course left to take, the only means of managing finally to put the finance truly in order, must consist in revivifying the entire state by recasting all that vicious in its constitution”; as printed in William Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 69.

¹³⁸ “We are not representatives of the Nation ... but we declared that altho’ we had no right to impede, it was our right to advise unless

calling of the Estates-General, a representative body of the three estates of France, last called in 1615. Further debate on representation and taxation and led to the submission of the so-called *Cahiers de Doléances*, petitions that outlined topics for debate in the Estates-General. These *cahiers* were not dominated by revolutionary fervour, but rather of representation, equality of taxation, the creation of a constitution and the abolition of serfdom.¹³⁹ In contrast, Russia too experimented with *cahier*-like petitions in 1905, largely dominated by the desire for a legislative assembly, the Duma.¹⁴⁰ These petitions failed to rouse even a legislative assembly from out of Tsarist autocratic hands; the petitions were dismissed on the grounds of being too revolutionary. As such, the Russian experience of the public sphere and of representative governance was much lacking by 1905, although an easily pacified advisory Duma was established. Workers took to the streets and strikes were frequent, only to be put down by the tragic events of Bloody Sunday: violence had yet again prevailed. In the interim, the issues of Bolshevik militancy compiled and were agitated still by another calamitous violent affair, the First World War. Soldiers returning from the front in 1917 provided weaponry and military experience in the February Revolution and subsequent October Revolution. Populist and Bolshevik

we thought the measures proper, and that we could not think of new taxes unless we knew the returns of expenditure and the plans of economy”; Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, as printed in William Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*, (1989), p. 72.

¹³⁹ George V. Taylor, “Revolutionary and Nonrevolutionary Content the Cahiers of 1789: An Interim Report” in *French Historical Studies*, 7.4, (Autumn, 1972), pp. 476-502, p. 497-499.

¹⁴⁰ Andrew Verner, “Discursive Strategies in the 1905 Revolution: Peasant Petitions from Vladimir Province” in *The Russian Review*, 54.1, (Jan., 1995), pp. 65-90.

violence compounded with the returning soldiers led Pete Holquist to conclude:

Soviet Russia was not simply a product of pure ideology, nor of the nature of the Russian village. Bolshevik ideology, sustained by resentments fostered in the late imperial period and exacerbated by the course of 1917, came to structure Soviet state violence. Violence, then, was not either timelessly Russian or the spontaneous product of ideology.¹⁴¹

In this sense, the Russian Revolution was born out of violence, in contrast to the French Revolution which had been born of political debate on state finance and political representation. The events that followed ‘Red October’, the initial free-elections to Russia’s new Council of Soviets and Lenin’s ‘food and land’ speech that swayed the peasant support are also characteristic of Lenin’s understanding that revolution led to civil war. After it became clear that Bolsheviks would not hold the majority of power outside of industrial areas in the November elections, Lenin simply ousted his opponents. Bolshevik power seizure was seen as vital to re-implement the Constituent Assembly, the true organ of representative liberal democracy, but the election loss was branded as unfair by Lenin as the Bolsheviks received just 24 percent of the vote. Lenin saw that a liberal, bourgeois assembly would have brought the class struggle to a head, and the assembly would have only been abolished by civil war; by November 1917, the Bolshevik minority had seized power violently, as political dialogue had failed.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Peter Holquist, “Violent Russia, Deadly Marxism? Russian in the Epoch of Violence, 1905-1921” in *Kritika Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 4.3, (June, 2003), pp.627-652, p. 652.

¹⁴² Orlando Figes, *Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991*, (2014), p. 135-136.

Lenin's Revolution was not akin to the expelled Third Estate majority of 1789 forming the National Assembly, but a violent and conspiratorial affair that saw the overthrow of political discourse in Russian until at least 1991. Therefore, it is easy to conclude that the failure during the eighteenth century to create a united liberal political sphere caused by a failure to establish a widespread public sphere, or *obshchevsto*, and the arbitrary nature of autocracy, left Russian Populism and Marxism to descend into violence, culminating in a violent seizure of power by a minority party in 1917: Violence had hijacked political discourse and only war could ensue.

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**Discuss the ways in which Jimmy Carter offered the USA
a different Foreign Policy agenda.**

Hamish Grundy – AM-240

In 2011, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden is reported to have affirmed in a conversation with the Chinese President, Xi Jinping that ‘no President of the United States could represent the United States were he not committed to human rights... it doesn’t make us better or worse. It’s who we are.’¹⁴³ Biden’s assertion that this commitment to human rights is ‘who we are’ owes itself to the policies and commitment of Jimmy Carter. Although Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were responsible for bringing it to the attention of the international community through the Helsinki Accords, Carter made it clear that human rights would be central to American actions abroad.¹⁴⁴ David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker note that Jimmy Carter sought to ‘re-direct American foreign policy away from the logic and policy of containment’, which had been the corner stone that presidents had built their foreign policy around since 1947.¹⁴⁵ He stated that human rights were a ‘fundamental tenet of our foreign policy.’¹⁴⁶ His pursuance of a strategy that he believed would ‘regain the moral stature that we [the United States] once had’ ensured a

¹⁴³ Evan Osnos. *Born Red: How Xi Jinping, and unremarkable provincial administrator, became China’s most authoritarian leader since Mao*, *The New Yorker* (April 6, 2015)

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ David F. Schmitz, Vanessa Walker, Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 28:1 (January 2004), pp. 113-144 (p.119).

¹⁴⁶ Jimmy Carter, University of Notre Dame: Address at Commencement Exercises at the University," May 22, 1977.

new agenda for foreign Policy.¹⁴⁷ It should be noted that Carter avidly pursued arm limitations with the Soviet Union through SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), and continued to strengthen links with China. However, human rights as Biden demonstrated, is now part-and-parcel of U.S. thinking and policy abroad and Jimmy Carter's greatest contribution to American policy during his presidency.

Carter's stance on human rights resulted in three different approaches to the way American conducted its foreign policy. First, American actions against those who rejected their human rights framework was imposed on American allies. Although critics continuously noted Carter's inconsistency towards this policy, he ensured that pro-American rulers and dictators were not given aid or support until they actively changed their oppressive policies towards their citizens. If they did not, Carter accepted that a change of approach was necessary.

Second, he endorsed a frank approach towards the Soviet Union. He gave exposure to dissidents, which in turn gave them a voice to show the USSR's violations and treatment of its people. Additionally the boycott of the Olympic Games further exposed treatment of human rights groups to the international community. This type of exposure would reduce the appeal of communism.

Third, Carter attempted to promote global interdependence. He wanted to move away from the East-West divide, as well as militarism and containment that came with it. This was promoted in his attempts to create better links with Latin America and Africa, but he also used this view to promote

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

peace in the hostile Middle-East region. Carter's promotion of regionalism within his policies developed from human rights in the attempt to address issues on their merit and not within a Cold War sphere. Issues would be dealt with for the people of the region, and not for American gain.

The Carter administration entered a new stage in American ideals when it began to challenge allied countries over human rights. Previous administrations had been willing to turn a blind eye to pro-American leaders who committed atrocities. However, Carter began to impose himself on countries that he believed were violating the principles that he set out in his quest to make the United States a morally just country. Carter ensured this was made known to the world in his inaugural address, proclaiming:

‘because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights.’¹⁴⁸

He further attests in his memoirs ‘when our own friends committed serious violations of Human Rights, their abuses would have to be acknowledged, and they would have to be encouraged to change their policies.’¹⁴⁹ Countries including Ethiopia, Uruguay, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and South Africa suffered ‘major setback’ as a result of Carter’s

¹⁴⁸ Jimmy Carter: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1977.

¹⁴⁹ Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (University of Arkansas Press: Arkansas, 1995), p.148.

attitude.¹⁵⁰ His administration was willing to cut economic and military aid in an attempt to squeeze change from governments. In South Africa, the Carter administration suggested that ‘without a peaceful change of policy of apartheid now, any venture in South Africa is a risky and insecure investment.’¹⁵¹ Although previous administrations had voiced concerns in regards to South Africa’s policies, Carter’s was first to stop aid to an ally over concerns for its human rights. His willingness to cut ties with pro-American states, especially ones that mined plutonium, attests to the commitment of the administration to ensure American allies adhered to American policies as it promoted its morality in the international arena.

Similarly, Carter refused to aid the Somoza government in Nicaragua. Here he used human rights ‘as a yardstick and rejected American intervention.’¹⁵² The Somoza regime had been long-term allies of the U.S., but he was also an oppressive ruler. In the wake of an uprising by the Sandinista guerrillas, Carter explained that ‘our effort was to let the people of Nicaragua ultimately make a decision on who should be their leader, what form of government they should

¹⁵⁰ Douglas Brinkley, *The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The ‘Hands on Legacy’ Legacy of Our Thirty-ninth President*, *Diplomatic History*, Vol 20:4 (Fall, 1996), pp.505-529, (p.521).

¹⁵¹ Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the President of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978: Book I – January 1 To June 30, 1978* (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1979), p.657.

¹⁵² David F. Shmitz, Vanessa Walker, *Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy*, p.142.

have.¹⁵³ Thus he refused to bolster Somoza with U.S. military aid in order for the Nicaraguan people to be able to influence change in the country by opposing their leaders, something the U.S. had been trying to push for in the region. Moreover, in light of uprisings against his rule, Somoza had instigated a series of oppressive measures including censorship of press, and imprisoning and torturing anyone who opposed him.¹⁵⁴ This, combined with the attempts to allow democracy to take hold in Nicaragua, meant the Carter administration refused to get involved militarily. Although they initially supplied aid and advice to Somoza in the hope he would resign peacefully, they eventually cut off all ties with him and allowed the pro-American dictator to become overthrown by the anti-American Sandinista's. While members of congress heavily criticized this move, it shows Carter's commitment to human rights in countries whose citizens were oppressed by pro-American governments.

Carter continued his approach to human rights by using a different approach towards the Soviet Union. It involved confronting them directly on the international stage. The administration saw dissidents, émigrés, and political prisoners as an important focus.¹⁵⁵ By concentrating on individuals, the Carter administration was putting faces to large-scale

¹⁵³ Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of The Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1979, Book II – June 23 To December 31, 1979* (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1980), p.1308.

¹⁵⁴ Betty Glad, *Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2009), p.243.

¹⁵⁵ Mary E. Stukeley, *Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and the National Agenda* (Texas A&M University Press, 2008), p.121.

struggles in an attempt to show suffering to the international community, thus pressuring the Soviet Union to change its internal policies. Dissidents including Andrei Sakharov, Vladimir Bukovsky had correspondence with Carter or visited the White House, as Carter sought to show his support for their struggles. The administrations invitation to Soviet dissidents was viewed by the USSR as interfering with their domestic affairs.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, critics often show this as being counter-productive to other issues between the countries. Cyril Vance was worried such a stance would force a wedge in the relations between the two countries when confronted with larger issues.¹⁵⁷ Yet Carter himself noted that ‘I cannot recall any instance when the human-rights issue was the *direct* cause of failure in working with the Soviet on matters of common interest.’¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the agitation shown by the Soviets towards U.S. policy demonstrates the potential for international embarrassment that faced them. The shift in policy to focus directly at the Soviets created exposure to problems that would otherwise remain undocumented. Carter’s attention to Soviet human rights, in particular on their treatment of dissidents, ‘became an important element of the executive branch’s approach to weakening the international appeal of Soviet-style socialism’.¹⁵⁹ Carter’s vision for a ‘reciprocal détente’ put pressure on the Soviet leaders to

¹⁵⁶ Mary E. Stuckey, *Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and the National Agenda* (Texas A&M University Press, 2008), p.121.

¹⁵⁷ Betty Glad, *Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy*, p51.

¹⁵⁸ Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, p.153/4

¹⁵⁹ Christian Philip Peterson, The Carter Administration and the Promotion of Human Rights in the Soviet Union 1977-1981, *Diplomatic History* Vol.38:3 (2014), pp.629-656 (p.630).

address human rights and accept accords with the United States over global issues.¹⁶⁰

Further, in light of correspondence between the administration and Soviet human rights groups, the U.S. government sought to boycott the Olympic Games. Although this is regarded as a stance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter shows that in the lead up to the games the Soviet authorities had ‘launched a tough, intensive crackdown against human rights organizations...in a long term effort to impose political conformity, but also part of a specific, pre-Olympic “vigilance” campaign’.¹⁶¹ The government, therefore, was well aware of human rights violations and consequently, ‘participation in the Moscow Olympics... would also have the effect of ignoring a major...crackdown against human rights activists.’¹⁶² The boycott openly exposed the Soviet internal issues and developed the United States as a morally aware state by refusing to participate. In the struggle to win hearts and minds of countries around the world, Carter’s human rights policies challenged the Soviet Union in an area that affected all. For people under oppressive leadership it sought to enlighten and embolden them against such rule. For nations that were seeking aid from communist or capitalist countries it identified potential issues that could be thrust upon them if they followed a communist path. In turn, this strategy meant the U.S. could combat communism through words rather than actions while attempting to promote the administration’s regionalist ideals that would allow for global independence.

¹⁶⁰ *ibid.* p.634.

¹⁶¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, NSC Weekly Report #144, June 6, 1980 p.2.

¹⁶² *ibid.*,p.3.

With human rights as its moral core, Carter promoted the idea of global independence. The Carter administration wanted to move away from the principle of containment. They rejected the East-West dichotomy of Kissinger's linkage theory, which tied Africa and other regions of the Third World to the central question of U.S.-Soviet relations.¹⁶³ 'Problems in that world, Vance stressed, had to be dealt with "on their own terms, and not through the prism of East-West competition."' ¹⁶⁴ The regionalist concept was essential for the Carter administration in its attempts to promote human rights case-by-case. The Third World countries held particular importance as the administration attempted to bring an end to white-supremacy rule. Moreover, the surest way to combat Soviet and Cuban expansion in the region was American support for majority rule, human rights, and economic development.¹⁶⁵ The U.S. stance on the independence of African countries was 'based on three fundamental principles: fair and free elections...an irreversible transition to genuine majority rule and independence... [and] respect for individual rights of all the citizens of an independent Zimbabwe.'¹⁶⁶ By backing countries individual human rights, especially in the Third World, the administration took on a different approach to combating Communism. By promoting human rights by

¹⁶³ Paul E. Masters, Carter and the Rhodesian Problem, *International Social Science Review*, Vol.75:3/4 (2000), pp23-33 (p.25).

¹⁶⁴ Cyril Vance in Walter LaFeber's *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to the Present* (Norton: New York; London, 1994), p.681.

¹⁶⁵ Paul E. Masters, Carter and the Rhodesian Problem, p.30

¹⁶⁶ Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the President of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978: Book I – January 1 To June 30, 1978*, p.647.

region the US could understand the needs of a particular country and therefore focus on establishing credible change that affected the people and allowed the administration to achieve a clear diplomatic victory.¹⁶⁷

This approach was also imposed during the Arab-Israeli conflict. This area in particular had been prime area for conflict since World War II and the 1973 Yom Kippur War almost drew the Soviets and U.S. into conflict with each other. As Israel was a key ally of the United States it was vital to ensure the region was stabilized to prevent further conflicts that could ruin any attempts to maintain détente and weapon treaties. The regionalist approach by the administration and the input of Carter to ensure a peace agreement was reached and thus another Arab-Israeli war was averted.¹⁶⁸ Diplomacy rather than troops were used to secure agreements and therefore creating, albeit temporarily, hope for peace in the region.

Additionally, the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty gave greater autonomy to Panama and therefore reduced American control. This is important, especially concerning the right to rule unaided or free from the clutches of another country; in this case the United States. The Treaty handed power to the Panama government – although with U.S. military protection if needed – and therefore allowed for a betterment of relations between the U.S. and Panama. Walter LaFeber even suggested it was ‘the most significant victory in U.S.- Latin American relations since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s good

¹⁶⁷ Paul E. Masters, *Carter and the Rhodesian Problem*, p.31.

¹⁶⁸ Douglas Brinkley, *The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The ‘Hands on Legacy’ Legacy of Our Thirty-ninth President*, p.510.

neighbor policies.’¹⁶⁹ Indeed, Carter claimed that the treaty would ‘ensure...a partnership with them, protecting the interests of America, protecting the interests of Panama’ and allowing the Panamanians the ‘opportunity to learn how to operate the canal.’¹⁷⁰ It would not be complete autonomy, however it would ensure Panama had more say and control within their own territory. This was important given the rise of nationalism in the region at the time and the fear that uprisings may begin to occur in the region. Ultimately, the administration’s belief, certainly in the first two years of Carter’s term, in regionalism and that less attention should be given to the struggles with the Soviet Union were driven by the belief in human rights. Carter’s conviction that countries should be allowed to make decision for themselves and not be ruled over by larger powers meant he ‘was determined to move away from the pattern of American dominance and intervention in Latin America and ‘promote balanced relationships’ as part of ‘a more realistic and lasting Hemisphere policy.’¹⁷¹

To conclude, Jimmy Carter offered the United States a different approach to foreign policy by rejecting containment and making human rights a central focus. Although circumstances around the globe forced him to change his

¹⁶⁹ Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to the Present* (Norton: New York; London, 1994), p.688.

¹⁷⁰ Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the President of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978: Book I – January 1 To June 30, 1978*, p.84.

¹⁷¹ John A. Soares Jr., Strategy, ideology, and Human Rights: Jimmy Carter Confronts the Left in Central America, 1979-1981, *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol.8:4 (Fall, 2006), pp.57-91 (p.66).

rhetoric in attempt to counter the Soviet attack in Afghanistan, before, Carter had ‘championed a post-Cold War foreign policy before the Cold War was over.’¹⁷² His policy moved away from the ideal of East-West competition and containment while promoting American power for the betterment of the globe. By endorsing human rights Carter was attempting to bring peace and stability. He moved attention away from the Soviets and sought to resolve issues in regions through diplomacy. His promotion of peace brought morality back into American policy that aligned more with ideals of freedom and liberty, which had been severely dampened following Vietnam and Watergate. As Herring notes, ‘Carter’s emphasis on Human Rights contributed to improving the global image of the United States. It gave the issue of international credibility, helping to set the agenda for world politics for the next decade.’¹⁷³ He advocated for majority rule in Southern Africa to remove white supremacy and give a voice to the mass populations. Moreover, the attempt to give greater autonomy to Panama, and allow for the democratic process to transpire in Nicaragua was an endeavor to improve relations with Latin American countries. His admirable attempts to bring peace in the increasingly hostile middle-east region were based on the administrations regionalist ideals, rather than global. Peace, of course, was in the U.S. interests, but it was also vital to ensure people in the region could attempt to live without fear and war. The human rights approach to the Soviet Union marked a stark contrast to

¹⁷² Douglas Brinkley, *Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The ‘Hands on Legacy’ Legacy of Our Thirty-ninth President*, p.522.

¹⁷³ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford University Press: Oxford; New York), p.847.

previous administrations. As attested by Douglas Brinkley ‘Carter’s human rights policy did dent the Soviet armor, contributing significantly to the Kremlin’s legitimate demise.’¹⁷⁴ Carter’s evocation of the Final Act to question the USSR directly, established a moral framework for Reagan to use when determining the USSR as an evil empire. America’s role as peacekeeper and protector of moral values that Biden expressed to Xi, are a result of the policies put into place by Jimmy Carter.

¹⁷⁴ Douglas Brinkley, *Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The ‘Hands on Legacy’ Legacy of Our Thirty-ninth President*, p.522.

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**What were the main military lessons learned from the Franco-Prussian war, the Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese War and how were these later applied?
Edward Kershaw - HUA-102**

This essay will discuss the lessons that were learnt from the experiences of the Franco-Prussian war, the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese war and examine the extent to which these lessons were subsequently put in to practice, not only by those nations who participated in these wars, but also by those who observed both the conduct and the outcome of these different types of warfare.

During the Franco-Prussian War, the main military lesson that was learnt was the value of conscription and the ability of the German states to call upon large, well trained military reserves. These reserves proved vital in providing the initial numerical superiority enjoyed by the Prussian army as it crossed into France in the beginning of August with 370,000 troops in comparison to the 240,000 French troops¹⁷⁵ in a war that would eventually see the mobilisation of 2 million French troops and 1.5 million German Troops.¹⁷⁶ This fact was further emphasised by the slow mobilisation of French reserves, which in July only managed 4,000 men in comparison to the Germans who had the ability to mobilise some 1 million reserves.¹⁷⁷ The lesson that regular armies had been surpassed by massed forces of small regular armies bolstered with that of large reserves was applied by many nations across Europe. In France during the war Freycinet

¹⁷⁵Brian Bond. *War And Society In Europe 1870 - 1970*. (London: Fontana Press, 1988). P.17

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. P.16

¹⁷⁷Geoffrey Wawro. *The Franco-Prussian War*. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007). P.75

carried out the conscription of skilled civilians.¹⁷⁸ In the period between 1871 and 1914 almost all continental powers, as well as the Japanese, adopted a form of conscription.¹⁷⁹ Most notably, Britain however did not adopt the policy of due to the nature and role of the British army as a force that largely garrisoned imperial holdings.¹⁸⁰

The Franco-Prussian War also seemed to highlight the necessity of a general staff as it was argued that it was one of the most important factors in German victory due to their extensive planning in preparation for war with France. During the 1860s in the years precluding the war, Helmuth von Moltke had sent members of the Prussian General staff to France in order to study France's eastern forts, map Alsace and Lorraine, as well as the calculation of the food stocks of French cities.¹⁸¹ The failures of the French General staff also come from lack of mapping undertaken, so much so that efforts to produce better maps were stopped as it was decided that it would be cheaper for officers to purchase road maps from book shops instead. Many nations saw the great advantage of having a Prussian style general staff and adopted similar systems. Japan, under the guidance of the Germans followed suit with the chief of staff being responsible to the Emperor rather than that of the Imperial Diet.¹⁸² The French too adopted a German style general staff in 1874 in response to the perceived advantages that it lent the Prussians.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁸ Brian Bond. P.23

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. P.32

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. P. 38

¹⁸¹ Geoffrey Wawro. P.47-48

¹⁸² Eugene O. Porter "The Evolution Of The General Staff". *The Historian* 8.1 (1945): 26-45 P.34

¹⁸³ Ibid. P.35

The importance of utilising technology to its fullest potential also came to prominence during the Franco-Prussian War, which highlighted its great logistical value. This manifested itself in numerous different ways. The importance of utilising technology to its fullest extent also came to prominence with developments such as the railway system, as well as breech loading rifles. Prussia gained significant advantages through its efficient use of the railways in the mobilisation of troops as the general staff had a railway section that was in charge of troop movements.¹⁸⁴ The French had no such equivalent and as such, while the Germans could move fifty trains a day to the French border, the French could only manage twelve.¹⁸⁵ The superior French Chassepot rifle's advantages were negated by poor French tactics.¹⁸⁶ Whilst the importance of technology played a large role in the Franco Prussian War, some ignored the lessons that were learnt. In 1887 the Prussian War Minister decided not to buy new artillery and instead suggested the resources should be spent on improving morale and leadership saying: 'one can have too much artillery'.¹⁸⁷ New technology was also developed in response to the war, notably the rapid firing French 75mm in 1898, as well as the Maxim gun in 1885 in response to the potential of the French Mitrailieuse.¹⁸⁸

The infantry and cavalry both struggled at the outbreak of the war. The marksmanship and accuracy of the Boers and their Mauser rifles taught the British the value of marksmanship as it had not been so much of a factor during smaller colonial wars, often against those who possessed no or very few rifles. In order to attempt to remedy the poor

¹⁸⁴ Geoffrey Wawro. P.48

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. P.74

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. P.105

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. P.306

¹⁸⁸ Brian Bond. P.42

accuracy of British soldiers there was increased rifle training for both the cavalry and infantry who were trained to fire fifteen aimed shots in a minute, known as the 'mad minute'.¹⁸⁹ In 1903, 300 rounds of ammunition were also allocated to each man for practice each year, although this did fall to 250 rounds per man in 1906 as surplus from the Boer War was running out; this was still far greater than of those on the continent.¹⁹⁰ The Artillery suffered from a lack of experience of modern warfare in the beginning with artillery primarily being used in support of the infantry, requiring being positioned in the open and firing directly at the enemy in order to suppress them.¹⁹¹ This taught the artillery of the need to conceal their positions in order to try to avoid Boer artillery and rifle fire. Another lesson was the need for the coordination of artillery fire and infantry, where after failures such as the battle of Magersfontein the artillery had done nothing to weaken the Boer position, leaving the infantry pinned down by Boer marksmanship.¹⁹² As a result of these failures, the artillery adapted their tactics and instead adopted that of a creeping barrage. This meant artillery would continue to fire until the last possible moment when the infantry would be almost on the enemy position, giving the defenders no time to prepare a robust defence. This was used with considerable success at the battle of Tugela.¹⁹³ This however was difficult

¹⁸⁹ Spencer Jones, *From Boer War To World War*. (Norman: Univ of Oklahoma Press, 2013). P.268

¹⁹⁰ Spencer Jones. "The Influence Of The Boer War (1899 – 1902) On The Tactical Development Of The Regular British Army 1902 – 1914". (University of Wolverhampton, 2009).P.79

¹⁹¹ Denis Judd and Keith Terrance Surridge. *The Boer War*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) P.64

¹⁹² Michael Carver. *The National Army Museum Book Of The Boer War*. (London: Pan Books in association with the National Army Museum, 2000) P.34

¹⁹³ Denis Judd and Keith Terrance Surridge. P.170

to implement and practice, resulting in difficulty in the early stages of the First World War which somewhat undermined the experience.

Perhaps the most important lesson that was learnt by the British in the Boer war was that of the empty battlefield. The Black Week saw General Buller's casualties reach 143 killed, 755 wounded and 240 captured.¹⁹⁴ The inadequacy of British training was exposed when the army came up against a sophisticated enemy such as the Boers with tactics such as volley fire and favouring obedience to commands rather than initiative.¹⁹⁵ During the campaign as a result of Boer marksmanship and their guerrilla tactics the British began to adopt the empty battlefield policy which encouraged the use of cover to mask their position and thus reduce the risk of enemy fire. The lessons learnt from the Boers' use of Guerrilla tactics resulted in the British adopting the tactics of concentration camps and scorched earth policies.¹⁹⁶ This was designed to restrict the movement of the highly mobile Boer Commandos; destroy access to supporters who could provide food; and contain the wives and children of the Boers who could be used as leverage in order to force the Boers to surrender.¹⁹⁷

One of the most important lessons from the land campaign during the Russo-Japanese war was that of the power of machine guns in entrenched positions. Many nations ignored the lessons that could have been learnt about the nature of machine guns and the use of entrenched positions. There were lessons also about the new nature that warfare was to take following the Russo-Japanese war, fighting on broad

¹⁹⁴ Michael Craver. P.49

¹⁹⁵ Denis Judd and Keith Terrance Surridge. P.63

¹⁹⁶ Michael Craver. P.220

¹⁹⁷ Michael Craver. P.221

fronts that lasted many days that would produce high numbers of casualties and rarely decisive victory.¹⁹⁸ The value of the machine gun was not learnt initially and took time to come into widespread service.¹⁹⁹ Lessons related to the use of artillery include the use of indirect fire by using a high angle of attack to bombard positions in order to suppress machine guns. This also, therefore, changed the types of ammunition that were used; from fragmentation shells to high explosives which were capable of breaking up entrenched machine gun emplacements as well as entrenched infantry.²⁰⁰ Despite what the Russo-Japanese war had shown, the lessons of indirect fire through high angle attack were not heeded resulting in a short supply of howitzers capable of such firing during the First World War. The British had only 18 such guns in an infantry division, the Germans with twelve, the Russians with three, and the French with none.²⁰¹

The lesson that the Battle of Tsushima seemed to reinforce was that of the battleship being the ultimate force in naval warfare; evident in the success that the Japanese had with the destruction of the Russian fleet. However, not all of the conclusions that were drawn from the conflict were uniform and there was much debate within the Royal Navy about the direction of the fleet. Admiral Fisher argued that instead of the construction of a small group of incredibly powerful battleships, the difficulty that the Japanese faced when attempting to destroy the Russian fleet whilst at port instead proved the need for submarines. In his letters to the

¹⁹⁸ John W. Steinberg. "Was The Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?". *The Russian Review* 67.1 (2008): 1-7. P.21

¹⁹⁹ Charles Townshend. *The Oxford History of Modern War* (Oxford University Press, 2005) P.117

²⁰⁰ Hew Strachan, *European Armies And The Conduct Of War*. (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1983). P.117

²⁰¹ *Ibid.* P.137

Prime Minister about using submarine warfare offensively and defensively, he outlined how the use of submarines would revolutionise the war at sea.²⁰² The destruction of Russia as a naval power resulted in debate in Britain about the need for the two-power which aimed to have a larger fleet than the next two powers combined.²⁰³ Following the Russo-Japanese war, the Germans put increasing effort into the creation of a fleet designed to rival that of the British Home Fleet. This resulted in Germany's naval budget increasing from £7 million in 1900 to £20 million in 1910, an increase of 65%, whilst at the same time the army's budget only increased by 25%.²⁰⁴ This military build-up ultimately did not transcribe with the realities of modern naval warfare and was not to be repeated, this can be most clearly be seen at the battle of Jutland in the First World War where a clash of capital ships failed to produce a decisive outcome for either side.²⁰⁵

In conclusion, there were numerous different lessons that could have been learnt from the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese War. Whilst many of these lessons later resulted in changing tactics and equipment, there were a great many lessons that were ignored or flawed conclusions drawn, such as that of the power of the battleship following the Battle of Tsushima or the necessity of a general staff. Many lessons were only adopted by those who could afford to alter their military strategies. Russia for example, could not apply many of the lessons from the Russo-Japanese war due to their near bankruptcy. For many of the lessons it took the First World War for entrenched prejudices to be expelled and new technology and thinking to be adopted.

²⁰² Rotem Knowner *The Impact Of The Russo-Japanese War*. (London, Routledge, 2010).P.283

²⁰³ Ibid. P.271

²⁰⁴ Brian Bond P.54

²⁰⁵ Rotem Knowner 285

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Assess the role of humanitarian assistance in conflicts.

Leo Sykes - HUA-306

Aid institutions and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) appear to people across the globe, and within conflict zones, as the knight in shining armour. They appear to represent the best side of humanity through promoting peace, safeguarding the poor, the needy and the defenceless. There is a growing debate however, that humanitarian assistance (or aid) exacerbates the conflict and lengthens the hardships of those they aim to support. The thesis of this paper is that humanitarian assistance is required in almost every situation it is involved with. However, this aid is not solely beneficial, it will also bring about negative impacts if abused or mismanaged. This essay aims to identify these negative aspects of humanitarian aid and address the impact they will have on the recipients. These impacts instigate debate over the success of humanitarian aid, whether the negative impacts are in comparison to the positives and what the possible solutions may be. Humanitarian aid is the subject of emotive debate; the scenarios in which it is required often leave solely positive outcomes impossible. To contextualise the negatives of humanitarian assistance, Somalia from 1991 to 1995 will be used as a case study.

In order to understand the arguments about humanitarian aid, a clear definition is required. This paper defines humanitarian assistance as:

Aid that seeks to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian

principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, as stated in General Assembly Resolution 46/182.²⁰⁶

The Somalian Crisis started when President Siad Barre was overthrown in January 1991. The outcome of this was clan warfare and a battle for power between the factions supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid.²⁰⁷ The conflict caused a poor harvest; resulting in a famine that swept through the country: “almost 4.5 million people in Somalia, over half of the estimated population were threatened by severe malnutrition and malnutrition-related disease”.²⁰⁸ This constituted humanitarian action by United Nations (U.N.) institutions and NGOs.

The first negative impact that arises with the provision of humanitarian aid, that this essay will address, is the problems that can surface through the provision of food aid. Food aid is mainly used as an emergency relief. The “proportion of World Food Program Emergency operations due to “man-made disasters” rose from 35% (1975) to 95% (1993)”.²⁰⁹ It is designed to safeguard the nutritional status of humans and preserve life.²¹⁰ With the fighting occurring within Somalia and a famine rampaging through the country

²⁰⁶ Reliefweb Project, 'RELIEFWEB GLOSSARY OF HUMANITARIAN TERMS' 2008.

²⁰⁷ United Nations, *UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I) - background (full text)*, <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html#four>> [accessed 6 December 2016]

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Frances Stewart, 'Food aid during conflict: Can One reconcile its humanitarian, economic, and political economy effects?', *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, iii, 80 (1998), 560–565

²¹⁰ Ibid.

“in 1992 the ICRC estimated that 95 percent of Somalis were suffering from malnutrition”.²¹¹ The U.N. initially implemented the 100-day programme to deal with the crisis, it was beneficial however, the scope of the crisis grew too large and complex for the programme to effectively deal with. Therefore, the relief mission continued to evolve in scale and complexity with the crisis, the U.N. implemented United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) “authorized by resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August”²¹², to provide the humanitarian assistance “there is little question that the intervention stabilized ongoing aid efforts and eased the work of relief workers”²¹³. However, it was not a final solution to the crisis. The humanitarian assistance operation preceded to evolve into Operation Restore Hope with the intervention of U.S. and U.N. troops acting as protection for aid against banditry and increasing the levels of health and food aid provided. This next step of humanitarian assistance and military intervention that took place in Somalia is a notorious case within the aid community and the subject of many debates over whether the relief mission and military intervention caused more harm than good.

Critics of Operation Restore Hope argue on the other hand, that U.N. assistance came too late, as there was a successful harvest in 1992 and private aid agencies had filled in the majorities of the populaces need for food. This resulted in the U.N. aid package being distributed in an already

²¹¹ Thomas G Weiss and Cindy Collins, *Humanitarian challenges and intervention: World politics and the dilemmas of help* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996)

²¹² United Nations, *UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I)*

²¹³ Marion Nestle and Sharron Dalton, 'Food aid and international hunger crises: The United States in Somalia', *Agriculture and Human Values*, iv, 11 (1994b), 19–27.

saturated market. The effect of this had an extremely negative impact on Somalia's food market; "the distribution of rice, wheat and sorghum at no or low cost was depressing the market for locally grown corn".²¹⁴ This meant that the foreign aid was undercutting the local farmers. This problem was compounded with the issue that the food aid provided was from external sources, meaning the Somalians were eating food that they were not familiar with, these foods were also ones that Somalian farmers were unable to grow locally as "Commentators noticed that Somalis had become accustomed to the rice used in the feeding kitchens and were no longer interested in eating locally grown corn or sorghum".²¹⁵ There was a drop-in demand for local produce which led to the Somalian economy shrinking. This, in turn, led to an increase in levels of poverty in the country. The result of that was the Somalian farmers experienced a fall in revenue and were unable to grow the crops that were in high demand, such as rice. This led to food shortages further down the line, prolonged the suffering experienced due to the hunger crisis and extended the length that the humanitarian assistance was required in the country.

It was clear that the emergency food was beneficial to the recipients in Somalia in the short run, alleviating severe malnourishment and malnutrition. The complexity of the emergency that was present in Somalia in 1992 was that "none of the well-established conditions for effective use of emergency aid were -early intervention, coordinated implementation, and functioning mechanisms for distribution were present in Somalia in late 1992".²¹⁶ Effectively, these were barriers stopping an efficient food relief programme

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

from occurring when the situation in Somalia had reached a critical point as the U.N. and the U.S were unable to efficiently deal with the crisis. Critics of the humanitarian assistance argue that “Ultimately the intervention caused harm to the Somali people”²¹⁷.

A more effective form of relief that would have perhaps proved positive towards the Somalian hunger crisis, would have been cash packages over food aid. As cash can act as a positive injection into the local economy, encouraging business networks between traders, it does not act as a form of competition to farmers; which the foreign food aid did.²¹⁸ Although a benefit of food aid over cash aid is that it is more equal in terms of gender, as the women in African culture generally handle the food whilst the males handle the cash, therefore cash packages can potentially only be used to serve male interests.²¹⁹

This leads to the next issue that arises when humanitarian assistance is provided to emergency situations. The aid becomes a target from warring factions as it represents economic wealth and political power in a conflict, which can be used to one’s advantage acting as leverage; because people who engage in war will always seek to control it. David Smock stated that warring factions gain access to these supplies through thievery or imposing taxes²²⁰, taking either the aid itself or cash payments to allow aid agencies to

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Martin Whiteside, 'Realistic rehabilitation', *Development in Practice*, ii, 6 (1996), 121–128.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ David R Smock, 'Humanitarian assistance and conflict in Africa' 2003.

access the civilians as “resources under the control of one or another warring faction help buttress the power and continuing legacy of that warring faction” aggravating instead of solving conflict.²²¹ This fuels the conflict and contributes to the factions ‘war economy’. Evidence of this is shown in Somalia where UNOSOM were fired upon and had their vehicles stolen in Mogadishu²²² and that “large sums of cash and relief aid were being extorted from donor agencies and organizations”.²²³ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that:

the level of diversion by the factions had reached a systematic and planned level, that it was integrated into the war strategy.... It had become obvious that the factions were opening the doors to humanitarian aid, up to the point where all the sophisticated logistics had entered the zones: cars, radios, computers, telephones. When all the stuff was there, then the looting would start in a quite systematic way.²²⁴

Supporters of aid agencies argue that these thefts and taxation of supplies do not contribute a massive amount to faction’s war economies as, much of the loot stolen, finds its way into the local markets, which then have the effect of lowering prices thus making goods more affordable to the poor, this

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² United Nations, *UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I)* -

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Sarah Kenyon Lischer, 'Collateral damage: Humanitarian assistance as a cause of conflict', *International Security*, i, 28 (2003), 79–109.

effect aid workers call 'Traditional distribution'.²²⁵ On the other hand, critics of this response argue that these defenders of aid overlook the "nonmonetary benefits of humanitarian aid as a resource of war" as it can give factions the appearance of legitimacy which strengthens its cause and can lead to a conflict being prolonged due to the public favouring the faction that is feeding them cheap food.²²⁶ Defenders of aid would retort by saying the amount of aid stolen is only a small fraction of the overall amount that reaches the population.²²⁷ A rather shocking figure from a report from Thomas Weiss stressed that "Estimates claim that 40 to 80 percent of the nearly sixty thousand metric tons of emergency food rations per month that arrived in Somalia in 1992 never reached the victims of the civil war and famine".²²⁸ Critics of the previous point would say that all aid matters, as that aid stolen could have been put to better use in another emergency.

Humanitarian assistance can also inadvertently present an ethical message to the local recipients, when aid workers use armed guards to protect themselves and the aid packages it seems to present the notion that there is a need for arms to attain admittance to supplies.²²⁹ This ultimately promotes the further use of weapons in society which only adds fuel to the fires of conflict. On the other hand, there is

²²⁵ Jeffrey Gettleman, 'Allegations of food aid theft Resurface in Somalia', *Africa*, 11 September 2014.

²²⁶ Sarah Kenyon Lischer, 79–109.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Thomas G Weiss and Cindy Collins, *Humanitarian challenges and intervention: World politics and the dilemmas of help* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996),

²²⁹ Mary B. Anderson, *Do no harm: How aid can support peace - or war* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

the argument that by working closely with local institutions in the recipient countries of aid relief, it builds up trust with the community rendering armed protection unnecessary. As illustrated by “the red cross, working closely with its Somalian counterpart (the red crescent), was able to unload and deliver food aid throughout the crisis without any need for military protection”.²³⁰ Another ethical message shown to the local people of an emergency proposed by Anderson, is one that cooperation is not important and it is reinforced by the “diversity of aid agencies in terms of long-and short-term goals, political agendas, religious stances and other differences in outlook, field workers often fail to cooperate with each other”.²³¹ Harmony and cooperation between people are vital in the pursuit of peace in a conflict so here lies another negative impact that Humanitarian assistance involuntarily brings with it.

The arguments presented in this essay show that humanitarian assistance does also provide negative contributions that would not be present if was no assistance were to be given at all, such as, the ethical messages spread by humanitarian assistance, aid acting as competition in local markets as seen in Somalia, whereby it depresses the local markets and undercuts the local farmers. Also, the aid relief draws fighting to itself, as warring factions always seeks to control them for their own political purposes and to act as a source of funding to carry on their war agendas. Whilst these negativities do pose a problem, they should only serve as encouragement to develop humanitarian aid further and iron

²³⁰ Donatella Lorch, 'MISSION TO SOMALIA; red cross won't use U.S. Troop escorts in Somalia', *World*, 20 December 1992.

²³¹ Mary B. Anderson, *Do no harm: How aid can support peace - or war* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

out the mismanagement and flaws that exists within humanitarian aid. It is evident that the distribution of humanitarian aid is still required as an emergency relief to alleviate the suffering that people are experiencing around the globe and these problems are not an excuse to stop the provision of humanitarian aid entirely.

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The Past is never dead, it's not even past" – William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun (1951) What role does memory play in the mythos of the 'Old South'?

Holly Thompson - AM-218

‘There are few areas of the modern world that have bred a regional mythology so potent, so powerful and diverse, even so paradoxical as the American South’.²³² This view, expressed by George B. Tindall brings to focus the ultimate conundrum when extracting the south from its myth and its reality. The South has held on to its traditions and idealistic values of the Old South right up to the present day, making the truth of the region difficult to grasp. Memory has always been the starting blocks of exploring history, however just as it is praised it also has its limitations. The South’s focus on memory has clouded the vision of the South, leaving behind a foggy history of the Old South but a clear myth of the pre-Civil War era clear. To detach the two you must look at three main focus points of how this intermingling of memory and reality came to be intertwined. Through studying how memory was originally used to create a myth, the popular cultures use of the myth and the true history of the era, we can uncover how significantly memory plays in retaining, and continuing the myths of the Old South.

Residents of the South have always been firm believers of the myth of the American South. As Frank E. Vandiver suggests, ‘the idea of the south... belongs in large part to the order of social myth’.²³³ With the collapse of the confederacy

²³² George B. Tindall, *Myth and Southern History: The New South*, ed, Patrick Gerster and Nicholas Cords, (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1989) p.2.

²³³ Frank E. Vandiver, *The Idea of the South*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964) p.1.

in 1865 many sought to remember the South through their own personal immortalisation in reunions. These reunions, particularly those of the Confederate veterans gave them a chance to ‘remember the past and their dead and keep strong bonds of camaraderie’.²³⁴ Veterans of the ill-fated Army of Tennessee met regularly to reminisce the War but also to share memories of the era which they had so fought to keep alive. The sight of ‘the regimental flag, tom and blackened in battle, elicited almost as much emotion from Veterans as did the mention of dead comrades’.²³⁵ These popular ‘veteran reunions’ allowed those who fought in the war to keep the dream of the Confederacy alive and quickly spread into the hearts of the American people. Ethel Moore a contributor to the *Veteran*, wrote into the paper, ‘in the eyes of Southern people all Confederate veterans are heroes. It is you [Confederate Veterans] who preserve the traditions and memories of the old-time South- the sunny south, with its beautiful lands and its happy people... the South that will go down in history as the land of plenty and the home of heroes’.²³⁶ Ultimately these reunions led to the belief that there was ‘a public need for the myth of the South’ and the memory of the ideals of the past.²³⁷ This also reflected the South’s stubbornness to change, and the Civil War reflected this trait of the South that has continued throughout its history. John Franklin observes the fact that, ‘if the South was unwilling to make any significant concessions toward change during the antebellum years, it saw no reason why defeat at the hands of the North during a bloody Civil War

²³⁴ Gary W. Gallagher, *The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History*, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2000) p.105.

²³⁵ *Ibid*, pp.93-94.

²³⁶ Ethel Moore, *Confederate Veterans: VI*, (October 1898), p.489.

²³⁷ Michael O’Brien, *The Idea of the American South 1920-1941*, (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1979) p.27.

should...provide any reason for change'.²³⁸ These reunions therefore allowed the 'Old South' way of life to continue. Gary Gallagher agrees with this idea. Whilst providing varying views in his book of compiled essays he agrees that by keeping the ways of the Old South alive it allowed Southerners to justify their way of life, continuously stating that the 'Confederacy had gone to war over the issue of state's rights' and not on a matter of slavery, an issue that they believed was intrinsic to 'the traditional picture of plantation life'.²³⁹

This strong need to keep the Old ways of South alive through memory, doesn't just end with the generations who saw it however. In many Southern schools 'schoolbooks and educational curricular [were] carefully guard[ing] the old memories' which allowed the myth of the Old South to be converted to history rather than myth.²⁴⁰ By allowing the next generation to 'connect with the past' in this way led to the reality of the Old South and the New South becoming blurred, making it difficult to separate the two.²⁴¹ This rapid spread of Southern mythology was necessary however in allowing the idea of the South to remain standing and to not become sucked in to the new ideas of the North. Richard Hathaway Edmunds, who was among the most versatile of the

²³⁸ John Hope Franklin, *Myth and Southern History: The New South*, ed, Patrick Gerster and Nicholas Cords, (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1989) p.109.

²³⁹ Gallagher, p.95.

Patrick Gerster and Nicholas Cords, *Myth and Southern History: The New South*, ed, Patrick Gerster and Nicholas Cords, (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1989) p.52.

²⁴⁰ Paul M. Gaston, *Myth and Southern History: The New South*, ed, Patrick Gerster and Nicholas Cords, (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1989) p.21.

²⁴¹ Gallagher, p.123.

New South leaders, crusaded timelessly for the industrial order of his day in order for Southerners to never forget their past. In an emotional speech he said,

‘to hold in tenderest reverence the memory of the Southern land: never forget to give all honour to the men and women of ante-bellum days; remember... that the Old South produced a race of men and women whose virtues... are worthy to be enshrine... in every American heart’²⁴²

Edmunds words suggest that this need for memory to maintain the Southern myth is to remember the Southern virtues and way of life to help maintain it for sentimental values. On the contrary William R. Taylor, a professor of Harvard argues that the ‘underlying point is that the desperate, furious myth-making of the period 1820-1860 was the product of a social order increasingly aware of its failure to grow and mature, and increasingly fearful that "Yankees" would exploit that failure’.²⁴³ This varied debate on the reason for this appearance of memory is still widely discussed between historians now, however it is clear that either side of the debate has strengths to its argument. But with the myth of the Old South still prevalent in Southern mentality today, it seems that for either reason, the use of memory in creating and establishing the myth was an intrinsic part of the keeping the Old South alive.

Another way the Old South has kept its virtuous and wholesome image is through the use of media and culture. Re-telling of the South’s story in books and films, whilst seen

²⁴² Gaston, p.23.

²⁴³ Michael W. Schwartz, *The Myth of the Old South*, The Harvard Crimson, (September 1962)
<<http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1962/9/29/the-myth-of-the-old-south/>> [date of access 04/05/15]

through an individual eyes, need an element of memory and legitimacy about them to be widely accepted. These often exaggerated ‘re-telling’s’ of the South’s past, help enormously in keeping the myth of the Old South alive. Most interestingly, Southern history, as both a professional and an amateur pursuit, has largely and consistently been written in the South by Southerners for Southerners and published by Southern Journals and Presses.²⁴⁴ This allows the myth of the South to be contained and kept ridged in its dimensions allowing a variety of novels and other creative outlets to fully capture the myth of the Old South. Firstly, the use of culture to help keep the myth of the past alive allowed the Old South to be romanticised and henceforth idealised by many Southern generations to come. Clement Eaton, an American South historian believes in this view that the South was romanticised due to the media and culture. He argues that ‘the romantic spirit expressed itself most potently in the arts and social matters’.²⁴⁵ Similarly, fellow historical writer, Wilbur Cash agreed that the South was romanticised by novels, however, it was the landscape described that was ‘a sort of cosmic conspiracy against reality in favour of romance’.²⁴⁶ An example of this romantic landscape can be seen in the popular 1936 novel, ‘*Gone with the Wind*’. The novel is set during the American Civil War and Reconstruction era and features descriptions of a lustrous landscape filled with opportunity and the perfect setting for a romantic novel. This romanticised image of the South allowed Margret Mitchell to ‘smooth over [any] ugliness that was present in the book’. ‘*Gone with the Wind*’ also discussed slavery and poverty in the novel, with the more recent film adaption allowing these to be put aside

²⁴⁴ Michael Brown, *Placing the South*, (Jackson, University Press of Mississippi, 2007) p.124.

²⁴⁵ Stephen A. Smith, *Myth, Media and the Southern Mind*, (Fayetteville, The University of Arkansas Press, 1985) , p.13.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p.6.

allowing the South of the novel to be a ‘generally a safe world inhabited by "righteous" people’.²⁴⁷ This view of the South from ‘Gone with the Wind’, ‘is one that is most deeply embedded in American Culture’ and formed the basis of American popular memory of the Old South.²⁴⁸ This basis of the Old South mythology on popular novels is also seen in Novels such as ‘Huckleberry Finn’ and through the work of authors such as William Faulkner and Tennessee Williams. Sean O’Hagan argues that the depiction of the South in these numerous works has ‘colonised our collective imagination as a place apart, even a state of mind’.²⁴⁹

These novels of the South are all seen to have similarities in how they cast the Old South. Most notably this is seen within their characters. These included at least one of the following: ‘the cavalier gentlemen, who became transformed into a planter, and the Southern belle, a reincarnation of the damsel of the castle’.²⁵⁰ This image of the Southern belle has been highlighted and exaggerated in many forms of culture and although undergoing modification throughout the years, it was still seen as a part of Southern life up to the 1920s. Consequently, many Southern women have found a pressure to live up to the myth of the Southern lady, and those

²⁴⁷ Feminist.com, *Romanticizing the Old South: Historical Analysis of Gone With the Wind*,
<<http://www.feminist.com/resources/artspeech/remember/rtl8.html>>
[date of access 29/04/15]

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Sean O’Hagan, *Myth, Manners and Memory: Photographers of the American South*, The Guardian, (October 2010),
<<http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2010/oct/03/myth-manners-and-memory-review>> [date of access 29/04/15]

²⁵⁰ Smith, p14.

endowed with the outward qualities have been celebrated.²⁵¹ This pressure to be seen as a Southern Belle is argued by Anne Scott 'as being defined with a precision that made it almost legal'.²⁵² For many this 'link between history and fiction' has moulded the idea of 'womanhood' with the notion of the 'Southern Belle' whilst few embody her essential qualities subsequently creating a myth that is no longer able to be recreated into reality.²⁵³

On the other hand, media and culture have also allowed reality to come crashing down on the myth of the Old South in more modern interpretations of the South. Walker Evans's photographs of the American south, taken between 1935 and 1938 during the Depression, for the Farm Security Administration, are among the most celebrated images of the 20th century due to their realistic and hard-hitting images of poverty and the 'real' South. For many they changed the way America viewed the south, and the way the south saw itself.²⁵⁴ These modern views of the Old South come with the change attributed during the Second World War, and where the myth of the Old South started to fade away due to people's memory of a simple life being erased due to the new opportunities of an urbanised South. However, images of the Old South, such as 'Gone with the Wind' still depict popular images of the Old South that are widely accepted as fact. Smith sees the use of

²⁵¹ Anne Firor Scott, *Myth and Southern History: The New South*, ed, Patrick Gerster and Nicholas Cords, (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1989) p.84.

²⁵² John Hope Franklin, *Myth and Southern History: The New South*, ed, Patrick Gerster and Nicholas Cords, (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1989) p.104.

²⁵³ Sara M. Evans, *Myth and Southern History: The New South*, ed, Patrick Gerster and Nicholas Cords, (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1989) p.150.

²⁵⁴ O' Hagan

culture to glamorise and continue the myth of the Old South as a way to keep the memory alive of a myth that many never had the chance to see themselves. She concluded her argument by quoting James McBride Dabbs theory which rings true for the majority of historians. ‘When a man finds his interpretation of life – that is, of his experiences, his past that does not work, he seeks a new interpretation, moulding the theory to the facts’.²⁵⁵ Novels and creative interpretations of South keep the memory alive, and allow many, even in the modern day to believe that the romantic and peaceful way of life in the ‘Old South’ was real and glorious.

The vices used currently to create and continue the myth of the ‘Old South’ have been both personal and creative, using imaginations to allow it to spread. However, these images of the South, having been weaved in the national stigma of the South’s culture, have henceforth bled in the historical accounts of the Old South being blurred with the memory. It has also allowed the South to maintain itself as a ‘separate entity with its own distinctive culture, economy, and romantic image in the consciousness of Americans’.²⁵⁶ Henceforth, memory has an increasingly important role in allowing the Old South to be viewed as it is, allowing the blurred vision to continue the myth of the South on for many years to come. Arthur Link suggests that many Southerners suffer from ‘Conservatism’, which as it is generally understood, ‘connotes a tendency to maintain the status quo and a disposition of hostility to innovations in the political, social and economic order’.²⁵⁷ Consequently, Southerners have been increasingly

²⁵⁵ Smith, p.46.

²⁵⁶ Pat Watters, *The South and the Nation*, (Toronto, Random House Inc., 1969), p.iv.

²⁵⁷ Arthur S. Link, *Myth and Southern History: The New South*, ed, Patrick Gerster and Nicholas Cords, (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1989) p.60.

resistant to changes in their history, and more receptive to mythology, which guides a large part of their opinion and identity in the South.²⁵⁸ In order to gain an accurate idea of how this mythology came to obscure the true history of the South, historians have to focus largely on the period of the Lost Cause and how, reality started to become distorted. With the drive during the Lost Cause to preserve memory, groups such as the Sons of the Confederate Veterans loyalty kept the region fascinated by the war and preserving the memory.²⁵⁹ Many historians writing in the 1960s assumed that these myths being harboured by these members of the Lost Cause were the true 'Mind of the South' and therefore represented the minds of the South before and after the Civil War, leading to the theory of the Lost Cause causing the convincing evidence to turn memory into myth.²⁶⁰ Nevertheless older historian polls suggest that the Lost Cause did not lead to an increase in knowledge of the War or public interest in keeping it alive. They suggest that this creation of historical memory could not have been due to the Lost Cause activists, as the numbers were so small that they influenced.²⁶¹ Similarly, those whom agree that the Lost Cause was the reason for widespread confusion of Southern history and myth argue that it lost 'any lasting effect after 1915' due to 'the forces of modernisation' as it spread across the South.²⁶² This idea is now widely considered true, with many historians, such as Gallagher agreeing that the myth of the South started to slip during the

²⁵⁸ Vandiver, p.2.

²⁵⁹Gaines Foster, Civil War Sesquicentennial: The Lost Cause, Civil War Book Review, (Fall 2013),

<<http://www.cwbr.com/civilwarbookreview/index.php?q=5590&field=ID&browse=yes&record=full&searching=yes&Submit=Search>>
[date of access, 29/04/15]

²⁶⁰ Ibid

²⁶¹ Ibid

²⁶² Gallagher, p.179.

early twentieth century. The wide discussion on this topic, extenuates how ever-changing this topic is and how the blurring of both history and myth has changed historians views throughout modern history. One idea that can be agreed on by the majority however, is the main victim of ‘the Lost Cause legend has been history’.²⁶³

This difficulty in separating history and the myth is simply due to the memory that surrounds the Old South image. Although as Woodward suggests, the ‘national myths have been waxing in power and appeal’, the memory of the South seems to be consistently alive in the hearts of southerners and allows the brutal history, of slavery, poverty and labour to be glossed over by the glamorous, if not distorted memory of the pre-Civil War South.²⁶⁴ Gerster, although continuously agreeing that memory is a large part of the myth argues that the South has ‘yet to be subjected to the kind of broad and imaginative historical analysis that has been applied to the idea of the American West’, henceforth suggesting that further inquiries need to be done.²⁶⁵ Consequently, due to his lack of recovering the historical facts from the myth, ‘the myth [has] become the ground for the belief... it has become the realities of history’ and as many other poignant myths have in the past, has ‘influenced the course of human action’ becoming, as a result, more powerful than history itself.²⁶⁶

Overall, it is clear that memory has become an extremely important component of the South image, to both itself and the world’s view, with the myth created of the Old

²⁶³ Ibid, p.14.

²⁶⁴ Woodward, p.125.

²⁶⁵ Patrick Gerster, *Myth and Southern History; The Old South*, (Indianapolis, University of Illinois Press, 1989) p.2.

²⁶⁶ Gerster, *Myth and Southern History; The Old South*, p.2.

South still regarded as the truth to many to this day. As Robert Penn Warren observes ‘at the moment of death the Confederacy entered upon its immortality’, the belief of the Southern people allowed the event to be celebrated rather than mourned.²⁶⁷ This stubborn tendency from the South to not allow history to override the glorified myth of the South has led to a blurring of the boundaries, consequently allowing both to interweave and create a distorted view of the Old and New South. After all, ‘A Myth’ Mark Schorer has observed, ‘is a large, controlling image that gives philosophical meaning to the facts of ordinary life’.²⁶⁸ In conclusion, the myth of the Old South has been almost completely relying on the memory of both the people of the Civil War era and the generations after to continue to push the myth and allow it to become completely enshrined into the beliefs of the American people. Going back to the titled quote, ‘the Past is never dead, it’s not even past’, the continuous use of memory to keep the Southern image alive, allows the Old South to never be truly settled in the past, by the continuation of memory, the Old South will always be present in the hearts and minds of Southerners and Americans alike.

²⁶⁷ Foster

²⁶⁸ Gerster, *Myth and Southern History; The Old South*, p.2.

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How do the formal, cinematic innovations of *The Graduate* relate to a sense of wider cultural change?

Holly Whitby – AM-337

The Graduate (1967) has long been considered one of the most influential and revolutionary films to come from the 1960s. The film was hailed a “milestone in American movie history”²⁶⁹ and sold over eighty million tickets, with many audience members choosing to see it multiple times.²⁷⁰ The decade witnesses some of the most disturbing and radical changes of the twentieth century, including student protests, the Vietnam War, development of the New Left and the assassinations of some of the most prominent men in politics and civil rights. Hollywood itself underwent some dramatic alterations which allowed young directors to put their stamp on the industry. In an attempt to synthesise the events of the 1960s, the films which the era produced provided a starker commentary on the political and social state of the country than had been possible previously. This analysis will prove that, while some of the cinematic and thematic devices Mike Nichols includes in his creation did pave the way for future ground-breaking works, the social and political commentary which *The Graduate* provides has been overstated.

Steven Spielberg regarded *The Graduate* as a “visual watershed”²⁷¹ which introduced New Hollywood to the American public and ultimately changed the way film was directed, produced, and viewed. Prior to this, Classical

²⁶⁹ Bert Cardullo, *Film Analysis: A Casebook* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 114.

²⁷⁰ Peter Kramer, *The New Hollywood: From Bonnie and Clyde to Star Wars* (London: Wallflower, 2005), 7.

²⁷¹ J.W. Whitehead, *Mike Nichols and the Cinema of Transformation* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2014), 38.

Hollywood and the studio system had been the sole form of film production in the United States and was often referred to as the ‘reign of the majors’ due to the all-encompassing control the studios held.²⁷² The system was liberated when *United States v. Paramount Pictures* ruled that studios’ use of block-booking and vertical integration²⁷³ “constituted anti-competitive and monopolistic trade practises.”²⁷⁴ The deconstruction of companies’ vertical integration meant that the self-censoring Production Code, which had enabled studios to avoid greater restrictions put in place by government agencies and religious groups, was left inoperable and studios lost power over their own censorship.²⁷⁵ The introduction of the rating system established a more enduring method of film censoring, one which is still used today.²⁷⁶

Rifts in Hollywood’s once-united audience were widened when overproduction of popular 1950s roadshow epics drove older generations to turn to television in search of entertainment.²⁷⁷ This, paired with the coming of age of the Baby Boomer generation, signified the initiation of a more liberal, accepting audience.²⁷⁸ These changes in demographics and regulations allowed Nichols to produce one of the most popular and shocking films of the era. The generational divide was making its presence felt through all aspects of American

²⁷² John W. Cones, *Hollywood Wars: How Insiders Gained and Maintained Illegitimate Control over the Film Industry* (Wisconsin: Marquette Books, 2007), 328.

²⁷³ Kramer, *The New Hollywood*, 20.

²⁷⁴ *United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.*, 334 U.S. 158 (1948).

²⁷⁵ Geoff King, *New Hollywood Cinema: An Introduction* (London: I.B.Tauris Publishers, 2002), 30.

²⁷⁶ King, *New Hollywood Cinema*, 30.

²⁷⁷ Kramer, *The New Hollywood*, 38.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 59.

life, something which Nichols attempted to reflect in his work.

The Graduate uses unprecedented camera techniques to establish the protagonist Ben (Dustin Hoffman) as an unknowing narrator of his own story. The camera becomes a dominant feature and the use of uncomfortable shots convey, not what Ben sees, but what he is feeling. On his return home from university, newly graduated Ben contemplates his future, which he wants “to be different”.²⁷⁹ Ben’s positioning in front of a fish tank is symbolic of his being trapped in the glass tank of suburban life. The camera fails to adjust as his parents enter and leave the shot and their proximity to the screen makes them appear as intrusions into Ben’s thoughts. As Ben is unaware of his narrator role, he possesses an objective and forward-looking perspective, denoting feelings of uncertainty which 1960s youths had about their future, as well as the intrusion they felt from their parents’ generation.

Glass and water are the film’s most prominent themes and are used to separate the adult’s world of plastic materialism from the youth culture to which Ben wants to escape.²⁸⁰ The most striking use of water is when Ben is forced to parade around in his \$200 scuba suit. Here he submerges himself into the world of his parents as they look on eagerly. When Ben tries to escape to the surface, the camera shows Ben’s perspective as his parents physically and metaphorically push him back into the tank. The camera plays a hugely important role here, drifting away to show Ben as a cowering figure in the corner of the tank. Eventually he will run out of air and suffocate in the society by which he is confined. Nichols saw Ben as a person “drowning amongst objects and things”, highlighting

²⁷⁹ *The Graduate*. DVD. Directed by Mike Nichols. Los Angeles: Lawrence Turman Productions, 1967.

²⁸⁰ Cardullo, *Film Analysis*, 114.

society's concerns over the constraints of materialism and consumerism.²⁸¹ These were reiterated by President Johnson in 1964 when he asserted that the older generation was "condemned to a soulless wealth."²⁸²

Mrs. Robinson plays a significant role in submerging Ben into the tank of suburban Californian life. The fish tank is a prism through which Ben views his life of isolation, people can look in and see him but he cannot escape. When Mrs. Robinson throws Ben's car keys into the fish tank in his bedroom, she is plunging him into the same trapped life she is leading. When she threatens to tell Elaine about their affair, Mrs. Robinson unwittingly forces Ben to make a conscious decision to break the glass of his tank. This is a turning point in the film as Ben ultimately demonstrates where he belongs.

Mrs. Robinson became the archetype for a promiscuous, sexually devious female and audiences viewed her as a "bitter and pitiful" woman who preyed on young Ben and attempted to lure him away from Elaine, his true love.²⁸³ The film's casting of female roles creates problems for the women's rights movement which was attempting to redefine limitations of women in the 1960s. The early years of the decade saw wide availability of the contraceptive pill²⁸⁴ and President Kennedy made women's rights an important part of his New

²⁸¹ J.W. Whitehead, *Appraising the Graduate: The Mike Nichols Classic and its Impact in Hollywood* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2011), 39.

²⁸² Lyndon B. Johnson, "Great Society" (speech, University of Michigan, Michigan, 22nd May, 1964), *The Washington Post* <https://www.washingtonpost.com/posttv/national/lyndon-b-johnsons-great-society-speech/2014/05/16/39289be8-dd3e-11e3-a837-8835df6c12c4_video.html> [Accessed 10/12/2016]

²⁸³ Cardullo, *Film Analysis*, 114.

²⁸⁴ Alan M. Rees, *Consumer Health USA* (Phoenix: Oryx Press, 1997), 119.

Frontier.²⁸⁵ He appointed women to high-level government jobs and founded the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women, whose work established many local, state and federal organisations which would go on to battle gender inequality.²⁸⁶ Elaine's character epitomises the cultural dilemma experienced by many young women at the time. The famous lines spoken between Mrs. Robinson and her daughter, Elaine "it's too late" "not for me" are used to demonstrate the differences between the two generations however, there is little about Elaine's situation which is empowering.²⁸⁷ There are only ever two options available to Elaine, one is to marry Carl Smith, a representation of the world her parents want her to live in, and the other to marry Ben. Regardless of whom she chooses, Elaine is locked into her fate as a future wife and mother and there is no suggestion that she can command her own future outside the constraints of a traditional marriage.

While wider society showed support for the advances towards gender equality, the film industry was contradicting such monumental events. Kramer notes that, by marginalising women, New Hollywood cinema provided a compensatory action, allowing male audience members to act out situations which society now deemed unacceptable. Films like *The Graduate* gave men an escape from the expansion of women's sphere of influence beyond the home and into the domains of business and politics.²⁸⁸ Nichols uses female characters either as symbols for Ben's sexual initiation or as damsels in distress

²⁸⁵ Steven M. Buechler, *Women's Movements in the United States: Woman Suffrage, Equal Rights and Beyond* (London: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 26.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁸⁷ *The Graduate*. DVD. Directed by Mike Nichols. Los Angeles: Lawrence Turman Productions, 1967.

²⁸⁸ Kramer, *The New Hollywood*, 72.

whose cries awaken the ‘hero’ from his misery.²⁸⁹ Because of these limitations, *The Graduate* cannot be viewed as a forward-thinking, progressive film in the context of gender.

Foreign policy was the consuming issue of the 1960s and the war in Vietnam signalled a complete change from traditionalist views for the American youth. The draft left many Baby Boomers susceptible to conscription and continued involvement of the military and a growing death toll led to demands for withdrawal from foreign entanglements.²⁹⁰ Critics J.W Whitehead and Bert Cardullo acknowledge the absence of foreign policy issues but credit the timeless popularity of the film to this omission.²⁹¹ Cardullo notes that, had Nichols explicitly discussed the issue of Vietnam, *The Graduate* “would have been accused of tokenism” and would have become outdated as issues changed.²⁹² The most suggestive nod Nichols gives towards the escalating conflict is on Elaine’s Berkley campus when Ben is pictured sitting alone under an American flag. The camera angle from above makes Ben appear small and isolated, something which students and drafted youths across the country could relate to. One reference to the conflict is the use of Simon & Garfunkel’s “Scarborough Fair”, a song addressing the act of preparing for an unwelcome and futile war.²⁹³ Except for these small acknowledgments, *The Graduate* is not noted as being an aggressive protest film and Jonathon Rosenbaum accuses the film of following “escapist principles” and “studiously avoid[ing] everything about the

²⁸⁹ Whitehead, *Appraising the Graduate*, 72.

²⁹⁰ Walter L. Hixson, *The Vietnam Antiwar Movement* (New York: Garland Publishing Company, 2000), 15.

²⁹¹ Whitehead, *Appraising the Graduate*, 18.

²⁹² Cardullo, *Film Analysis*, 117.

²⁹³ Whitehead, *Appraising the Graduate*, 18.

60s that is worth remembering.”²⁹⁴ Individuals tended to identify strongly as ‘doves’ or ‘hawks’ and opinions became extremely divisive amongst the public.²⁹⁵ Nichols avoids taking a hard line on Vietnam so as not to alienate segments of the audience, however this damages the film’s standing as culturally significant but ensured its timeless popularity.

Attitudes towards the escalating conflict in Vietnam and increased feelings of alienation were expressed by way of student protests. *The Graduate* uses two opposing camera angles to demonstrate the juxtaposition between Ben’s entrapment in his suburban home and his liberation on the Berkley campus. Close, claustrophobic shots are used to signify entrapment whereas sweeping, broad lenses are used after Ben’s escape from the ‘tank’. University campuses were the setting of some of the most active political campaigns and protests of the 1960s and Berkley was used specifically in *The Graduate* for its role in founding the Free Speech Movement.²⁹⁶ The University imposed restrictions on the advocacy of political candidates and political activism, which was viewed by many as a violation of their First Amendment Rights to Free Speech and Right to Assemble. Seven hundred and eighty three students were arrested for their part in a non-violent sit-in which hoped to readdress these restrictions, resulting in the largest mass arrest in Californian history.²⁹⁷ The only notable mention Nichols gives to the protests comes from Ben’s landlord, who asks if he is one of “those outside

²⁹⁴ Kyle Stevens, *Mike Nichols: Sex, Language, and the Reinvention of Psychological Realism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 91.

²⁹⁵ Hixson, *The Vietnam Antiwar Movement*, 179.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 99-100.

²⁹⁷ Doug McAdam, *Freedom Summer* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 163.

agitators”.²⁹⁸ This is a subtle reference to groups such as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), one of the largest and most successful attempts to unite student voices.²⁹⁹ Despite the omission of political activism, *The Graduate* shows college campuses as places where young adults could express their ideas and be their true selves. Nichols’ camera work parallels this, finally allowing Ben and the audience to breathe once he has left the confines of his Californian home. Kyle Stevens notes that, although *The Graduate* gives little acknowledgement to the existence of student protests, counterculture, or the Vietnam war, because of its “abstract portrait of rebellion” the film allows audiences to adapt the narrative to suit whatever issue they are facing, helping it to remain relevant through the decades.³⁰⁰

One cinematic innovation which *The Graduate* utilises is in its soundtrack, primarily composed of Simon & Garfunkel songs. Prior to this, Hollywood had used custom-made film scores or operatic pieces to narrate pictures.³⁰¹ Nichols was the first to use songs from an already released album, something which has become common practice today.³⁰² Although the use of a pre-made soundtrack made *The Graduate* unique in its tone, the melancholy of Simon & Garfunkel’s music contradicted the loud, upbeat rock ‘n’ roll music which was popular with 1960s counterculture. Nichols

²⁹⁸ *The Graduate*. DVD. Directed by Mike Nichols. Los Angeles: Lawrence Turman Productions, 1967.

²⁹⁹ Hixson, *The Vietnam Antiwar Movement*, 122.

³⁰⁰ Stevens, *Mike Nichols*, 108.

³⁰¹ Kristopher Spencer, *Film and Television Scores, 1950-1979: A Critical Survey by Genre* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2008), 10.

³⁰² Spencer, *Film and Television Scores*, 320.

decided on the duo because “they sounded to me like the voice of Benjamin. Full of feeling and not very articulate.”³⁰³

Silence also plays a big part in the film as there is an “impossibility of real spoken communication” between the opposing generations.³⁰⁴ As demonstrated when Mrs. Robinson says “I don’t think we have much to say to each other” the older and younger generations spoke entirely different languages and by retreating into silence, Ben is able to escape his parents’ scrutiny. The absence of sound references the influential leaders who had been ‘silenced’ in the decade. The 1960s witnesses the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King and Malcom X, triggering national mourning and an overwhelming feeling that hope for a brighter future had been lost.³⁰⁵ In the final scene, Ben and Elaine have finally escaped to a place where they can express themselves and yet they sit in silence. Suddenly they are overwhelmed by the enormity of their actions and the uncertainty which awaits them.

While some have tried to view *The Graduate* as a commentary on the cultural issues of Vietnam and student protest, others see Nichols’ work as an observation of the growing ‘generational gap’ and consumerism which the 1960s witnessed. Whitehead saw the film as “a focus on individual freedom versus collective repression”³⁰⁶ and argued that it was widely misinterpreted as a political commentary when it was in fact a satire of the materialistic society.³⁰⁷ Aaron Cooley also asserts that the film is an assessment of the

³⁰³ Joseph Gelmis, *The Film Director as Superstar* (London: Doubleday, 1970), 285.

³⁰⁴ Stevens, *Mike Nichols*, 92.

³⁰⁵ Stevens, *Mike Nichols*, 87.

³⁰⁶ Whitehead, *Appraising the Graduate*, 39.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

consumerism of 1960s culture and that the audience does not see the growing issues in American society because the camera is concerned solely with Ben's perspective, who is too self-absorbed to take notice of such things.³⁰⁸ The opening scene of the film shows Ben on an airport walkway collecting his possessions, a metaphor for the conveyor belt of life which he must fight against in order to prevent himself from becoming a possession of materialistic society. The camera lingers on a sign 'Do They Match?' which becomes a prelude to Ben's ultimate decision on where he 'matches' in society, with Mrs. Robinson and his middle-class parents, or with his own generation, who are attempting to redefine their boundaries and identities. Ben's role has been widely debated and while he is viewed as the original rebel by some, recent critics have produced a damning reassessment of his character. Stevens sees Ben as an embodiment of political activists who were striving to have their voice heard³⁰⁹ and views Ben's struggle to find an identity as "inextricable from *The Graduate's* historical context."³¹⁰ Cardullo regards Ben as a moralist whose actions always have some value to a wider moral compass.³¹¹ In contrast to this, Jacob Brackman has described Ben as a "countercultural apologist"³¹² and Rosenbaum states his utter confusion at Ben's 'rebel' label.³¹³

The sole interaction Ben has at a drive-in restaurant with the counterculture of his generation results in him rolling up the roof of his car to drown out their music. While this can be

³⁰⁸ Aaron Cooley, "Reviving Reification: Education, Indoctrination, and Anxiety in *The Graduate*," *A Journal of the American Educational Studies Association* 45 (2009): 371.

³⁰⁹ Stevens, *Mike Nichols*, 93.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 95.

³¹¹ Cardullo, *Film Analysis*, 110.

³¹² Whitehead, *Appraising the Graduate*, 1.

³¹³ Stevens, *Mike Nichols*, 90.

seen as an attempt for Ben and Elaine to observe the constraints of the world they live in from inside the ‘tank’³¹⁴, a more challenging and convincing interpretation suggests that this is Ben’s deliberate attempt to separate himself from the challenging presence of the counterculture’s world. Nichols himself explained that he never intended for Ben and Elaine to be perceived as heroes³¹⁵, and saw the film as a representation of the “Los Angelization of the world in which *things* take over a person’s life.”³¹⁶

Nichols’ work can be read as a new take on the American Dream, one which differs from the materialistic qualities of Ben’s parents’ ideals. The original Dream is concerned fundamentally with wealth and to achieve it, one must be rich in possessions and must display these accordingly. For Ben and for the counterculture of the 1960s, the American Dream transformed into a symbol of hope for a brighter future, one where equality prevailed and oppression from ‘plastic’ life was obsolete.³¹⁷

The famous finale of *The Graduate* leaves viewers with an unresolved ending. Ben manages to prevent Elaine’s permanent descent into the tank by crashing her wedding to Carl Smith. The couple escape the glass church and symbolically trap the seething adults inside with a cross. This not only represents Ben and Elaine’s liberation, but signifies the older generation’s own entrapment within religious institutions. The couple ride off into the unknown on a bus with dazed expressions on their faces. “The Sound of Silence” plays and Ben’s story has come full circle as he is carried into an uncertain future, yet again accompanied by a married

³¹⁴ Cardullo, *Film Analysis*, 111.

³¹⁵ Whitehead, *Appraising the Graduate*, 2.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 71.

³¹⁷ Whitehead, *Appraising the Graduate*, 115.

woman.³¹⁸ Some critics have viewed the ending as a message that ‘love conquers all’³¹⁹ and Cardullo has noted that although Ben’s future is unsolved, for him, nothing is worth solving without Elaine.³²⁰ Nichols states that this is a misinterpretation of *The Graduate*’s ending and that the film is about uncertainty, the generational gap, and the circle of life which ensures that Ben and Elaine will ultimately end up like their parents.³²¹ The film questions the plight of the young generation and asks if, once the thrill of protests and counterculture has worn off, whether they will end up with the ‘girl next door’ that their parents wanted them to in the first place.³²²

The Graduate has been hailed as a milestone movie which paved the way for a more socially and politically conscious Hollywood. This essay argues that the assumption that *The Graduate* was a commentary on the turmoil of monumental events such as Vietnam and student protests is a gross overestimation. Nichols fails to acknowledge the presence of these events and the film is concerned with issues which were more psychological in nature. The film primarily addresses the ‘generational gap’ which became prevalent for Baby Boomers. Themes of glass and water, the film’s conclusion and the use of music and silence represent feelings of confusion and uncertainty which were prominent in society at the time. Aside from these themes, *The Graduate* does not address wider cultural change in the 1960s. The reading of Ben’s character as the embodiment of a rebellious generation is also a misinterpretation. Nichols himself did not see Ben as a hero and Ben’s actions throughout the film lend more

³¹⁸ Stevens, *Mike Nichols*, 109.

³¹⁹ Cardullo, *Film Analysis*, 111.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, 116.

³²¹ Whitehead, *Appraising the Graduate*, 2.

³²² Cardullo, *Film Analysis*, 116.

credence to the theory that he is being carried passively through life on decisions which have been laid out for him by other people. The cinematic devices which Nichols used were unprecedented and because of these, *The Graduate* can be seen as an innovative film. Despite this, the argument stands that *The Graduate* fails to relate to a significantly wider sense of cultural change.

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**WHAT IS THE
POTENTIAL FOR
MILITARY CONFLICT
IN THE ARCTIC?**

TOM SMITH

PO-396

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A military conflict in the Arctic is very unlikely, it is not wanted by Arctic countries and would be expensive to participate in. However, that is not to say that Arctic states do not have a military presence in the Arctic. With climate change comes increased accessibility to the vast amount of resources in the region and states are acting to protect their resources in the region and to protect the extraction in the future.

Russia, the largest state in the Arctic region, has a varied policy in the Arctic, but one which is still unlikely to cause conflict in the near term future. As Russia is surrounded by NATO member states in the region and believes it has to have the capability to defend itself in the region. However, Russia also participates in military exercises with these countries, showing signs of cooperation that would not be present if a conflict was inevitable.

The United States of America has a very non-committal Arctic policy, its citizens do not have an Arctic identity, and the Arctic is seen by the government as a strategic location by which it can potentially exploit resources in the future and to use the region strategically for international politics.

Canada's new liberal government has almost removed the risk of a conflict involving Canada in the Arctic. It has shifted from an aggressive foreign policy to one that is open to communication and cooperation.

Possible triggers for conflict in the future, although still unlikely, is when the decisions of the Commission on the Limit of the Continental Shelf is published. It could lead to

regions of the Arctic disputed between nations and could potentially lead to conflict. However, this is unlikely as states are willing to try to cooperate so that they could all benefit economically from the resources in the region.

Introduction

This report will focus on how likely a military conflict in the Arctic is. Currently, the region is becoming increasingly accessible due to the shrinking polar ice and therefore, Arctic states view the region as potentially more volatile as it previously has been. This report will outline the background to why the Arctic is becoming potentially more dangerous due to its increasing accessibility and will also show how the Arctic can easily go from cooperating during World War Two to a state of conflict during the Cold War. The report will outline the strategies of the three nations who have the potential to cause a full scale war in the Arctic; Russia, The United States of America (USA) and Canada, before focusing on potential causes of conflict such as the Northwest Passage (NWP), Northern Sea Route (NSR) and competing claims to extend the exclusive economic zones of Arctic nations. This report will conclude that the potential for conflict in the Arctic is very small, states are building up military forces in the region to protect their resources and to have a solid foundation for negotiations in the future. Cooperation in the Arctic is a more likely to occur due to the wealth of revenue potential in the Arctic and states realise this to be the case, and want to work together, but can never rule out a military conflict in the future and should prepare for it.

Climate Change

KEY QUOTE

“Climate change may start a scramble for resources not seen since the 19th century gold-rush in California”³

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is recognised as the legitimate body in the Arctic for determining maritime issues. UNCLOS divides the world’s maritime areas into different categories, including EEZ’s. A state, once it has ratified UNCLOS, has 10 years to submit a claim to extend its EEZ to the CLCS. To be successful, a state must prove through scientific data that the extended area is a natural extension of the state’s continental shelf. If a claim is successful, the state will have access to the extended seabed resources (which in the Arctic, could be worth millions of pounds). All Arctic coastal states have ratified UNCLOS, except the USA, whose congress will not ratify but all presidents since the creation of UNCLOS have supported it.⁷

Climate change in the Arctic is of greater severity than the rest of the earth. Arctic global surface air temperatures have increased by 1.8°C over the last 100 years, which is double that of the rest of the globe.³²³ Due to this, the National Snow and Ice Data Centre has warned that if current trends continue, the Arctic could become ice free by 2060.^{324,325} However, the Arctic is still a harsh environment and it is important to note that although the conditions in the Arctic are becoming less harsh due to climate change, it does not mean that the Arctic is readily accessible currently. No evidence suggests that the Arctic will be ice free in the winter months.³²⁶ Therefore although the Arctic is becoming

³²³ William L. Chapman, 'Arctic Climate Change: Recent and Projected', *Swords and Ploughshares* edition 'Global Security, Climate Change, and the Arctic', Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 17.3 (2009), 5-10 (pp.6-7).

³²⁴ National Snow and Ice Data Centre, *Arctic Sea Ice News Fall 2007* (2007), <<http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2007/10/589/>> [accessed 13 November 2016].

³²⁵ Steven L. Lamy, 'The U.S Arctic Policy Agenda: The State Trumps Other Interests', in *Future Security of the Global Arctic: State Policy, Economic Security and Climate*, ed. by Lassi Heininen (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp.77-98 (p.80).

³²⁶ David W. Titley and Courtney C. St.John, 'Arctic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy's "Arctic Roadmap"', in *Arctic Security In An Age Of Climate Change*, 2nd edn, ed. by James Kraska (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.267-280 (pp.268-269).

increasingly accessible, it does mean that the resources are still hard to access. However, this has not stopped nations from preparing for when the vast resources in the Arctic become commercially viable.

Increasing Accessibility

It is estimated that 30% of the world's undiscovered gas resources and 13% of the world's oil is in the Arctic.³²⁷ Therefore, the Arctic is a region where, if exploited correctly and sustainably, could be greatly beneficial to the Arctic states. However, extraction of resources in the Arctic is still not commercially viable.³²⁸ This means that states in the region are still able to cooperate without having the added pressure of competing over resources in the area due to overlapping claims in relation to the extension of a state's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which is permitted through a formal submission process to the United Nations Commission³²⁹ on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).³³⁰ In addition to an increase in resources on the seabed that could become available due to climate change, the diminishing Arctic ice could result in shorter

³²⁷ Rob Huebert, 'Canada and the Newly Emerging International Arctic Security Regime', in *Arctic Security In An Age Of Climate Change*, 2nd edn, ed. by James Kraska (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.193-217 (p.193).

³²⁸ Lamy, p.78.

³²⁹ Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola, 'Arctic Conflict Potential: Towards an Extra-Arctic Perspective', *Finnish Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper*, 138 (2013), 3-9 (pp.4-5).

³³⁰ Käpylä and Mikkola, p.4.

shipping routes for commercial vessels due to the opening up of both the NWP and NSR.³³¹ However, these passages are not without contention, as both Canada and Russia have disputes with other state's over the NWP and NSR respectively.

Increased Accessibility leading to conflict

KEY QUOTE

“The Arctic is rapidly emerging as a major playing field in world politics”¹⁰

Due to the increasing accessibility of the Arctic, the region is becoming more important in global politics. Because of this, more state and non-state actors will be involved in³³² the Arctic which therefore means a greater potential for conflict in the future.³³³ Media speculation has suggested that the Arctic could become a conflict zone as it becomes more accessible which compliments the theory that a more accessible Arctic's logical conclusion is one of conflict and competition with each other.³³⁴ There is a debate over whether the Arctic is preparing for conflict or cooperation in the future, and

³³¹ David Gove, 'Arctic Melt: Reopening a Naval Frontier?', *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, 135.2 (2009), 16-21 (pp.17-18).

³³² Pauli Järvenpää and Tomas Ries, 'The Rise of the Arctic on the Global Stage, in *Arctic Security In An Age Of Climate Change*, 2nd edn, ed. by James Kraska (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.129-144 (p.129).

³³³ Käpylä and Mikkola, p.3.

³³⁴ Titley and St. John, p.273.

whether military presence in the region automatically results in a conflict, however many academics recently have tended to suggest that the Arctic is in fact a region of cooperation.³³⁵ This is in stark contrast to what newspapers have reported, with many leading their readers to think that the Arctic could be returning to a Cold War style state with different countries competing with each other.³³⁶ This has led to a difference in opinion in the Arctic, the popular perception, due to the newspaper reports, is that the Arctic is preparing for conflict, however much of the academic opinion of the Arctic views conflict as not out of the question but a long way off ever happening.

³³⁵ Käpylä and Mikkola, p.3.

³³⁶ Paul Sonne, 'Russia's Military Sophistication in the Arctic Sends Echoes of the Cold War', *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 October 2016, <<http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-upgrades-military-prowess-in-arctic-1475624748>> [accessed 21 November 2016].

World War Two and Cold War

Figure 1: A map showing the Distant Early Warning line, the black dots show radar locations. Source:

<http://static4.businessinsider.com/image/542d6f2c6da8112815701308-680-560/arctic-ice-9.jpg>



The Arctic is not a region that is new to military conflict, it is important to look at the history of the Arctic to view at examples of where the Arctic nations could both cooperate and be in conflict with each other in the past. World War Two gave an example of where the Arctic states could cooperate with each other. During World War Two, the arctic was used as a supply route to the Soviet Union after Nazi Germany invaded in June 1941. The allied ships sailed around northern Norway to the ports of Murmansk and Archangel in the Soviet Union. Conditions showed how severe the Arctic is, as the loss rate for Allied ships was

higher than any other convoy route.³³⁷ As World War Two transitioned in to the Cold War, the Arctic was a region where NATO became immediate neighbours with the Soviet Union and cooperation turned to conflict. During the Cold War, there were many offensive and defensive systems put in place in the Arctic in addition to a large military presence. The Distant Early Warning Line was developed to monitor the Arctic airspace was a line of anti-aircraft bomber radars crossing Alaska, Northern Canada and Greenland to provide advance notice of potential attacks, as shown in figure 1, the Soviet Union also built their own preventative radar system between 1963 and 1964.³³⁸ Due to the unexpected end of the Cold War, Young's theory that there would be an 'Age of the Arctic' with a large scale conflict never materialised, however it shows that a conflict in the Arctic has been seen as probable in the past.³³⁹ In 1987, the Arctic saw its first signs of cooperation in the Arctic since World War Two as the Soviet leader, Gorbachev, delivered a speech which became known as the "Murmansk Initiative".³⁴⁰ In this speech Gorbachev outlined how to ease tensions in the Arctic and wanted to encourage cooperation on issues such as scientific development and environmental protection. By analysing World War Two and the Cold War, it can be seen that Arctic nations can both cooperate and conflict with each other. With

³³⁷ Alexander Comber, review of *Voices from the Arctic Convoys*, by Peter C. Brown, *The International Journal of Maritime History*, 27.3 (2015), 580-581.

³³⁸ No Author, Notes Section, 'Distant Early Warning Line', *Polar Record*, 61.9 (1959), 345-359 (pp.352-353).

³³⁹ Oran R. Young, 'The Age of the Arctic', *Foreign Policy*, 61 (1985), 160-179.

³⁴⁰ Ronald Purver, 'Arctic Security: The Murmansk Initiative and Its Impact', *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, 11.4 (1988), 147-158 (pp.147-148).

the end of the Cold War and the cooperation that it started in the region it enables this report to focus on the strategies of Russia, USA and Canada to see whether these countries are breaking away from this cooperation. By looking at the policies of Arctic nations, it can be determined what the countries see the future of the Arctic as and whether they are preparing for cooperation or conflict.

STRATEGIES OF ARCTIC STATES

Russia

KEY QUOTE

“Siberia alone is estimated to hold oil reserves equal to the Middle East”²¹

Russia’s large Arctic coastline, covering almost half of the latitudinal circle, puts it in a good place to influence Arctic affairs. Russian activity in the Arctic is vital to Russia, and up to 20% of Russia’s GDP comes from inside the Arctic Circle.³⁴¹ In addition to this, as the Arctic becomes more susceptible to extracting resources, security in the region will become important as up to 70% of the Arctic’s undiscovered resources are in the Russian sector.^{342 343} Therefore, protecting the Arctic is of vital importance to Russia and in addition to this, Russia is aware that it can only claim to be a world superpower on two fronts. Firstly, oil and gas resources and the revenue that that results in and secondly, their power as a nuclear force.³⁴⁴ This may be why, despite problems with the

³⁴¹ Järvenpää and Ries, p.138.

³⁴² Ibid. pp. 138-139.

³⁴³ Ibid., p.138.

³⁴⁴ Ibid. p.135.

armed forces, Russia has maintained a large military presence in the region after the Cold War, as can be seen in figure two by the large amount of military bases in the region.³⁴⁵ It seems that Russia is determined to maintain a strong showing of military force in the Arctic due its current relationship with the west. As the other four Arctic coastal states are members of NATO, Russia, which deems NATO to have an anti-Russian bias, feels the need to portray national strength in the region to be a deterrent to any potential conflict. Zysk views the Russian Arctic policy as one of both deterrence and engagement occurring simultaneously.³⁴⁶ This judgement has credit as Russia has continued to trigger tensions in the Arctic through its military actions whilst simultaneously promoting peace in the region. Examples of this can be seen next.

³⁴⁵ Katarzyna Zysk, 'Military Aspects of Russia's Arctic Policy: Hard Power and Natural Resources', in *Arctic Security In An Age Of Climate Change*, 2nd edn, ed. by James Kraska (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.85-106 (p.85).

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p.91.

Causing Tension	Promoting peace and cooperation
Planting of Russian Flag on seabed of North Pole in 2007. ³⁴⁷	Member of Partnership for Peace programme along with Norway, Finland and Sweden. ³⁴⁸
Underwater missile launches resumed in 2006, 11 years after suspension due to lack of resources. ³⁴⁹	Russian and NATO cooperation on aircraft radar, with each giving full access to radar. ³⁵⁰
In 2006, there were 14 Russian strategic bombers identified flying across the Norwegian Coast, in 2007, this number was 88 which was higher than the total sum of the previous 10 years flights. ³⁵¹	Russia and Norway participate in annual POMOR exercises which simulate events which could happen in either state. ³⁵²
In 2007, after a 15 year absence, Russia restarted their Long range aviation patrols from the Atlantic, across the Arctic and in to the Pacific. ³⁵³	Barents Euro-Arctic cooperation. ³⁵⁴

³⁴⁷ Järvenpää and Ries, pp.136-137.

³⁴⁸ Michal Luszczuk, 'Military Cooperation and Enhanced Arctic Security in the Context of Climate Change and Growing Global Interest in the Arctic', in *Future Security of the Global Arctic: State Policy, Economic Security and Climate*, ed. by Lassi Heininen (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp.35-54 (p.44).

³⁴⁹ Zysk, p.93.

³⁵⁰ Luszczuk, p.44.

³⁵¹ Zysk, p.86.

³⁵² Luszczuk, pp.42-43

³⁵³ Zysk, p.86.

³⁵⁴ Luszczuk, p.41.

The table shows that Russia is adopting a policy in the Arctic that is not promoting cooperation but not wanting a war in the Arctic. Russia does not want a military conflict in the Arctic, however cannot risk not preparing for conflict if it does arise in future. *The Russian Federation's strategy until 2020* document outlines that the energy resources in the Arctic are of such importance to Russia that it could not count out military forces in the future to solve any issues that arise.³⁵⁵ What is clear is that Russia views oil reserves in the Arctic as an asset worth protecting, and it has also made it clear that it views NATO as a foreign military presence which could turn in to an armed conflict.³⁵⁶ Therefore, although Russia wants cooperation in the Arctic and



³⁵⁵ Järvenpää and Ries, p.137.

³⁵⁶ Zysk, p.98-99.

has declared that it does not want an arms race in the region that was last seen in the Cold War, but foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated that he saw no reason for a military alliance presence in the Arctic as there were no issues that required a military solution.³⁵⁷ Consequently, Russia's strategy of deterrence and engagement suggests that a military conflict is not wanted and there are currently no direct military threats and Russia is currently cooperating with numerous other states. But Russia cannot rule out military conflict in the future.

United States of America

KEY QUOTE

“U.S. Arctic policy is on one hand about the economic and social development of Alaska, and on the other hand about security in a larger international setting.”³⁷

Like Russia, the USA considers cooperation in the Arctic as the optimal policy and has declared that if its national interests are threatened it will respond with military action.³⁵⁸³⁵⁹ Part of the desire to be cooperative in the Arctic

³⁵⁷ Ibid. p.99.

³⁵⁸ Huebert, p.213.

³⁵⁹ Kristine Offerdal, 'Interstate Relations: the complexities of Arctic politics', in *Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: Regional dynamics in a global world*, 2nd edn, ed. by Rolf Tamnes and Kristine Offerdal (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2014), pp.73-96 (p.78).

is due to the fact that an estimated 30 billion barrels of oil and 221 billion cubic feet of natural gas reserves are in the American economic zone in the Arctic.³⁶⁰ The history of the USA's Arctic policy can be split in to three sections, the 1980s were associated with military security, 1990s with environmental security and 2000s and beyond with a broader agenda that includes state sovereignty.³⁶¹ After the Cold War, the USA continued to send submarines to the Arctic, and although there were theories that the new class of US submarines could not go to the Arctic, this was proved not to be true, when in 2009 the USS Texas reached the North Pole.³⁶² Although the USA continued to send submarines to the Arctic, it was only in 2009 with the outgoing Bush administration that the Arctic was taken seriously again by the American government. In January 2009, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 66, the first published document relating to the Arctic since the Clinton administration in 1994.³⁶³ In this document, which President Obama supported, maintaining national security interests in the Arctic was an important element. These interests were; missile defence, a strategic deterrence, a maritime presence in the region and ensuring freedom of navigation and flight in the region.³⁶⁴ This document clearly shows that the USA is willing to stand up and protect the Arctic, however the

³⁶⁰ Titley and St. John, p.271.

³⁶¹ I. Lundestad, 'US Security Policy in the Arctic since 1981: American Strategy, Russian Relationship', (Dissertation for PhD in History, University of Oslo), pp.189-192.

³⁶² Huebert, p.213.

³⁶³ I. Lundestad, 'US Security Policy and Regional Relations in a Warming Arctic', *Swords and Ploughshares* edition 'Global Security, Climate Change, and the Arctic', Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 17.3 (2009), 15-17 (p.15).

³⁶⁴ Huebert, p.213.

document is not specific and does not include exact details. Although the USA has reiterated that it wants to have cooperation in the Arctic, in October 2009, with the publication of the USA's 'Navy Arctic Roadmap', it states that the USA navy needs to rebuild in the Arctic because of the potential future challenges the Arctic faces.³⁶⁵ On May 10, 2013, the Obama White House released the *National Strategy for the Arctic Region*, emphasizing three areas: advancing U.S. security interests, pursuing responsible Arctic region stewardship, and strengthening international cooperation.³⁶⁶ This document highlights best the USA's strategy in the Arctic. It is a very non-committal document and highlights the importance of cooperation in the region, however it also highlights the fact that the USA is prepared to act if its national interests in the region are threatened. Academics such as Titley and St. John highlight the fact that the Arctic is a unique environment where the USA can build relationships with traditional enemies such as Russia and China on 'soft' politics areas.³⁶⁷ This opinion is the preferred approach of the United States in the Arctic, it is not prepared to have a conflict in the Arctic over issues that happen elsewhere in the world as it would preferably want to view the Arctic as a separate environment, however will not rule out military conflict in the future.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ 'National Strategy for the Arctic Region', Presidential Report, May 2013.

³⁶⁷ Titley and St. John, p. 274.

Canada

KEY QUOTE

“The Truth is that the Arctic is a national territory that is too large to be secured by conventional military means, and in fact, the cost of each surveillance and military patrol is increasingly prohibitive”⁵²

With Justin Trudeau’s victory in the 2015 election, Canada is likely to take a new line in the Arctic. However, even with a change in government, Canada in the Arctic will always be connected to sovereignty and economic development.³⁶⁸ Unlike the USA, Canada sees itself as an Arctic state, and has a great attachment to the Arctic. Therefore, Canadian policy in the Arctic is likely to be focused on protecting Canadian sovereign rights in the region at all times. Although there are currently no direct military threats in the region to Canada (like Russia and the USA), Canada needs to impose sovereignty on its areas to provide effective security to the region.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁸ Heather N. Nicol, ‘Ripple Effects: Devolution, Development and State Sovereignty in the Canadian North’, in *Future Security of the Global Arctic: State Policy, Economic Security and Climate*, ed. by Lassi Heininen (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp.99-120 (p.101).

³⁶⁹ Huebert, pp.196-197.

Canada took steps under Stephen Harper to remove NATO's role in the Arctic. In 2009, Canada vowed to veto any NATO council action in the Arctic as Canada believed that NATO may force it to settle disputes in the Arctic over issues such as with the USA on the status of the NWP and Beaufort Sea boundary and with Denmark on Hans Island.³⁷⁰ This action clearly showed Canada as intent on being a strong force in the Arctic and although not seeking conflict, it did not rule out the possibility of conflict by not allowing NATO to act in the region to unify its strategy in the region between member states. Canada's *Northern Strategy* in 2009 showed Canada's aggressive Arctic policy, the document outlined Stephen Harper's commitment when he became Prime Minister in 2006 to increase Arctic patrols, both on land and at sea, and to assert Canada's presence in the North.³⁷¹

Under former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Canada promoted a popularized, militaristic approach.³⁷² Harper advocated an approach that would involve more surveillance in the region and an increase in troops.^{373 374} However, Nicol viewed Harper's approach as erroneous, and it is one that is appropriate due to Harpers' view of how to act in the region. Harper saw the Arctic as a region where he had the motto 'use or will lose'.³⁷⁵ However, the Arctic is not an environment that is traditional or predictable, therefore conventional military methods of protecting a region is not the answer to defending the potential problems that Canada may face in the

³⁷⁰ Helga Haftendorn, 'NATO and the Arctic: is the Atlantic alliance a cold war relic in a peaceful region now faced with non-military challenges?', *European Security*, 20.3 (2011), 337-361 (p.349).

³⁷¹ Offerdal, p.75.

³⁷² Nicol, p.100.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Haftendorn, p.341.

region and the way in which Harper acted raised the possibility of a military conflict in the region.

Under new Canadian Prime Justin Trudeau, the chances of a Canadian conflict in the Arctic have been essentially removed. Trudeau, and his Foreign Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion, although waiting roughly one year after taking office to make an announcement on the Arctic, have declared that they intend to work with Russia in the region, even though Canada and Russia have differing opinions on other issues in the world.³⁷⁶ In addition to this Canada is never going to have a conflict with any of the other NATO member states in the Arctic due to the closeness of the military alliance, with state's instead adopting a policy of agreeing to disagree. Therefore, although Canada will continue to promote its sovereignty claims in the region it will do so in a way it can cooperate with other nations. However, there may be one limitation on the cooperative way in which Canada wishes to operate in the Arctic, the way in which Canada defends the NWP as its own internal waterway. Canada has always maintained that the NWP should be treated as an internal waterway of Canada, and therefore have the rights associated with it (The NWP will be discussed in greater detail in the next section).³⁷⁷ In conclusion, Canada has shifted its Arctic policy from an aggressive and assertive foreign policy under Stephen Harper, which resulted in the potential for conflict being high, to a cooperative policy under

³⁷⁶ Marie-Danielle Smith, 'Trudeau government announces 'rational' shift in Arctic policy, will seek to work with Russia', *National Post*, 1 October 2016, <
<http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/trudeau-government-announces-rational-shift-in-arctic-policy-will-seek-to-work-with-russia>> [accessed 4 December 2016].

³⁷⁷ Kämpylä and Mikkola, p.4.

Justin Trudeau. The current potential for conflict is limited and is only likely to occur if Canada is directly attacked, as it is improbable that Trudeau will do anything aggressive in the region as that is not what he has signalled so far during his brief tenure as Prime Minister.

POTENTIAL CAUSES OF CONFLICT

Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route




Figure 3: A map showing the routes of the

NWP and NSR. Source:

<http://www.static4.businessinsider.com/image/542d6f2c6da8112815701308-680-560/arctic-ice-9.jpg>

As has previously been discussed, the NWP is an area of the Arctic which has the potential to cause conflict. But the NSR also has potential to cause conflict. Until recently, the NWP and NSR were impassable and therefore any statements

which the Arctic countries had on these areas didn't need to be backed up by any action. However, with the ice cap melting, the two passages in question are becoming more accessible, with estimates that the Northern Sea Route could be accessible for ships with no ice breaking strengthening for three months of the year by the end of the century.³⁷⁸ Therefore Arctic nations are having to assert their previous position on the Arctic with actions. Both the NWP and NSR are key potential shipping routes, as was shown in September 2009 when 2 cargo ships travelling from South Korea to Rotterdam travelled through the NSR, and by doing so cut off 4000 nautical miles from the trip, saving time and money in the process.³⁷⁹ The routes of both the NWP and NSR are shown in figure three. Through the opening of the passages, it could create a non-traditional conflict. This is due to the increased risk of terrorism, piracy and trafficking.³⁸⁰ Therefore, Arctic state's military forces in the Arctic could be in conflict with non-state actors, which is what has occurred in other parts of the world previously. In addition to this, conflict could arise from the actions of Russia making it mandatory for all ships travelling through the NSR to have an expensive ice breaker escort (which is legal under international law) which other state's and commercial companies may not want to pay.³⁸¹ The issue for the Northwest Passage is what it is defined as, the USA and Europe have a dispute with Canada as they see it as an

³⁷⁸ Chapman, p.10.

³⁷⁹ Ibid. p.11.

³⁸⁰ Järvenpää and Ries, p.138.


³⁸¹ Marianne Lavelle, *Arctic Shipping Soars, led by Russia and Lured by Energy* (1 December 2013), <<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/11/131129-arctic-shipping-soars-led-by-russia/>> [accessed 4 November 2016].

international strait, which according to UNCLOS should enable free passage.³⁸² Canada however, sees it as internal waters. The USA has a vested interest in the Northwest Passage as if it is termed internal waters it may hinder the travel of the US navy in other parts of the world, and therefore the USA has to publicly disagree with one of its closest allies. Although the NWP and NSR in their current states are likely to cause conflict, the issue is the ease in which a nation could blockade the passages if it chose to do so.³⁸³ Consequently, the NWP and NSR could be the cause of conflict from both non state and state actors.

³⁸² Käpylä and Mikkola, p.4.

³⁸³ Gove, p.18.

Contested Claims for Extension of EEZ



Arctic states could potentially come in to conflict with each other when the CLCS makes its decisions on the boundary disputes in the region. Currently, numerous states have pending claims in the Arctic, however the CLCS are not due to publish their results for some time to come.³⁸⁴ However, if

³⁸⁴United Nations, *Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the*

past evidence is set to continue then conflict could be a very possible reality in the future. When Russian scientists planted an aluminium flag on the seabed of the North Pole in 2007 as part of their seabed evidence gathering, it caused ramifications across the Arctic.³⁸⁵ Canada announced within one week of the flag planting a new \$100 million deep water port facility in Nanisivik and a new army training centre at Resolute bay.³⁸⁶ If the responses of other nations are the same once CLCS releases its response to the claims made by the states then a military conflict in the Arctic is much more likely than the current state of the system. As shown in figure four, the contested region in the Arctic is large and contains large numbers of undiscovered resources. An example of this is the Lomonosov Ridge, which could hold up to 75 million barrels of oil, which could be partly why Russia, Canada and Denmark have all claimed or intend to claim.³⁸⁷ In addition to this, the decisions made by the CLCS are not legally binding and are dependent upon each of the states accepting, and if states disagree with the rulings it could spark a conflict in the region.

Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (last updated 28 October 2016),
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm> [accessed 2 December 2016].

³⁸⁵ Järvenpää and Ries, pp.136-137.

³⁸⁶ Haftedorn, p.338.

³⁸⁷ Andy Rowell, *Russia Leads Arctic Oil Race* (September 2010), <<http://priceofoil.org/2010/09/23/russia-leads-arctic-oil-race/>> [accessed 28 November 2016].

CONCLUSION

A military conflict in the Arctic is unlikely to happen in the region due to the current state of international politics in the region. As has been disclosed in this report, the three Arctic states, of which conflict is most likely to be on a large scale if began, do not have a desire to enter a military conflict in the Arctic. States wish for the Arctic to be a region which they can all cooperate and benefit economically. However, due to actions by all countries in the region through preparing militarily for a potential conflict in the future, nothing can be ruled out. This issue has sparked lots of academic debate, and will continue to do so as the Arctic will continue to be a global issue as climate change makes the region more accessible. The future of the Arctic is one where none of the states want conflict to occur and it is unlikely to do so until the CLCS delivers its reports. Even after this, states are in a position where they do not want a conflict in the region and would prefer to exploit the resources in the region in a profitable manor. However, states see a sound military deterrent as a good place for negotiations should this need to happen.

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