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Introduction

The Political and Cultural Studies Department at Swansea University have decided to create a biannual undergraduate journal to showcase some of the excellent work produced by its students.

We would like to thank Evelien Bracke for the insight she provided and the knowledge she instilled in us to create and run an undergraduate journal. Many thanks also go to Harry Maines-Allen for suggesting the name *Populo*.

Political and Culture Studies covers a wide range of subjects under the umbrellas of American Studies, Politics and International Relations, and War and Society - the name needed to encapsulate all these elements. *Populo* is the Latin for 'by the people' but can also be translated as 'for the people.' As the journal is led by students, comprised of the work of students, and for the students, it plays on this idea. It is also reminiscent of Abraham Lincoln's speech nicely encompassing the various interests of each subject area.

The current editorial team consists of five dedicated students; Benjamin Armitage, Heather Harvey, Kyle Johnson, Vickie Neal, and Alex Roberts, with guidance and support from Eugene Miakinkov.

**What were the main terrorist threats faced by the U.S.A. during
the 1960s and 1970s?**

Natalie Blight - AM-338

The United States of America, during the 1960s and 1970s, oversaw a dramatic turn in the nature of terrorism. Revolutionary terrorism was the primary tactic utilised in order to encourage ‘fundamental political change’ on a domestic level.¹ This would extend to a global scale facilitating a key transition from an era of domestic threats to international terrorism, which J. Bowyer Bell and Ted Gurr claim to be ‘the most dramatic innovation in violent politics of this generation.’²

This essay shall discuss how notions of revolution, and a transition to terrorism on an international level, are represented through the main terrorist threats during these turbulent decades. The youth movements of the early 1960s adopted acts of violence and symbolic threats to promote their anti-war sentiments, an overstated threat that would eventually dissipate as the Vietnam War ended. Anti-Colonialism, portrayed through the actions of Puerto Rican Separatists and Croatian Nationalists, employed revolutionary terrorism in their fight for independence from America. This would be a rising threat from earlier decades that would escalate to a critical level during the 1970s. The increased number of hijackings and hostage situations encouraged widespread media involvement and exposure to the horrific nature of terrorism, but would also force the

¹ J. Bowyer Bell and Ted Robert Gurr, ‘Terrorism and Revolution in America’, in *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (United States: SAGE Publications, 1979), p. 330.

² *Ibid*, p. 333.

President to officially acknowledge the threats of terrorism, allowing further development of revolutionary terrorism in later decades.

The arrival of the 1960s oversaw a wave of revolution, brought on by staunch anti-imperialism and opposition to the progression of Civil Rights by the students of America. Following the announcement of intervention in Vietnam, the movement swiftly adopted an anti-war position, re-fuelling their drive for political change. The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) would soon form under this New Leftist movement, seeking to ‘model the new, vigorously democratic society it desired.’³ The primary goal of this organisation would be revolution by peaceful protest, as outlined in the *Port Huron Statement*, drafted in 1962.⁴ The manifesto firmly summarises the society’s attitudes against the use of violence in social and political change, whilst also stating the importance of key social institutions being ‘generally organized with the well-being and dignity of man as the essential measure of success.’⁵ As controversial American involvement in Vietnam continued to grow, however, so too would the level of threat and terrorism orchestrated by these young protestors.

As tensions in Vietnam increased, radicalisation occurred within the SDS, resulting in a ‘violent faction’ operating under the name the Weathermen.⁶ Brenda and James Lutz argue that youth movements were inevitably ‘movements of the weak,’ as a result of their age and inexperience; terrorism would be ‘one of the few

³ Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) p. 22.

⁴ Students for a Democratic Society, ‘The Port Huron Statement’, 1962 <<http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/huron.html>> [accessed 29 November 2015].

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Jeffrey D. Simon, *The Terrorist Trap: Americas Experience with Terrorism, Second Edition*, 2nd edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001) p. 3.

methods [...] available to them' and the chief approach employed by this group.⁷ The Weathermen, alternatively known as the Weather Underground and the Weather People, and categorized by Martin Schiff as 'the vanguard of a unique cultural and political rebellion,' employed guerrilla tactics to further challenge and campaign against U.S. intervention in Vietnam.⁸ Rhetoric of key members, such as Bernadine Dohrn reiterated and reified the methods of protest undertaken, affirming that 'revolutionary violence is the only way.'⁹ This radicalisation dramatically increased the threat posed by the Weather Underground during the 1960s and 1970s, however they were eager to endorse that the protests and violent action they utilised were merely a tool to represent the objective of the cause, and not to bring harm to innocent American civilians.

Whilst present on the American political landscape during the 1960s and 1970s the Weather Underground 'could claim responsibility for some of the most dramatic events of the time.'¹⁰ Jeffrey Simon identified that over twenty bombings would be claimed by the Weather Underground between 1970 and 1975 alone, 'including attacks on the U.S. Capitol and State Department.'¹¹ The notable Days of Rage, in October 1969, was the Weather

⁷ Brenda J. Lutz and James M. Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, 1st edn (London: Taylor & Francis, 2008) p. 157.

⁸ Martin Schiff, 'Neo-Transcendentalism in the New Left Counter-Culture: A Vision of the Future Looking Back', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 15 (1973), p. 57, Brenda J. Lutz and James M. Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, 1st edn (London: Taylor & Francis, 2008) p. 134.

⁹ Bernadine Dohrn, 'A Declaration of the State of War' (The Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1970)
<<http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/MRC/pacificviet/scheertranscript.html>>
[accessed 1 December 2015].

¹⁰ Bell and Gurr, p. 335.

¹¹ Simon, p. 3.

Underground's 'first major protest.'¹² The attack took place on Chicago's Gold Coast and 'drew in a few hundred people to an orgy of street violence' according to James Farrell.¹³ Vandalism overran the streets throughout the three-day demonstration, resulting in six members of the Weather Underground being shot, and a further 68 arrested.¹⁴ Jeremy Varon considered the violence experienced during this pivotal event as 'the great catalyst [that] revealed the importance of militancy for the New Left.'¹⁵ The following year, and potentially the most crucial incident took place at the University of Wisconsin. Up to this point, the youth movement had been instrumental in ensuring the deaths of them only; this would soon be short lived.¹⁶ On August 24th, 1970, Sterling Hall at the University of Wisconsin was struck with high explosives late in the evening, later revealing the body of Dr Robert Fassnacht, the first civilian loss of life at the hands of the Weather Underground.¹⁷ The movement could no longer claim to utilise symbolic bombs as their only means of revolution. As such, 'the virtue of "doing no harm" had vanished.'¹⁸ Bell and Gurr argue that following this incident, those who 'sought to demonstrate their affirmation of life and the evil of war, had murdered the innocent,' and shortly after this event membership would dramatically fall.¹⁹

Even prior to the dramatic rise of terrorist incidents, the FBI, under Director J. Edgar Hoover, had kept the Weather Underground and other anti-war movements under strict scrutiny, utilizing numerous agents to infiltrate the organisations in order to discover and

¹² Barry M Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, *Chronologies of Modern Terrorism* (United States: M.E. Sharpe, 2008)

¹³ James J. Farrell, *The Spirit of the Sixties: The Making of Postwar Radicalism* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1997) p. 197.

¹⁴ Rubin and Colp Rubin, p. 38.

¹⁵ Varon, p. 74-75.

¹⁶ Bell and Gurr, p. 336.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 336.

¹⁸ Varon, p. 195.

¹⁹ Bell and Gurr, p. 336.

divulge its inner workings and operations.²⁰ Whilst remaining a key terrorist movement during the 1960s and early 1970s seeking political revolution, in reality the terrorist threat imposed by the Weather Underground was dramatically overstated. As the Vietnam War came to an end, much of the violence and civil disobedience would all but disappear, allowing the introduction of new terrorist threats to arise during the 1970s.²¹

Brenda and James Lutz argue that in ‘modern times, the use of terrorism by nationalists has often been associated with national liberation struggles against colonial powers.’²² Such was the case of Puerto Rican and Croatian Nationalists living in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. These movements would adopt revolutionary terrorism in order to promote the desire for liberation in their homeland.

Puerto Rican nationalists adopted anti-colonial protest and terrorism in an attempt to contest American involvement and intervention in their home state. Puerto Rico has been a commonwealth since 1952, allowing ‘some control over its internal affairs’ by the United States.²³ They did not maintain independence as a state, nor were they encompassed officially as a state within North America. This desire for independence and self-sufficiency led to a growing number of revolutionaries within America, where, as Bell

²⁰ Bernard A. Weisberger, ‘The FBI Unbound’, *American Heritage*, 46 (1995) <<http://www.americanheritage.com/content/fbi-unbound?page=show>> [accessed 30 November 2015] p. 2.

²¹ Ted Robert Gurr, ‘Political Protest and Rebellion in the 1960s: The United States in World Perspective’, in *Violence in America: Historical & Comparative Perspectives Eisenhower*, ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (London: SAGE Publications, 1979), p. 57.

²² Lutz and Lutz, p. 103.

²³ Robert Pastor, ‘The International Debate on Puerto Rico: The Costs of Being an Agenda-Taker’, *International Organization*, 38 (1984), p. 576.

and Gurr note, ‘media coverage guaranteed them maximum impact.’²⁴ Progression in the increased attacks led to the creation of the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN), a radicalised faction of the separatists that would later undertake a severe terror campaign during the 1970s.²⁵ It has been identified that around ‘95 per cent of the FALN actions focused on the destruction of property, sabotage and symbolic actions of solidarity with the national liberation movement in Puerto Rico.’²⁶ The terrorist threat surrounding this group had been looming since the 1950s. As a result of other political issues surfacing, however, such as initial Cold War tensions and the violent actions of the anti-war movement, it would not be until the 1970s that they would significantly increase their campaign of terror. Although not as prominent, Croatian nationalists also provided a threat of terrorism through domestic anti-colonialism within the United States at this time. The movement itself ‘linked émigrés from Croatia in several parts of the globe, all of them aiming to free their home from Communist Yugoslavia.’²⁷

Barry and Judith Rubin identify two early examples of terrorism by nationalists in the United States. It would be the Puerto Rican movement that would attempt to assassinate President Harry Truman during a stay at Blair House in 1950, and four years later ‘fire into the House of Representatives from the visitors’ gallery, wounding five congressmen.’²⁸ Upon the announcement of FALN in 1974 a swift and destructive attack would fall upon America, seeing five

²⁴ Bell and Gurr, p. 338

²⁵ Rubin and Colp Rubin, p. 112.

²⁶ Michael González-Cruz, Alberto Marquez Sola and Lorena Terando, ‘Puerto Rican Revolutionary Nationalism: Filiberto Ojeda Ríos and the Macheteros’, *Latin American Perspectives*, 35 (2008) p. 155.

²⁷ Al Baker, ‘Terrorist’s Release Reopens Wound of Unsolved Bombing’, *New York Region* (The New York Times, 10 August 2008) <www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/nyregion/10laguardia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1> [accessed 27 November 2015].

²⁸ Rubin and Colp Rubin, p. 105-106.

individual locations across New York bombed by the organisation due to the economic interests, held by the companies affected, with Puerto Rico.²⁹ Shortly after this, an equally horrific attack would leave New York City traumatized, as the Fraunces Tavern, a popular lunch spot near Wall Street, was bombed in 1975, leaving four people dead and fifty-five injured.³⁰ Bell and Gurr state that here, ‘the intent was to kill’ a notion that took the idea of revolutionary terrorism beyond the parameters of political protest, creating a clear and significant threat to the security of the American people.³¹ A final, yet conspicuous attack to be noted, is the bombing of La Guardia Airport in 1975, killing an incomprehensible 11 people and injuring a further seventy-five.³² Al Baker comments in the *New York Times*, that ‘there were no credible claims of responsibility [and] no arrests were ever made’: He, and many others, have suggested involvement of the Croatian Nationalists due to the prime suspects Croatian heritage, and recent involvement in other New York City bombings. Nevertheless, it remains an “open homicide” case.’³³

Baker recalls that during the period of 1974-1977, there were ‘49 bombings attributed to the [...] Puerto Rican Nationalist group’ FALN, all seeking retribution for unwanted American intervention.³⁴ Bell and Gurr claim that this ‘shift to armed militancy was the result of frustration with Puerto Rican electoral politics [the] 1976 vote for

²⁹ Michael González-Cruz, Alberto Marquez Sola and Lorena Terando, ‘Puerto Rican Revolutionary Nationalism: Filiberto Ojeda Ríos and the Macheteros’, *Latin American Perspectives*, 35 (2008)

³⁰ Bell and Gurr, p. 339.

³¹ *Ibid*, p. 339.

³² Baker,

<www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/nyregion/10laguardia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1> [accessed 27 November 2015]

³³ *Ibid*.

³⁴ Baker,

<www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/nyregion/10laguardia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1> [accessed 27 November 2015].

independence was [...] only 6.5 per cent.’³⁵ The nationalists passionately ‘waged a sustained campaign of liberation with bombs and bullets,’ but it did not achieve the independence of their homeland.³⁶ This escalation was truly one of violent and dramatic proportions and as the issue of independence is yet to be resolved, it is an issue that still lies dormant within the American political sphere. Little has occurred following the events of the 1970s, a time in which ‘the United States has viewed Puerto Rico as [...] at worst, dangerous subversives and revolutionaries,’ their progressive silence has reduced the threat posed by them to the United States as international threats became more prominent and prevalent.³⁷

Due to rising tensions in Latin America and the Middle East notions of anti-colonialism grew exponentially on an international level. Terrorism was no longer only a domestic issue for the United States. Various terrorist organisations employed international tactics, such as airline hijackings and hostage-taking, to highlight their cause.

‘Hijackings are not a new phenomenon,’ as Brenda and James Lutz suggest, yet during the 1960s and 1970s they became a key tool in the arsenal of terrorists.³⁸ The use of airline hijackings would significantly increase during the period 1968-1972 under the necessities of two typographies as identified by Robert Holden; transportation hijackings, and hijackings for extortion.³⁹ Transportation hijackings were significantly employed by Cuban exiles in the wake of the Cuban revolution, as a means of returning to

³⁵ Bell and Gurr, p. 338.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 338.

³⁷ Pedro A. Malavet, *America’s Colony: The Political and Cultural Conflict between the United States and Puerto Rico* (New York: New York University Press, 2004) p. 147.

³⁸ Lutz and Lutz, p. 26.

³⁹ Robert T Holden, ‘The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking’, *American Journal of Sociology*, 91 (1986), p. 874-879.

their home country, initially forbidden by the State Department.⁴⁰ In 1968 alone, Holden remarks, nineteen hijackings of ‘domestic U.S. flights’ landed in Cuba.⁴¹ In the wake of Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) ‘consciously adopted terrorism as the centrepiece of its strategy.’⁴² They would utilise hijackings as a means of extortion, allowing the release of hostages in exchange for the release of imprisoned comrades. On September 6, 1970, the PFLP hijacked four consecutive airlines – including two jets from Trans World Airlines and Pan America: the planes were flown to Dawson’s Field in Jordan, where they were destroyed following the disembarking of passengers and crew.⁴³ All passengers and crew were released in exchange for a small number of Palestinians highlighting the effectiveness of the deed, particularly under such heavy media scrutiny.

As a continuation of hijacking attempts, Middle Eastern terror cells adopted the tactic of hostage taking, in order to stir media attention and promote their cause; subsequently there are two key hostage situations that haunt the 1960s and 1970s. During the Munich Olympics in 1972, Black September terrorists (a faction of the PLO) stormed the Olympic village, where they took nine Israeli athletes hostage and killed a further two, demanding the release of ‘over two hundred Arabs jailed in Israel.’⁴⁴ The outcome of this attack was a ‘colossal failure’ in terms of the hostage situation and the attempt to rescue the captives, Bruce Hoffman contends.⁴⁵ No Israeli athletes survived and no Arab prisoners were released. Hoffman later adds, however:

⁴⁰ Holden, p. 880-882.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 881.

⁴² Rubin and Colp Rubin, p. 176.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 187.

⁴⁴ Rubin and Colp Rubin, p. 188.

⁴⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) p. 68.

The real lesson of Munich [...] was counterintuitive [providing] the first clear evidence that even terrorist attacks that fail to achieve their ostensible objectives can nonetheless still be counted successful provided that the operation is sufficiently dramatic to capture the attention of the media.⁴⁶

This incident was arguably the ‘ideal forum to publicize the Palestinian cause’ and the media responded in full swing.⁴⁷

The second, and possibly most significant hostage situation took place at the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979, in which sixty-three American hostages were held by supposed student demonstrators.⁴⁸ It could be debated that these situations ‘provide an indication of the strength of the dissidents and the weaknesses of the government’ depending on the rapidity and successfulness of the response, an area in which President Jimmy Carter failed.⁴⁹ The disastrous rescue mission that ‘killed eight American servicemen’ and the inability to successfully negotiate the return of the hostages, disillusioned the people of America, highlighting Carter’s weakness as a leader and effectively ending his administration.⁵⁰ The significant media involvement of the increasing hijacking and hostage situations, during the 1960s and 1970s, would compel a response to address the global pandemic that is international terrorism from Washington.

In the years prior to this point in history, presidents had been hesitant to address the issue of terrorism publicly, whether a result of pressing need in other areas of concern or a consciousness to subdue levels of fear and uncertainty among the American people. This was certainly the case with the earlier threats discussed. It could be argued,

⁴⁶ Hoffman, p. 69.

⁴⁷ Lutz and Lutz, p. 123.

⁴⁸ Carol K Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006) p. 37.

⁴⁹ Lutz and Lutz, p. 27.

⁵⁰ Winkler, p. 38-50.

however, that it has become increasingly convoluted to avoid public addresses of terrorism in recent years due to the ‘tremendous growth of the mass media’ following international terrorist developments, subsequently thrusting the issue to the forefront of every presidents political agenda.⁵¹ President Richard Nixon would be the first American leader to officially address ‘inhuman wave of terrorism’ as a key threat haunting these decades, in his ‘Action to Combat Terrorism’ speech of 1972.⁵² Nixon would bring the issue to the frontline of political thinking and security by claiming the ‘time has come for civilized people to act in concert to remove the threat of terrorism from the world.’⁵³ It would be the presidency of Jimmy Carter, a victim of his decisions and insecurities, which would end in such catastrophic disappointment following the Iran hostage crisis of 1979, and therefore directly a result of terrorism. His inconsistency in naming the suspects as hostage takers offers a prime example, Carol Winkler suggests, of Carter’s hesitancy during this time and as such his ineffectiveness.⁵⁴ Jeffrey Simon notes that this incident would ‘virtually paralyze his presidency’, with any opportunities to salvage his legitimacy as America’s leader lost following the failed rescue mission.⁵⁵ At this point international terrorism would reach a critical point in development, with a prevalent need for action and a ‘warrant for immediate international condemnation [...] against such behaviour in the future.’⁵⁶

As Bruce Hoffman notes, ‘anticolonial terrorism campaigns are critical to understanding the evolution and development of modern

⁵¹ Simon, p. 10.

⁵² Richard Nixon, ‘Action to Combat Terrorism’, 1972

<<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3602>> [accessed 30 November 2015].

⁵³ Nixon, <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3602> [accessed 30 November 2015].

⁵⁴ Winkler, p. 39.

⁵⁵ Simon, p.8.

⁵⁶ Winkler, p. 44-45.

contemporary terrorism.’⁵⁷ Throughout the decades in discussion, anticolonial terrorism has been rife within America; it is the transition from a domestic level, as portrayed through the terrorist campaigns of the Puerto Rican separatists, to an international level of anticolonial terrorism, demonstrated in the use of hijackings and hostage taking situations, that re-enforces the developments addressed by Hoffman, initiating forms of terrorism that we are more familiar with today. As a consequence of involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars, the United States would find itself facing numerous enemy states that sought to fight against imperialism throughout the Middle East, in later years.⁵⁸ Palestinian journalist Saqr Abu Fakhr, discusses the threat of a ‘new barbarism’ in an article for *al-Hayat al-Jahida*; ‘the American barbarism committed by the United States in the name of international legitimacy.’⁵⁹ Attitudes such as these, along with knowledge and understanding of these international terrorist tactics, triggered a development of rogue states across the Middle East provoking anti-American sentiments that continues to develop, in threat and volume of support, to present day.

In conclusion, the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, although not necessarily prominent in historical knowledge, emphatically shaped the future of terrorism through the incidents highlighted. Each provided a crucial threat of terror, rendering the legacy of these decades as one of transformation ‘from a primarily localised phenomenon into a security problem of global proportions.’⁶⁰ The Youth Movement and its subsequent factions formed and

⁵⁷ Hoffman, p. 62.

⁵⁸ A Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 93

⁵⁹ Saqr Abu Fakhr, ‘The New Barbarism’, 1998, cited in Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin edn, *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 129.

⁶⁰ Hoffman, p. 62.

disbanded during these decades, wreaking terror on the streets of the United States and highlighting the power and potential of a united front seeking to revolutionise what they believed to be a cruel and imperial regime. The domestic anti-colonialism as enacted by the Puerto Rican and Croatian Nationalists sought violence as a means of liberation, readily prepared to kill for the cause, whilst a remaining threat to some extent the movement itself has sat dormant for many years now. The transition to international anti-colonialism, through the use of hijackings and hostage taking, and the rise of Middle Eastern dissidents, would outlive these decades. The global reaction and presidential responses that followed provided inspiration for future terror cells and developed anti-American sentiments within the region, provoking future attacks including the fateful day of September 11th, 2001. Revolutionary terrorism was itself revolutionised, and so the nature of terrorism would be forever changed.

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To what extent (if any) did European colonizers of Australia engage in conscious campaigns of genocide against Australia's indigenous inhabitants?

Camilla de Paula-Yarmohammadi – PO-256

In this essay I will be looking into the European colonisation of Australia and exploring whether or not these colonisers committed conscious campaigns of genocide against the indigenous inhabitants of Australia, with focus on the British colonisers of Australia. I will provide an account of the colonisation of Australia along with exploring the idea of cultural genocide and Australia's Stolen Generations. In order to reach a conclusion to the question I will draw upon articles and journals and I will look into the definitions of genocide.

Prior to my research, I strongly believed that the European colonisers of Australia did in fact engage in conscious campaigns of genocide against indigenous Australians. I believed that the conscious genocide committed by these colonisers was primarily cultural genocide, due to the European colonisers' desire to forcibly remove indigenous children from their homes.

Defining Genocide

Genocide was a term coined in 1945 by Jewish-Polish Lawyer Raphael Lemkin following the Holocaust where only Lemkin and his brother survived and the rest of his family were murdered. He combined the words 'genos', that means race or tribe in Greek, and 'cide', which means 'to kill' in Latin. In 1948, following campaigning from Lemkin, the UN Convention of Genocide was adopted and came into effect in 1951. Under this convention, genocide is described as being "any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such": Killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group

conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’⁶¹ If genocide takes place in a country it is the duty of the country to punish the perpetrators and prevent genocide from taking place.

However, despite the adoption of the UN Convention of Genocide, many have criticised the convention claiming that the convention is very limited meaning that none of the mass killings committed since the convention was put in place can be classified as genocide. Common criticisms include; the convention excludes targeted political and social groups, the definition of genocide limits itself to direct acts against people and therefore excludes acts against the environment which sustains them or their cultural distinctiveness, it can be challenging to prove the intention of committing genocide, members of the UN are often hesitant to single out other members or intervene, and it is often difficult to stipulate how many deaths equate to a genocide.⁶²

What is cultural genocide?

When Lemkin coined the term genocide, he described eight dimensions to the term; political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious and moral. Each dimension targeted a different aspect of a group’s existence. Out of all these dimensions, physical, biological and cultural genocide are the most recognised. Physical genocide refers to the physical annihilation of a group by killing and injuring its members. Biological genocide refers to measures that are put in place in order to limit the reproductive

61 BBC, "*How Do You Define Genocide?*", BBC News, 2016
<<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-11108059>> [accessed 26 April 2016].

62 BBC

capacity of a group through involuntary sterilization or through the forced segregation of sexes.⁶³

Cultural genocide goes much further than the biological and physical elements of a group; it seeks instead to eliminate fundamental aspects of a group. Often this is done through the abolition of the group's native language, applying restrictions to certain traditional and cultural practices, the destruction of religious institutions and objects that are significant to the targeted group, the persecution and attacks on clergy members and academics. Along with this, elements of cultural genocide include the restriction and prohibition of artistic, literary and cultural activities, along with the destruction and confiscation of national treasures, libraries, archives, museums, artefacts and art galleries.⁶⁴

In the 1948 convention there is mention of physical and biological genocide, however cultural genocide oddly is not. In earlier drafts of the Genocide Convention however, cultural genocide was included and prohibited under the convention but as the treaty neared finalisation questions arose surrounding the relevance of cultural genocide. It was argued that cultural genocide lacked logic and proportion, stating that "to include in the same convention both mass murders in gas chambers and the closing of libraries" did not make much sense. Despite this however some still agreed with Lemkin's broader definitions of genocide, agreeing that an attack on cultural institutions can be detrimental to a group without an attack on physical and biological aspects of the group.⁶⁵

63 David Nersessian, "*Rethinking Cultural Genocide Under International Law*", CarnegieCouncil.org, 2005

<https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_12/section_1/5139.html/pf_printable> [accessed 27 April 2016]

64 David Nersessian

65 David Nersessian

In the finalised convention, cultural genocide was largely ignored except for a part in which it states that it is prohibited to forcibly remove children from a group and place them in another. It was strongly acknowledged that the removal of children was fundamentally destructive, both physically and biologically. They also recognised that attempting to impose customs, language and values of a foreign group upon children was “tantamount to the destruction of the [child’s] group, whose future depended on that next generation.”⁶⁶

What happened to the Indigenous in Australia?

When British colonists entered Australia in 1788, the indigenous population had had almost no previous outside contact. They were met with hostility from the British who forced the indigenous out of their homes, attacked them regularly, poisoned or shot them, and confined them to the most inhabitable areas of Australia. In the 120 years that followed the actions of the British colonisers led the indigenous population to near extinction.⁶⁷

In 1871-72 Anthony Trollope, a novelist visited the British colonies in Australia. He declared the indigenous population was ‘incredibly savage’ and doomed to extinction. Unfortunately, his prediction did come true in part when the ‘full blood’ Tasmanians died out. In the late 19th century the indigenous population was plummeting with many British colonisers claiming that the co-called ‘lower races’ were simply unable to withstand ‘civilisation’, much like the unfortunate indigenous inhabitants of the Americas before them. Despite being extremely violent towards the Indigenous Australians, British colonists and British Australians were adamant to blame disease and dislocation in an attempt to free them of any blame associated with the

66 David Nersessian

67 Brett Stone, "*Report Details Crimes against Aborigines - World Socialist Web Site*", Wsws.org, 1999

<<https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/1999/09/geno-s07.html>> [accessed 28 April 2016].

strong decline in the indigenous population. The indigenous population was declared a 'dying race' by anthropologists, who claimed that the best they could do was to segregate the indigenous in reserves where they would be protected from exploitation.⁶⁸

Following the segregation of the indigenous population, British colonisers systematically removed indigenous children, particularly those with mixed parentage from their families, placing them in institutions or with white parents, in an attempt to raise them as lower class white children. These children were referred to as the Stolen Generations and these acts continued well into the 20th century. As outlined in the introduction to the essay, I will focus on the cultural genocide that took place in Australia.

The Stolen Generations and cultural genocide

Between 1910 and 1970, thousands of indigenous Australian children were forcibly removed from their families as a result of various government policies, in particular the 1897 Aboriginal Act. The trauma faced by many indigenous families during this time continues to affect many communities, families and individuals. The idea of forcibly removing indigenous children from their families followed the ideology of Assimilation. Assimilation was an ideology founded on the assumption of black inferiority and white superiority, which proposed that the indigenous population should be allowed to 'die out' through a process of natural elimination or where possible they should be assimilated into white society.⁶⁹

68 Dirk Moses, *Genocide and Holocaust Consciousness in Australia*, 1st edn (Sydney: University of Sydney, 2016), pp. 1-2

<http://www.dirkmoses.com/uploads/7/3/8/2/7382125/moses_genholoconsaustralia.pdf> [accessed 28 April 2016].

69 Australianstogether.org, "*The Stolen Generations*", Australians Together, 2016 <<http://www.australianstogether.org.au/stories/detail/the-stolen-generations>> [accessed 29 April 2016].

Once removed from their parents the indigenous children were instructed to reject their indigenous heritage and were made to adapt themselves to white culture. Along with this their names were changed and they were forbidden to speak their traditional language. Despite some children being adopted by white families, many were placed in institutions where they were abused and neglected. The process of Assimilation focused primarily on children whom authorities considered to be more adaptable into white society rather than indigenous adults. Children of mixed white and indigenous parentage were the biggest targets for removal as their lighter skin meant that they could be more efficiently integrated into the white community.⁷⁰

When child removal policies were put in place white Australians believed that they would be improving the lives of indigenous Australians by helping them integrate themselves into white society, however this was not the case and indigenous Australians were (and still are) marginalised. They were rejected by society as they refused to accept indigenous people as equals despite their efforts to suppress their culture and race.⁷¹

Despite the practice of the ideology of Assimilation happening before the 1948 Genocide Convention, the removal of indigenous children from their parents continued far beyond the passing of the convention, and despite the exclusion of cultural genocide in the final draft of the Genocide Convention, as mentioned previously there is a part that states: ‘Forcible transfer of children, imposed by direct force or through fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or other methods of coercion’ is considered to be an act of Genocide, along with evidence of the ‘widespread and/or systematic discriminatory and targeted practices culminating in gross violations of human rights of protected groups, such as

70 Australianstogether.org

71 Australianstogether.org

extrajudicial killings, torture and displacement'.⁷² Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families and there is evidence of their displacement, and many testimonials given by the Stolen Generations have proven this. If the accounts of the indigenous victims are accurate then there is evidence that the European colonisers of Australia did indeed commit conscious acts of genocide, that fall under Lemkin's category of cultural genocide.

These testimonials however have been scrutinised and their validity has been questioned, notably by conservative critics Ron Brunton and Paddy McGuinness whom have characterised Stolen Generations testimonies as exemplifying 'false memory syndrome', suggesting that victims have created memories of removal that are being accepted in a sympathetic political and cultural climate.⁷³ Keith Windschuttle also rejects the idea of Stolen Generations claiming that 'in the... 20th century, there was no... statement by anyone in genuine authority that child removal was intended to end Aboriginality. The only support for that proposition has come from... selected statements taken out of context by politically motivated historians', claiming instead that the removal of indigenous children from their parents in the 20th century was 'almost all based on traditional grounds of child welfare.'⁷⁴ This can perhaps be true as 'false memory syndrome' can affect early memories and since many indigenous children were removed at a very young age it could be that

72 UN, "*Office of the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (Osapg)*", 1st edn (UN, 2016), p. 3

<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_analysis_framework.pdf> [accessed 29 April 2016].

73 Ann Curthoys et al, *Aboriginal History*, 1st edn (Canberra: ANU Printing, 2001), p. 116 <<http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p72971/pdf/book.pdf?referer=1063>> [accessed 29 April 2016].

74 Keith Windschuttle, "*There Were No Stolen Generations*", *The Spectator*, 2009 <<http://www.spectator.co.uk/2009/12/there-were-no-stolen-generations/>> [accessed 30 April 2016].

their memories of that time were clouded, for example, child psychologist Jean Piaget gave an account of his own false memory. He recalled that there had been an attempt to kidnap him when he was young. He recalled seeing his nanny fight off the kidnapper followed by an officer who chased the kidnapper away. Piaget swore it happened however his nanny revealed that she had made the story up. Piaget wrote: "I therefore must have heard, as a child the account of this story...and projected it into the past in the form of a visual memory, which was a memory of a memory, but false."⁷⁵

Despite the accusation of ‘false memory syndrome’ being a very valid one indeed, it can be argued that it is very difficult for such a large group of individuals to all be suffering from the same condition. The accounts of the Stolen Generations can perhaps be confirmed by taking a better look at the Aborigines Protection Act, in 1909, the act gave the Aborigines Protection Board legal permission to remove Indigenous children from their families. In 1915, the act was amended; this meant that the Board was able to legally remove any indigenous child from its parents without parental consent or a court order. Poor record keeping meant that it is not known exactly how many indigenous children were taken, which also means that it is almost impossible to find solid evidence to support the cultural genocide that took place in Australia apart from testimonials.⁷⁶

On February 13th 2008, Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd, made a formal apology to the indigenous population of Australia and in particular to the Stolen Generations. He said ‘we apologise ... for the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country.’ The

75 FMS, "False Memory Syndrome Foundation", Fmsfonline.org, 2013 <<http://www.fmsfonline.org/?ginterest=CreatingFalseMemories>> [accessed 30 April 2016].

76 Racismnoway, "*The Stolen Generations | Fact Sheet*", Racismnoway.com.au, 2016 <<http://www.racismnoway.com.au/teaching-resources/factsheets/52.html>> [accessed 30 April 2016].

evidence presented that led to the apology was published in a report called *Bringing Them Home*. In the report there was evidence presented through the accounts of over 500 victims and hundreds of letters presenting eye witness accounts and testimonies. The scale of testimonies itself is a clear indication that the Stolen Generations did in fact happen and the official apology backed up this evidence.⁷⁷

The amendment of the Aborigines Protection Act and the official apology are the only acceptable forms of official evidence of intent to commit genocide against the indigenous population of Australia. It is evident through the testimonials given by the Stolen Generations that they were indeed taken from their families with intent and against their will and placed elsewhere, along with being banned from speaking their native language which under the 1948 Genocide Convention, as I previously outlined, constitutes as an act of genocide. On the other hand however, there is a lack of evidence surrounding the aims of the colonisers and a lack of evidence outlining the intent of the colonisers to commit acts of genocide against the indigenous population. Despite the official apology for the acts committed by colonisers, there is no evidence suggesting that the removal and displacement of indigenous children was in fact an act of ethnical cleansing or if they were, as Keith Windschuttle claimed, merely an enforcement of traditional child welfare laws. However the lack of records surrounding the removal of children possibly hints towards cruel intentions as it can be seen as a 'cover up' which is not uncommon throughout history, most notably the rush by guilty Nazi's to destroy concentration camps during WW2. It must be remembered that in order for an act to be considered genocide it must be proved that the perpetrator had intent to commit the act of genocide. This can be extremely upsetting for people who believe they were victims of

77 NMA, "*National Museum Of Australia - National Apology*", Nma.gov.au, 2016

<http://www.nma.gov.au/online_features/defining_moments/featured/national_apology> [accessed 1 May 2016].

genocide. The accounts provided by the Stolen Generations outlines the emotional and mental scars that have affected them throughout their lives, and although I believe that cultural genocide was committed in the sense that indigenous children had their cultural identities taken from them there is no official evidence outlining that the colonisers intended to suppress and eliminate their indigenous culture. Due to the lack of evidence outlining the intent of the colonisers to commit conscious campaigns of genocide, I will conclude that conscious campaigns of genocide were not committed against the indigenous population of Australia, my thesis was therefore disproved.

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**Critically discuss the view that writers, artists and film-makers
have been unjustifiably pre-occupied with the concept of the hero
in their representations of war**
Elizabeth Gardner – HUA-308

The term hero has been applied to characters for centuries and often means a strong and courageous figure who does something brave to help others in some way. Throughout history, the idea of the hero has been shaped and developed but it continues to go on. In most films and literature, there will be a protagonist who is shown as the hero. This idea of the hero has been developed from Homer's works and continues today. Artists like Jacques-Louis David and Alexander Gardner, as well as film-makers like John Ford and Wolfgang Petersen. Society has lived through several wars and is therefore interested in its depictions and by presenting heroism, people allow themselves to believe that they too can be a hero. It is society that is unjustifiably preoccupied with the hero in their representations of war, and the artists and writers give society what they want in their works. War is more collective than individual, so although heroism is not always realistically represented, it is still showing what people must do to survive in the wars and this template was set out by Homer.

The concept of heroism, and the template for which the attributes and plot have been followed throughout history, can arguably be traced to Homer. Homer's *Iliad* (c. 762 B.C.) lays out a story of battles, warriors must fight to retain and win honour and nobility during the Trojan War. The warriors he depicts are "driven to action by a need for social validation: status, respect, honour in the eyes of other men."⁷⁸ This can be seen in Hector's farewell to Andromache when he says "[he'd] be disgraced, dreadfully shamed among Trojan men... if [he] should, like a coward, slink away from

⁷⁸ Michael Clarke, 'Manhood and Heroism,' in *The Cambridge companion to Homer*, edited by Robert Fowler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 77

war.”⁷⁹ It is important to the men that they prove their strength through fighting. From their battles, they achieve fame “and this in turn encourages warriors to continue their display of prowess.”⁸⁰ It is all about showing the people how strong they are, and the “male energy” they have.⁸¹ Homer depicts the warriors as strong, and able, and virile men who take to violence in order to stop the enemy, and save the women and children from what events might occur from a battle lost.

These warriors Homer depicts, are then heroes because when they win the battles they have (usually) single-handedly stopped the enemy and won the war. As Michael Clark explains, “the men of the heroic race command wonder because of their strength, their fierceness, their superhuman force.”⁸² It was their “nobleness of nature” and “fierce and unruly temper” which made them heroes.⁸³ C.M. Bowra goes on to say that “though the word *hērōs* originally meant no more than warrior, it came to assume more august associations and to imply a special superiority in human endowments and endeavours.”⁸⁴ It is not just the fighting which makes them heroes, but the pride and courage they show within the battles. It is also not just the ones that win that are considered heroes, as Odysseus explains when he is left alone, “the man who wants to fight courageously must stand his ground with force, whether he is hit, or whether his blows strike the other man.”⁸⁵ Therefore, it is not just

⁷⁹ Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. by Ian Johnston (Virginia: Richer Resources Publications, 2012), 6. 540-543

⁸⁰ Clarke, ‘Manhood and Heroism,’ p. 77

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 80

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 80

⁸³ W.A. Camps, *An Introduction to Homer* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 11; p. 12

⁸⁴ C.M. Bowra, *Homer* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Company Ltd., 1979), p. 79

⁸⁵ Homer, *The Iliad*, 11. 408-410

about winning battles, but being courageous in life in order to be remembered after death.

Fame after death is an important aspect for Homeric heroes. A warrior is nothing more than that if he is forgotten after death, but a hero is a man who fights courageously and dies in honour and is remembered for their legacy. In this way, “heroism and death are tied together” as they need to “perpetuate one’s status” in order to continue “fame after death.”⁸⁶ A hero will be remembered for his “tale of deeds” by “future generations.”⁸⁷ It is therefore acceptable to die in war because “though dead, he shows his nobility.”⁸⁸ Homer uses the characteristics of the hero to show the importance of bravery and strength during a war. The characters themselves want to be considered heroes and want to be remembered for their achievements, and in this way, Homer accentuates the idea of the hero in order to express the character’s prowess.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that they are not heroes at all, as Richard Gaskin argues that “choices are made for them rather than by them.”⁸⁹ If Gaskin’s view is correct, that the choices the characters make are not their own and if they are not their own decisions, then the results which lead to their success should not be reaped by them. The use of Gods does make it more likely that the men who achieve success, were chosen by the Gods to win. This makes them less like heroes. However, they are still fighting themselves and putting themselves at risk, which takes bravery. *The Iliad* has also been criticised, as it is historic legend but not truly history, so does not necessarily depict a true representation of the wars and ‘heroes’ of the time. Although, it is thought that some royal families may “trace their

⁸⁶ Clarke, ‘Manhood and Heroism,’ p. 75; p. 77

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 78

⁸⁸ Homer, *The Iliad*, 22. 92

⁸⁹ Richard Gaskin, ‘Do Homeric Heroes Make Real Decisions?’ in *Oxford Readings in Homer’s ‘Iliad,’* edited by Douglas L. Cairns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 147

descent from heroes and were proud to hear of their prowess,” C.M. Bowra believes that it should be treated for what it is, as an “artistic resurrection of the past.”⁹⁰ On the other hand, it does not need to be historically correct, as even if the depictions are not true, it sets the template for which representations of heroes in other works of literature and culture can be measured against.

Some of the descriptions in Homer’s *Iliad* do more than accentuate the strength of a character. Hector, for example, is more than a hero to the reader because of the scene with his wife and son which shows us “the cause for which he is fighting and makes us feel for him throughout the story as typically human as well as heroic.”⁹¹ Although he does have heroic qualities, there is more to him than simple strength and honour, and the humanity which is represented gives him more depth than other characters. Being a hero is more than being strong and brave and winning battles. Homer develops this idea through some of his characters like Hector, but also sets a basis for other writers and film-makers through generations to work from, in regards to the hero.

Homer can be attributed to creating a template from which writers, artists and film-makers have since used in their works. This Homeric tradition of the hero, especially heroism in wars, can be seen, for example, in works by artist Jacques-Louis David. David’s life “coincides with the most tumultuous period of history that France and the Western world had yet experienced.”⁹² He therefore had a lot of events to capture in his work. He was also “recognized as the artist whose works best captured the ideals of the Revolution.”⁹³ By using his art to show events of the time, he allows historians today to have

⁹⁰ C.M. Bowra, *Homer*, p. 94; p. 80

⁹¹ W.A. Camps, *An Introduction to Homer*, p. 27

⁹² Warren Roberts, *Jacques-Louis David, Revolutionary Artist: Art, Politics, and the French Revolution* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 3

⁹³ Roberts, *Jacques-Louis David*, p. 5

visual images of some of the events that occurred. It was not just his art, but “he served the Revolution in more than an artistic capacity: he was politically involved as well.”⁹⁴ Although this may mean that his works of art can be biased towards his interests in the events, his works still show a preoccupation with the individual and battle scenes. His work often shows aspects of life that he was experiencing at the time, and had an interest in battles and the role of the hero. Warren Roberts believes that “David’s art is evidence of his attraction to the courageous, heroic, and violent.”⁹⁵ Since he had an interest in such things, his work can be seen to present heroic ideas of the time.

One of David’s paintings which clearly shows an example of wartime heroism, is *Napoleon Crossing the Alps* (1801). Which features Napoleon Bonaparte on horseback. Napoleon and the horse are central in the image and take up most of the scene, which immediately leads the eye to them. The main focal points are the orange/red colouring of Napoleon’s clothing, the pointed arm which leads to the battle, Napoleon’s body and, the muscular physique of the white horse. Reared back on its hind legs, the horse is ready to charge towards battle and Napoleon is commanding him on, pointing to the action. Under the horse’s front hooves, in the distance, some other men can be seen. However, they are not clear and there does not seem to be any fighting occurring. The sky blends into the land and both are muted in colour, and are jagged and rough which emphasises the manliness of Napoleon and the struggle of war. The light appears to shine down on Napoleon, which insinuates his importance and focuses him in the image. It gives him a god-like quality and suggests he is a hero in the battle.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 5

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 26

The paintings of Napoleon, supposedly, were “painted according to Napoleon’s own wishes and not those of David.”⁹⁶ This suggests that this is not how David wanted to paint him and perhaps not how he would present a ‘hero.’ However, “when David proposed to paint him sword in hand, Napoleon... replied that battles were no longer won with the sword and that he wished to be painted ‘calm, on a fiery horse.’”⁹⁷ This shows how the battles were seen as being won by people of higher status and the aristocrats, rather than the poorer masses who fought to the death. This can further be seen by the clothing Napoleon is wearing in the painting, which is not something that would be worn to war. As well as the fact that his sword is not easily visible, and fairly small, and not in his hand ready to fight, but still attached by his leg. These representations of wars are therefore focused on the individual; however, war is a collective event and not won by a single person. This idea also follows on from Homer’s works, as the battles he described were also often one-on-one. David therefore, similarly to Homer, is interested in the hero as an individual, and the descriptions of their battles rather than the mass war which is more likely to have occurred.

The individualism of war which is presented in Homer and David’s work, makes it not a true representation of war. Just as with David’s artistic depictions, Homer’s “main narrative focuses on individuals” and usually “one-to-one combat.”⁹⁸ This makes the descriptions not only false representations, but unrealistic, as war would not have occurred in this way during the period. As David shows with his images of Napoleon, the depictions in art and literature also make the wars “aristocratic combat” where “the common man is almost invisible.”⁹⁹ R.B. Rutherford argues that this makes the warfare

⁹⁶ Anita Brookner, *Jacques-Louis David* (London: Chatto & Windus Ltd, 1980), p. 147

⁹⁷ Brookner, *Jacques-Louis David*, p. 147

⁹⁸ R.B. Rutherford, *Greece & Rome: New Surveys in the Classics No.26: Homer* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 37

⁹⁹ Rutherford, *Greece & Rome*, p. 37

seem “straightforward and noble” but also “highly artificial.”¹⁰⁰ By focusing on the hero which is more of an individual concept, the reality of war is lost. This individualism can also be seen in the film *The Searchers* (1956) which was directed by John Ford.

Although not a film which depicts a war as such, *The Searchers* can be seen to represent war as the protagonist Ethan wears his Confederate Army uniform when the audience first meets him, and the film centres around racist ideas of Native Americans and the war between white Americans and Native Americans. Although not typical to the Western genre, the film, similarly to Homer and David, has a “concentration on a solitary hero rather than a social group.”¹⁰¹ This helps to emphasise one of the main aspects of the Western which is the ‘hero.’ Homer and David’s work depicting individual situations of battle accentuates the hero and how a battle is essentially won by one person. In *The Searchers*, this is also the case as the story follows Ethan as he attempts to find his niece after she is taken by Native Americans. The Western genre in general is “based on a triplex system of the hero, the adventure, and the law” so Ethan’s character is essential to the story.¹⁰² However, the film has been criticised for its representation of racism, and argued that Ethan is not a hero at all.

As Tag Gallagher states, Ethan, “so thoroughly perverts the hero’s traditional tasks.”¹⁰³ It is clear that Ethan is “not a saint on a mission of goodness.”¹⁰⁴ It is also clear, that he is interested in his brother’s wife. Even in his search for his niece, he is mostly desperate to get her away from the Native Americans, and has interests in her

¹⁰⁰ Rutherford, *Greece & Rome*, p. 39

¹⁰¹ Tag Gallagher, *John Ford: The Man and his Films* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 328

¹⁰² George N. Fenin and William K. Everson, *The Western: From Silents to the Seventies* (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1978), p. 25

¹⁰³ Gallagher, *John Ford*, p. 337

¹⁰⁴ Stanley Corkin, *Cowboys as Cold Warriors: The Western and US History* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), p. 137

too. Despite this, Martin M. Winkler's view, is that the reason some viewers may still see Ethan as a hero is because he is "played by the actor who more than anybody else in screen history embodies the western hero" making his role as a 'hero' ambiguous.¹⁰⁵ Winkler goes on to assess Ethan's characteristics, and argues that it is Ethan's "savagery and increasing obsession and madness" which "undercut Ethan's heroic qualities."¹⁰⁶ Some of Ethan's actions also, go against the traditional hero depiction, since there is a scene where he kills three men whilst they are running away, which could arguably be seen as cowardly. Winkler states, it is "an action incompatible with the unwritten code of behaviour for western heroes."¹⁰⁷ It can be seen that Ethan therefore, does not follow Homer's example and does not embody the nature of a hero.

This can further be seen Ethan is also a racist figure. Not only is it "his extreme racism that keeps him from being a hero" but it is not the actions of the Native American's which make him racist towards them, as he can be seen as "a racist *before* the murder of Martha."¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, although not the embodiment of the traditional hero as represented by Homer, the casting of John Wayne makes the viewer see him as a kind of "troubled hero" and "feel pity... and sympathy for a murderous racist."¹⁰⁹ Since the viewers will still imagine Ethan as a hero because of the actor who plays him, it is likely that many will associate Ethan as a hero, despite his more negative characteristics. It is therefore the viewers who make him into a hero, as it was not John Ford's intentions. It is the culture of today,

¹⁰⁵ Martin M. Winkler, 'Homer's *Iliad* and John Ford's *The Searchers*,' in *The Searchers: Essays and Reflections on John Ford's Classic Western*, edited by Arthur M. Eckstein and Peter Lehman (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2004), p. 151

¹⁰⁶ Winkler, 'Homer's *Iliad* and John Ford's *The Searchers*,' p. 152

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 155

¹⁰⁸ Corkin, *Cowboys as Cold Warriors*, p. 137; Edward Buscombe, *The Searchers* (London: BFI Publishing, 2000), p. 18

¹⁰⁹ Buscombe, *The Searchers*, p. 24; p. 26

which needs to see heroes in literature and films rather than the writers and film-makers themselves.

Film-makers in particular understand the need for heroes, and therefore make sure to emphasise it in their films. It was the two world wars which marked a change in the presentation of the hero. For example, after World War II there was a “marked move to make the hero a less idealized character” as “the war had destroyed too many illusions.”¹¹⁰ The public had lived through the war and understand more about it than ever before, and did not want to see unrealistic films. Which painted the situation out as one that was easily won by one person, rather than the husbands, sons and brothers who had fought and often died in the wars. Ethan’s character in *The Searchers* could therefore be seen as a kind of hero who has been changed by his experience in the Confederate Army. It can be seen as following Homer’s heroic template and Martin Winkler agrees that the “Greek heroic myth” is “an archetypal precursor of the American Western film in general and of John Ford’s *The Searchers* in particular.”¹¹¹ He goes on to add that, “Ford’s understanding of heroism places especially the figure of Ethan Edwards and the film’s ending in the cultural tradition of Homeric epic.”¹¹² *The Searchers* can be seen as following Homer’s idea of the hero, despite it being filmed post-World War II and understanding the collective effort that it was.

Even with somewhat more realistic representations of war and ‘the hero’ developing after World War II, it continues to be a popular theme. Representations of war are important, especially, for example, in American culture, as “the war movie was central to the global propaganda campaigns during World War I and World War II.”¹¹³ By

¹¹⁰ Fenin and Everson, *The Western: From Silents to the Seventies*, p. 27

¹¹¹ Winkler, ‘Homer’s *Iliad* and John Ford’s *The Searchers*,’ p. 145

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 145

¹¹³ Guy Westwell, *War Cinema: Hollywood on the Front Line* (London: Wallflower Press, 2006), p. 1

impressing upon people that they can be the hero and help their country, this encourages people to join the army and help however they can in the war effort. “The release of a successful Hollywood war movie will often boost recruitment to the US armed forces” as well, which means people enjoy watching the films and want to achieve what the characters do, even if it is unrealistic.¹¹⁴

This desire for a hero in wartime imagery can be seen in some of Alexander Gardner’s photography. For example, his photograph, *Home of a Rebel Sharpshooter, Gettysburg* (1863) depicts a soldier who has made a kind of trench, dead at the bottom of it with his gun next to him. As it is a black and white image, the eye is first led to the pure white of the sky which contrasts against the dark hole the soldier resides in. From there it follows the pile of protective rocks before finally resting on the soldier’s crumpled form. His body parts blend in with the rocks of the terrain he is surrounded by which suggests he has become “one with the inanimate world.”¹¹⁵ With no one else in sight, this image suggests that this soldier is a hero, shooting the enemy from his hiding place and protecting the lives of his fellow soldiers. However, years after the photograph was taken, “the image was discovered to have been posed.”¹¹⁶ It is not then a depiction of a hero shooter, but an image which was created by dragging a soldier who had died on the battlefield. Nevertheless, this does not actually detract from the image as Gardner has created a narrative which “lends dignity to the life of the fallen soldier.”¹¹⁷ Although his real story is unknown, he was still a soldier that fought in the war and died for the cause and which can be as heroic. Society’s need for a hero to praise does not mean that the masses of soldiers who go to war, are not individually heroes. Homer’s work has led society to desire a hero and

¹¹⁴ Westwell, *War Cinema*, p. 3

¹¹⁵ Angela L. Miller et al., *American Encounters: Art, History and Cultural Identity* (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), p. 272

¹¹⁶ Miller, *American Encounters*, p. 273

¹¹⁷ Miller, *American Encounters*, p. 273

this has informed the works of many other writers, film-makers and artists.

Society's desire for films with heroes has led to more film adaptations of literature than ever before and Homer's work, as the template for this, is no different. Although films like *The Searcher's* can be seen to embody the Homeric hero, film-makers are still looking towards the classics for modern development. *Troy* is a modern adaptation of *The Iliad* although only focusing loosely on one part of the Trojan War and was directed by Wolfgang Petersen in 2004. Although it did well in the box office, it did not receive the same level of critical acclaim that Homer has for his work, but it did make a classic more accessible to the masses. By using well-known actors such as Brad Pitt, Eric Bana, and Orlando Bloom, audiences are encouraged to watch these celebrities as well as learn some of Homer's story.

What Petersen chose to do in the film was to take out the Gods. This arguably makes the main characters even more like heroes as it places all the achievements on them, and also makes Gaskin's argument that the character's do not make their own decisions, redundant. As Kim Shahabudin states, "the removal of the gods leaves humans with full responsibility for their actions."¹¹⁸ The characters are further made to be heroes by their physique and dress which make them look powerful, especially against the female characters. Although the battle scenes are focused on individuals, there is more of a sense of the scale of the battles and the people involved, which is what is missing from some of the other pieces of literature and art. In one of the pivoting scenes, Hector duels and kills Patroclus whom he believes to be Achilles. Patroclus tries to be a hero and dies, but dies in honour which is the most important thing to the Greeks. *Troy* is an

¹¹⁸ Kim Shahabudin, 'From Greek Myth to Hollywood Story: Explanatory Narrative in *Troy*,' in *Troy: From Homer's Iliad to Hollywood Epic*, ed. by Martin M. Winkler (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2007), p. 115

example of a modern film which has embodied Homer's epic, through the depictions of heroes and brings it to the audience in a way that they enjoy. It is society that needs the hero, in order to think they have a chance of individually achieving something great.

The idea of the hero is not something that is going to disappear as it has been represented throughout time and continues today. Homer can arguably be seen to set the template for heroism in war, and does so through the grand battle scenes of one-to-one combat and the descriptions of the strength and nobility of the men involved. This view of what a hero is, has continued to be developed and can be seen in wartime imagery. Such as the paintings of Jacques-Louis David, who lived during a tumultuous period and focuses on war scenes and individuals, as well as Alexander Gardner whose photographs, although occasionally staged, present war as noble for those involved. Homer's heroism has been adapted into films and his ideas used in many different genres like the Western. The idea of the hero is therefore shown throughout history and writers, artists and film-makers are preoccupied with it. Although, much of the time it is not realistic, which means that their preoccupation is unjust, it is what society likes to see as it means they see themselves as having a chance of being a hero, so the artists are bringing what the people want.

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**The Impossible Dream: Transcendental Idealism in Liberal
Utopian Thought**
Robin Hill – HUP-201

“One must require from each one the duty which each one can perform,” the king went on. “Accepted authority rests first of all on reason. If you ordered your people to go and throw themselves into the sea, they would rise up in revolution. I have the right to require obedience because my orders are reasonable.” *The Little Prince*, Antoine de Saint-Exupery¹¹⁹

The claims of transcendental or utopian liberalism rest on two key conceptual elements. The first is the assertion that there is some necessary relationship between the prosecution of individual rights and an entity satisfying some criteria of statehood, and the second is that both states and basic human rights are more than hypothetical ideals. Neither is clear *prima facie*.

In his book *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, Robert Nozick outlined a philosophically justifiable state, often called the nightwatchman state, whose limits were in securing natural and universal rights, which may be called human rights, in property¹²⁰. His work remains highly influential and widely discussed, as does the liberal contractualist tradition to which it belongs. In order to examine the merits of Nozick’s claim as expressed above, it is first necessary to examine that tradition since Nozick echoes its logic and conclusions.

The liberal contractualist tradition has three founding texts, Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, Locke’s *Two Treatises of Government*,

¹¹⁹ Saint-Exupery, A. de, *The Little Prince*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1963, p. 46

¹²⁰Nozick, R., *Anarchy, State and Utopia* at https://joseywales1965.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/0001_anarchy_state_and_utopia.pdf, retrieved 14/04/2016 at 13:49 p.m.

particularly the second treatise, and Rousseau's *The Social Contract*¹²¹. There are many similarities shared between these works, and *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, and a few points of divergence as well.

They all agree, broadly, that “man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains”, in Rousseau's famous phrase, or that human liberty is naturally unlimited, but that the conditions of human social living necessitate limits to that liberty¹²². They also agree that the state, the entity that imposes those limits, is an artifice of human creation, or Leviathan, as Hobbes describes¹²³. They all derive those claims from a thought experiment on the functioning of human social living prior to the state, in the famous “state of nature”, and conclude, finally, that it is an exercise of human reason to voluntarily limit their own liberty in the creation of a civil society in order to prosecute an increased liberty within the confines of that society, free from the excesses of others' exercises of liberty. They disagree, however, on the essential nature of the individuals that comprise civic society. Between Hobbes' pessimistic assessment of the singular and atomistic agent as echoed by Hayek, Nash and von

¹²¹ Hobbes, T. *Leviathan*, at <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm>, Locke, J. *Two Treatises of Government*, at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf>, and Rousseau, J. J., *The Social Contract*, at <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf>, all retrieved 14/04/2016 at 14:06 p.m.

¹²² Rousseau, J. J., *The Social Contract*, at <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf>, p. 1

¹²³ “For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended;...” Hobbes, T., *Leviathan*, at <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm>, retrieved 14/04/2016 at 14:13 p.m.

Neumann¹²⁴, who is rationally self-interested, but does not play well with others, so to speak, and so seeks the protection of the state against the misdirected self-interest of others. Where the more flattering ascriptions of Locke and Rousseau, shared by Mill, who feel that humanity is essentially benign and co-operative by nature, and that the role of the sovereign is facilitation, of governance and apportionment, and the aversion of disputes between collections of individuals¹²⁵.

These disagreements in turn lead to differing conclusions about the limits of the power of the sovereign. For Hobbes, the sovereign state stands as a permanent bulwark against the *bellum omnium*, or struggle for survival and selfish interests that result in the state of nature. Thus, the sovereign is not subject to the limits on

¹²⁴ “It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another:...” Ibid., and “It is not surprising that in some respects man's biological equipment has not kept pace with that rapid change, that the adaptation of his non-rational part has lagged somewhat, and that many of his instincts and emotions are still more adapted to the life of a hunter than to life in civilization.” Hayek, F. A., *The Constitution of Liberty*, at <http://www.libertarianismo.org/livros/tcolfh.pdf>, retrieved 14/04/2016 at 15:00 p.m., p. 40. See also von Neumann, J. And Morgenstern, O., *The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour*, PUP, Princeton, 1944, and the rules of “So Long Sucker” created by Hausner, M., Nash, J., Shapley, L. S. And Shubik, M.

¹²⁵ “The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions;” Locke, J., *Two Treatises of Government*, at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3113/locke/government.pdf>, p. 107, and both Rousseau’s discussion of the social compact in Ch. 6 of *The Social Contract* at <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf> and paragraph 12 of Mill’s introductory chapter to *On Liberty* at <http://www.bartleby.com/130/1.html>, both retrieved 14/06/2016 at 15:53 p.m.

liberty that she exists to impose, and cannot be justifiably overthrown, whatever her conduct¹²⁶. For Locke and Rousseau, and Mill in particular, the sovereign state exists to prosecute the common will, and becomes illegitimate and unjustified if it exceeds or neglects this purpose, at which point, the social contract is dissolved and the state ceases to exist¹²⁷.

Nozick's line of argument tends to concur with Locke and Rousseau on both of these points of divergence, with a greater emphasis on property, and the economic functions of individuals. Thus, Nozick's position is that the state's only function is to secure and preserve the ability of its citizens to contract freely with one another; a demand for reversion to the night-watchman, or minimal state, of the laissez-faire liberalism of the 18th and 19th centuries¹²⁸.

Nozick's argument that private contract is the most philosophically desirable means for the exercise of attendant human liberty makes no claim that it is the most practically desirable or efficient means. Nor is it clear that "basic" human rights, or the rights to property and to freedom of contract, are in any way impinged by, say, universal health or education provision. As Nozick observes, "The operators of the ultra minimalist state are morally obligated to

¹²⁶ See Hobbes, T., *Leviathan*, Ch. XIII "Of The Naturall Condition of Mankind" in the section "Out of Civil States" at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm#link2H_4_0203, retrieved 14/04/2016 at 15:57 p.m.

¹²⁷ See Locke, J., *Two Treatises of Government*, at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf>, p. 161, Rousseau, J. J., *The Social Contract*, at <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf>, p. 12, and in general terms, Mill, J. S., *On Liberty*, at <http://www.bartleby.com/130/1.html>, all retrieved 14/04/2016 at 16:14 p.m.

¹²⁸ Nozick, R., *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, ps. 26, 51 and 84 at https://joseywales1965.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/0001_anarchy_state_and_utopia.pdf, retrieved 14/04/2016 at 19:30 p.m.

produce the minimal state.”¹²⁹ It then remains unclear why materialistic individualism is inherently preferable to collectivism, and why the moral impetus to ensure protection against social risk ends at the minimal state. Presuming the social utility and economic efficiency of both state provision through redistributive taxation and private provision through private contract were equal, it is not clear what grounds Nozick would have for preferring the latter. Nozick presumes the opposite, and the opposite is often true in fact, but in accepting the artificial nature of the state, Nozick and the liberal contractualist tradition must also acknowledge that this is not a necessary state of affairs, but merely a common one.

Philosophically, too, Nozick’s position is questionable. From a Foucaultian perspective, “bio-power” and the subsequent rise of state racism occur because of a vacuum of purpose within the state. From a Marxist perspective, the state exists, and has always existed, to prosecute the political aims of the economically powerful as a means of redressing the numerical imbalance between them as a group and the economically weak, a perspective mirrored by Aristotle. In Plato’s *Republic*, Socrates rejects this form of institutionalism entirely and focuses on the duty and character of the ruler¹³⁰. When Hayek observed that “a democracy may well wield totalitarian powers, and it is conceivable that an authoritarian government may act on liberal principles”, he was observing that no necessary connection between the type of government, a minimal constitutional one in Nozick’s case, and its subsequent purpose, the prosecution of the basic human rights to free contract and property ownership, and those necessary to

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 52.

¹³⁰ See Foucault, M., “Society must be defended” at http://rebels-library.org/files/foucault_society_must_be_defended.pdf, p. 239, Marx, K. and Engels, F., *The Communist Manifesto*, OUP, Oxford, 1998, p. 10 , Aristotle, *Politics*, at <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html>, Part V and Plato, *Republic*, Book I, at <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.2.i.html>, both retrieved 14/04/2016 at 19:48 p.m.

secure them, can be made¹³¹. Instead, it is entirely plausible, as Hobbes observed, that a usurper or foreign invader may prosecute the supposed function of the state at least as effectively as a minimal state, if not better¹³².

Finally, as Saint-Exupery's universal monarch expresses, once the liberal claim to human rationality is made, all subsequent claims to the function of a state are reducible to the claim that the state pursues that which is reasonable; it is not basic human rights that are maintained, but reason, since when two individuals' basic human rights are in conflict, it is reason that the state will use to decide whose basic human rights will not be maintained, and it is reason that causes the constitution of the state in the first instance. This combination of rules of reason and libertarian principles has been examined by John Gray, who finds that intuition and stipulative conditions play a substantial role, and that the synthesis of arguments such as Nozick's extend far further than the authors often admit¹³³.

In this regard, Nozick, and his predecessors in the liberal contractual tradition, were describing hypothetical ideal forms of government, and not practical extant ones. In this way, similar to Plato's *Republic*, *The Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels, or that suggested by Nozick's contemporary and opponent, John Rawls, in *The Theory of Justice*, the exercise is directed more at the discovery of principles of general applicability that offer insights into the improvement of present governance, with its associated practical

¹³¹ Hayek, F. A., *The Constitution of Liberty*, Routledge Classics, Abingdon, 2006, p. 103

¹³² Hobbes, T. *Leviathan*, at <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm>, "Not By The Victory, But By The Consent Of The Vanquished." Retrieved 15/04/2016 at 13:41 p.m.

¹³³ Saint-Exupery, A. de, *The Little Prince*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1963, p. 46, and Gray, J., "Mill's liberalism and liberalism's posterity", *The Journal of Ethics*, 4 2000. Pp. 137-165

difficulties, rather than wholesale implementation¹³⁴. Thus, the pragmatist claim, after Richard Rorty, that a state that seeks to protect and promote “basic human rights” is more desirable than one that does not, regardless of the philosophical validity of the rights claimed or the fundamental necessity of the state having “functions”, is as well served by Nozick’s formulation of the argument as it is by Thomas Paine or the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)¹³⁵. Similarly, Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” argument, and his emphasis on rights and liberty, can be seen in the context of an appeal to similarly desirable concepts; it becomes less relevant whether the claim to the state’s fundamental purpose is valid and merited or not, and more relevant whether, in pragmatic terms, there is a universal appeal in the notion of a state that prosecutes basic human rights over one that does not¹³⁶. If there is, then Nozick’s argument is as good as any for attributing that function to civic governance, since the criterion for assessing the merits of the argument are similarly eroded.

Liberalism has also found difficulty in separating the ideal from the extant in relation to the definition of a state¹³⁷. As Joseph Raz notes:

¹³⁴Ibid., pp.154-155, specifically footnote 28.

¹³⁵ Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, CUP, Cambridge, 1989, Paine, T., *The Rights of Man*, at <http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/thomas-paine-the-rights-of-man/text.php>, specifically his “Enumerations”, and the European Convention on Human Rights at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf, both retrieved 15/04/2016 at 13:56

¹³⁶Nozick, R., *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, at https://joseywales1965.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/0001_anarchy_state_and_utopia.pdf, ps. 96 and 161 retrieved 15/04/2016 at 14:12 p.m.

¹³⁷Nozick, R., *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, at https://joseywales1965.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/0001_anarchy_state_and_utopia.pdf, p. 22, retrieved 15/04/2016 at 14:12 p.m.

Perfectionist liberalism has firm moral foundations. On the one hand, on this conception governments' function is to protect and promote, within the bounds of their competence, the well-being of people. On the other hand, people prosper through a life of self-definition consisting of free choices among a plurality of incompatible but valuable activities, pursuits and relationships, i.e., a plurality of valuable and incompatible styles and forms of life¹³⁸.

Nozick echoes such a plurality¹³⁹. Yet the state, minimal or otherwise, and rights, basic, human or otherwise, are assumed rather than explained. For this reason, it is not clear if any organisation that efficiently prosecutes this plurality and is compatible with an offered epistemology of rights is equally acceptable to Nozick, and if not, why this should be so.

Equally, such a pluralistic state is both singular and universal; the rights claimed are claimed for all and the subsequent function of the state, in preserving the manifold variety of the means of human flourishing, is equally universal. Nozick, in contrast to Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, idealises such a universal state¹⁴⁰. Still, however, it remains unclear how a Marxist utopia, Oakeshott's "civil association" or any community of an entire species deserves the name "state" in the first instance, and abrogates the moral impetus that led to its

¹³⁸Raz, J., *Ethics in the Public Domain*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 105

¹³⁹Nozick, R., *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, at https://joseywales1965.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/0001_anarchy_state_and_utopia.pdf, p. 307, retrieved 15/04/2016 at 14:37 p.m.

¹⁴⁰Ibid. and Hobbes, T. "(in which we see them live in Common-wealths,)", *Leviathan*, at <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm>, Locke, J. *Two Treatises of Government*, at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf>, p. 131 and Rousseau, J. J., *The Social Contract*, at <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf>, Ch. 9, p. 23 and Ch. 10, p. 24, retrieved 15/04/2016 at 14:39 p.m.

creation at the stage of the achievement of the minimal state in the second¹⁴¹.

Finally, there is the question of the meaning of “basic human rights”. As identified, within the liberal contractualist tradition, these rights are primarily property rights, with other rights derived from these. For example, the right to claim what one has “mixed one’s labour” with necessitates the right to continued existence¹⁴². If the meaning of “basic” is taken to be the first order rights only, then the second order rights are practicalities only. Yet, as identified above, these practicalities may extend significantly beyond the nightwatchman state as traditionally envisaged; the right to contract freely may well necessitate the right to education, to life, to privacy, to freedom of association, to paid holidays, to freedom from slavery and inhumane treatment and many of the other superficially secondary rights, without which, the right to contract freely can neither be achieved nor have any meaning.

Within this context, it is also worth noting that an equitable rights claim, such as Nozick, Locke or Mill make, contains two inherent difficulties¹⁴³. The first concerns the justice claim upon which

¹⁴¹ “The establishment of a system of society based upon the common ownership and democratic control of the means and instruments for producing and distributing wealth, by and in the interest of the whole community. THAT IS SOCIALISM.” From the Socialist Party of Great Britain’s manifesto, at <http://www.worldsocialism.org/spgb/pamphlets/manifesto-socialist-party-great-britain-june-12th-1905>, and Parekhi, B., “Review: Oakeshott's Theory of Civil Association”, *Ethics*, Vol. 106, No. 1, Oct. 1995, pp. 158-186, p. 175

¹⁴² Locke, J. *Two Treatises of Government*, at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf>, 2nd Treatise, Sec. 27, retrieved 19/04/2016 at 13:00 p.m.

¹⁴³ Nozick, R., *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, at https://joseywales1965.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/0001_anarchy_state_and_utopia.pdf, page ix, See Locke, J., *Two Treatises of Government*, at

it is based, where Nozick's argument is deficient, and the second concerns the epistemological and conceptual nature of those rights.

In the first instance, Nozick's ideal state would seem to require a quite different state in order to begin. It is not at all clear how any definition of "free" is to be applied to the current state of affairs for the purpose of free contracts. Thus, all suspicions of corruption, nepotism, privilege and heredity will have to be eradicated, not to mention historical geographical disparities, before an equitable position will exist between all the members of Nozick's hypothetical universal state¹⁴⁴. Similarly, it is not at all clear what provision will be necessary to enable those who simply cannot participate equitably with their peers due to impairment to at least participate to the satisfaction of their basic needs. If the answer is private charity, then the historic best case has been inefficiency, stigma and subsistence, and the worst case has been extreme human misery, and would open Nozick to accusations of racist, ablist and ageist eugenicism. It may turn out that there is such a thing as "social justice" after all, even within the terms of utopian, anarchist rational self-interest¹⁴⁵.

In the second, two difficulties persist. The first is that, despite the efforts of Locke, Hegel, Kant, Paine, Gewirth, Lafayette, Jefferson or the Parliamentarians and jurists behind the Bill of Rights, ECHR, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) or Charter of Fundamental Rights, it is not clear what rights are in the context of their violation, what criteria exist for determining them that also

<http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf>, Sec. 87, and Mill, J. S., *On Liberty* at <http://www.bartleby.com/130/1.html>, para. 12, all retrieved 19/04/2016 at 13:23 p.m.

¹⁴⁴ Nozick, R., *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, at https://joseywales1965.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/0001_anarchy_state_and_utopia.pdf, p. 150, retrieved 19/04/2016 at 14:01 p.m.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 66, and Sen, A., "Liberty and Social Choice", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 80, No. 1, Jan. 1983, pp. 5-28, p. 15

forbid certain other rights of a less ethically desirable nature, or what status the undisputed possessor of a right who is either unable to exercise it due to impairment, or simply chooses not to, has¹⁴⁶. It has also been asserted that such rights do not exist¹⁴⁷. Simply, beyond something similar to a legal nicety and convention, although highly desirable and meta-ethical, basic, natural, human, civil and legal rights are so obviously not inalienable or self-evident as to raise serious doubts about their efficacy, purpose and metaphysical existence as a whole, which is a highly unsatisfactory position for any conceptual element of a claim to a first principle of governance to occupy.

The second is that, whilst “human” seems a functional and obvious reduction of the concepts of civil, legal, basic and natural for the purposes of a criterion to decide the scope of their application. A satisfactory definition of “human” that encompasses not only the current extant population of six billion diverse individuals at a time of

¹⁴⁶ European Convention on Human Rights at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf, Universal Declaration of Human Rights at <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>, US Bill of Rights at <http://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/>, CFR at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf, and Gewirth, A., “The Epistemology of Human Rights”, *Social Philosophy and Policy*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, Spring 1984, pp. 1-24, Locke, J., *Two Treatises of Government*, at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf>, Paine, T., *The Rights of Man*, at <http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/thomas-paine-the-rights-of-man/text.php>, Hegel, G. F. W., *The Philosophy of Right* at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hegel/right.pdf> and Kant, I., *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* at http://www.inp.uw.edu.pl/mdsie/Political_Thought/Kant%20-%20groundwork%20for%20the%20metaphysics%20of%20morals%20with%20essays.pdf, all retrieved 19/04/2016 at 14:21

¹⁴⁷ See Nietzsche, F., *On the Genealogy of Morals* at http://www.inp.uw.edu.pl/mdsie/Political_Thought/Nie-GenologyofMorals.pdf, Essay 2, Sec. 9.

conceptual uncertainty for the previously highly relevant distinctions within gender, ethnicity, age and culture, but also operates backwards for the purposes of historical judgments and subsequent learning, and forwards for the purposes of relevance and applicability, in time, is impossible. *Prima facie*, it is clear it would be dissatisfactory to advocates of animal “rights”, such as Peter Singer, and wholly alien to the subjects of many parochial and charismatic authoritarian regimes globally, who, although one can speculate on their objective reaction if removed from their present circumstances, seem to proceed on a relatively amicable relationship to an entity that denies that they are even individually distinguishable or important, much less the possessor of rights¹⁴⁸.

Thus, Nozick and much of the liberal contractualist tradition, falls foul of the fallacy of “transcendental institutionalism”, or the search for a practical reality within a hypothetical, and implausible, ideal, identified by Amartya Sen, who observed that “[i]f a theory of justice is to guide reasoned choice of policies, strategies or institutions, then the identification of fully just social arrangements is neither necessary nor sufficient.”¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ Singer, P., *Practical Ethics* at <http://emilkirkegaard.dk/en/wp-content/uploads/Peter-Singer-Practical-Ethics-2nd-edition.pdf>, p. 55, retrieved 19/04/2016 at 14:50 p.m.

¹⁴⁹ Sen, A., *The Idea of Justice*, Allen Lane, London, 2009, p.15.

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**In the Centre and in the Periphery: The Economic Ideas and
Legacies of Raúl Prebisch**
Jamie Margetson – PO-345

Arriving in the vibrant, cosmopolitan city of Buenos Aires in 1918, the young Raúl Prebisch (1901-1986) scarcely imagined that it would be the opening act of a highly remarkable career; one leaving a legacy which would see him revered across the whole of Latin America, but reviled at home in his beloved Argentina. His work, inspired by the plight of indigenous workers in his birthplace of Tucumán, would see him hailed as “the most influential Latin American economist of all time.”¹⁵⁰ Deeply devoted to public service, Prebisch’s career as a policymaker and economic diplomat would be fundamental in shaping the thinking of an entire generation of Latin American economists. His central theses, the idea that there are two interrelated elements in the global economy, the “centre” and the “periphery”¹⁵¹, and the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, would give birth to Latin American structuralism: a novel approach to economics that would play a pivotal role in Latin American development during the latter twentieth century. His reputation as an institution builder and *tour de force* in development economics cannot be understated. While his policies were not always successful, and the institutions he led would inevitably falter, Prebisch left a legacy that few of his compatriots could match. Understanding Latin American development in the twentieth century is impossible without first understanding the economic ideas and legacies of Raúl Prebisch.

During the early twentieth century, Argentine economic thought was dominated by neoclassical orthodoxy. Disillusioned¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Oreste Popescu, *Studies in the History of Latin American Thought* (London: Routledge, 1997), page 269.

¹⁵¹ Raúl Prebisch, “Anotaciones sobre nuestro medio circulante” *Revista de Ciencias Económicas* (Buenos Aires) 9, serie 2 (3) 1921, pages 93-175.

¹⁵² Edgar J. Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), pages 27-28.

with the quality of teaching he was receiving at the University of Buenos Aires, Prebisch organised a research group with other committed peers, forming the foundations of the later renowned “Prebisch Team.”¹⁵³ It was here that Prebisch first began to note the inconsistencies between established economic theories on business cycles, and the realities experienced by Argentina. It appeared to Prebisch, through his research on Argentine economic history, that countries in the *periphery* – a term first coined by Prebisch that would become a mainstay of developmental lexicon – experienced business cycles differently to those in the “centre”, those more commonly known as the developed countries. However, it was not until his experience as Under Secretary of Finance in General José Félix Uriburu’s military government that Prebisch would become disenchanted with the neoclassical orthodoxy prevalent at the time.¹⁵⁴ Like many vulnerable economies, Argentina was faced with disaster and mass unemployment as international trade collapsed during the Great Depression. No longer could the government remain distant: strong state intervention was required to restore economic prosperity. Prebisch found his agency limited however, as Argentina’s export market was heavily dependent on Britain; Britain consumed ninety-four percent of total global beef exports, with Argentine exports comprising sixty-four percent of these products.¹⁵⁵ Argentina’s economic fate was therefore solely in the hands of the British, whom did not share the same dependency on exports as a consequence of being an industrialised nation. Argentina then, had no leverage in bilateral trade talks with its primary trading partner, a fact ruthlessly exploited by the British delegation to the Imperial Preference negotiations. Following the negotiations, Prebisch concluded that the actual “currency of international trade” was “power”¹⁵⁶. Ricardian

¹⁵³ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 36.

¹⁵⁴ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 87.

¹⁵⁵ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 26.

¹⁵⁶ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 81.

comparative advantage – a pillar of liberal free trade orthodoxy – seemed a burden, rather than a boon, to the Argentine economy.

Intuitively nurtured through practice, it was not until the publication of Prebisch's *Havana Manifesto*¹⁵⁷ that he would finally be able to ascertain the theoretical foundations that matched his experiences. These foundations would give rise to the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, Prebisch's central contribution to economic theory. The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis states that the benefits arising from international trade are heavily in favour of industrialised economies: the terms of trade of primary product-based economies deteriorate because, in the long term, the price of primary commodities decline in relation to the price of manufactured goods. While Prebisch has historically, and admittedly unfairly, received the bulk of the credit¹⁵⁸, the German-British economist Sir Hans Wolfgang Singer – a great development economist in his own right – was the first to highlight statistically the long term trend in the terms of trade of underdeveloped countries, in his paper published in February 1949 titled '*Post-war Price Relations between Under-developed and Industrialized Countries*'¹⁵⁹. Nevertheless, both Prebisch and Singer reached similar conclusions independently and at roughly the same time. But Prebisch's focus was on the business cycle, specifically illustrating the various reasons why the behaviour of wages in underdeveloped and developed countries differed. Singer himself argued that Prebisch's views were "better integrated into general

¹⁵⁷ Raúl Prebisch, "The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems" *Economic Commission for Latin America* (English translation: New York, 1950)

¹⁵⁸ John Toye and Richard Toye, "The origins and interpretation of the Prebisch-Singer thesis," *History of Political Economy* 35 (3) 2003, pages 437–467.

¹⁵⁹ UN, "Relative Prices of Exports and Imports for Under-Developed Countries. A study of Post-War Terms of Trade between Under-Developed and Industrialized Countries" *United Nations Department of Economic Affairs* (New York, 1949)

development thinking” because they placed “more emphasis on factorial terms of trade rather than barter terms of trade.”¹⁶⁰

The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, sixty-five years after its formulation, remains influential because it suggests that, should current economic structures and the structure of international trade continue to exist, the gains from trade between countries specialising in primary commodities and those that specialise in producing manufactured goods will continue to be distributed unequally. Furthermore, inequality of per capita income will have a linear relationship with the trade between these two types of countries, with increasing inequality of per capita income occurring whenever international trade between developed and underdeveloped countries takes place. This hypothesis can be justified on the basis of manufactured goods (in comparison to primary commodities) having a greater income elasticity of demand, which is the measure that shows the responsiveness of quantity demanded in relation to changes in income. Moreover, primary products tend to suffer from having a low price elasticity of demand: a decline in the price of a commodity will actually reduce revenue, rather than increase it. Both the income elasticity of demand of manufactured goods, and the price elasticity of demand of primary commodities, exacerbates the inequality in gains from trade between developed and underdeveloped countries. In the long term, there are two negative effects on the terms of trade for underdeveloped countries that prove structurally damaging. The first occurs because primary commodity markets and manufacturing markets are comprised of fundamentally different institutional features. For example, both cost-plus pricing and the unionisation of labour are institutional features of industrialised economies that have been historically important for long term economic development.¹⁶¹ The second negative effect impacting the terms of trade is

¹⁶⁰ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 521.

¹⁶¹ John Toye and Richard Toye, “The origins and interpretation of the Prebisch-Singer thesis,” *History of Political Economy*, 35 (3) 2003, page 437.

technological progress: not only are the fruits of technological progress distributed asymmetrically (in favour of industrial economies), but also progress has an asymmetrical impact on future demand (again in favour of industrial economies).

Has the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis withstood the test of time? Unsurprisingly, the hypothesis has been intensely scrutinised as a consequence of its conclusions. If the hypothesis is true, then it logically follows that underdeveloped countries need to industrialise and – in strong contradiction to the degree of trade liberalisation promoted by the Washington Consensus– increase tariff protections on nascent industries.¹⁶² The hypothesis has neither been confirmed nor refuted empirically, however recent research is moderately in favour of the hypothesis being true. In 2013 The International Monetary Fund published a paper investigating the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis.¹⁶³ The authors of the paper examined the secular trends and short run volatility (two important factors in the dynamics of relative primary commodity prices) of twenty-five primary commodities, with some of the data in the series going as far back as 1650. The authors of the paper concluded that, while the results were mixed, there was a clear indication that “in the majority of cases the PSH” was “not rejected.”¹⁶⁴

Although the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis has been vigorously contested by neoliberal economists, there are a number of reputable neoclassical economists that have acknowledged – in similar terms to

¹⁶² Center for International Development, “Washington Consensus” *Harvard University* (April 2003),

<<http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html>>

¹⁶³ Rabah Arezki, Kaddour Hadri, Prakash Loungani, and Yao Rao “Testing the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis since 1650: evidence from panel techniques that allow for multiple breaks” *International Monetary Fund* (2013)

¹⁶⁴ Rabah Arezki, Kaddour Hadri, Prakash Loungani, and Yao Rao, “Testing the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis since 1650: evidence from panel techniques that allow for multiple breaks” *International Monetary Fund* 2013, page 3.

Prebisch – an inequality in the terms of trade between primary-product producing economies and manufacturing economies. In a League of Nations study conducted in 1927, the Swedish economist Karl Gustav Cassel noted: “From 1913, a very serious dislocation of relative prices” took place in “the exchange of goods between Europe and the Colonial World.”¹⁶⁵ In 1948, upon observing an inequality in the terms of trade between developed and underdeveloped countries, the Nobel-Prize winning economist and staunch free trade advocate, Paul Samuelson, commented that the “terms of trade are abnormally favourable to agricultural production” and that one could “venture scepticism that this abnormal trend of the terms of trade” would, counter to the “historical drift... continue”¹⁶⁶. Even though economists have not been able to reach a consensus on the empirical validity of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, the hypothesis has encouraged underdeveloped countries to examine their terms of trade and productive capabilities more closely. Singer himself believed that the Prebisch-Singer thesis had entered the economic mainstream. In 1998 he argued that the “advice given by the Bretton Woods Institutions to developing countries” showed that the Prebisch-Singer thesis had been “incorporated both implicitly and explicitly.”¹⁶⁷ The warnings given to developing countries from the IMF and World Bank on the dangers of currency overvaluation, Dutch disease, and an overreliance on booming export sectors were, Singer asserted, exactly the same warnings posited by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis.

Prebisch’s theoretical formulation of the inequality in the terms of trade would have a profound influence on Latin America’s economic development. It would also directly support into his other

¹⁶⁵ Joseph Leroy Love, *Crafting the Third World: Theorizing Underdevelopment in Rumania and Brazil*, (California: Stanford University Press, 1996), page 79.

¹⁶⁶ Paul Samuelson, “International Trade and the Equalisation of Factor Prices” *Economic Journal* 58 (1948), pages 163-184.

¹⁶⁷ Hans Singer, “The Terms of Trade Fifty Years Later – Convergence and Divergence” *The South Letter* (30), (1998)

central idea, one which would not only mould his own conceptual framework, but also the framework of an entire generation of Latin American economists: the idea that countries could be categorised into two different types – those that were in the *centre* and those that were in the *periphery*.

The distinction made between separate economic and political *worlds* – those being the first, second, and third worlds – and the idea that these *worlds* require different strategies and policies to achieve sustainable economic growth, has long been accepted by economic institutions in Latin America – however it was not always the case. The dominant liberal orthodoxy in Argentina during the early twentieth century long held the view that the economic realities of Argentina were no different to that of Europe. The Argentinian private banker and minister of finance, Norberto Piñero, was one such proponent of this view. In his *La Moneda, el Crédito y los Bancos en la Argentina*, Piñero argued that the business cycle in Argentina was in essence a replication of the European experience.¹⁶⁸ Excessive credit accumulated when times were good would eventually create crises of imbalance through excess consumption and the subsequent flood of imports, followed by an imbalance in trade and the flight of gold. Eventually this imbalance would be automatically corrected through the market: interest rates would rise resulting in short term capital being pulled back into the market. This view was essentially one of the “sacred assumptions of liberal equilibrium theory”¹⁶⁹ widely taught at the University of Buenos Aires, and one that was broadly accepted in Argentine intellectual circles. But the comprehensive historical analysis of Argentine boom-and-bust cycles undertaken by Prebisch and his team, from Argentina’s independence in 1810 to the First World War, strongly contradicted Piñero’s conclusions. Not only did the research reveal that neither Piñero nor

¹⁶⁸ Norberto Piñero, *La Moneda, el Crédito y los Bancos en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: J. Menéndez, 1921)

¹⁶⁹ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 37.

any other Argentine economist had researched Argentine business cycles to any meaningful degree, it also demonstrated that – while international and Argentine markets were no doubt linked – there were an interaction of factors unique to Argentina that were absent in European business cycles. A narrow base of taxation and a severe lack of domestic capital markets, both consequences arising from Argentina’s inability to effectively implement property taxes, made Argentina extremely reliant on international borrowing. Argentina then, was faced with intrinsic psychological, political, and government policy differences that were unique to its situation. A rise in interest rates alone could not and did not reverse capital outflows, nor was it enough to attract new investment. Prebisch noted that this research “projected a new perspective”¹⁷⁰ on Argentina’s monetary problems. And it was in his written response to these findings, an article titled ‘*Notes on Our Money Supply*’¹⁷¹, that he first used the terms *centre* and *periphery*. Although in this case used in the context of the relationship between Buenos Aires and Argentina’s dependent interior republic, Prebisch would similarly apply the terms not just to Argentina – and its status as a periphery country to Britain – but also to all underdeveloped countries, affirming their status in the international economy and the relationship they experienced with developed countries in the centre.

Prebisch’s idea of there being two interrelated elements in the world economy – the centre and the periphery – was revolutionary because it contradicted the dominant neoclassical trade theory that was popular at the time. It suggested that, rather than there being a mutually beneficial set of relationships that linked global trade and the economies of the world together, there was in fact asymmetry in the global economic system. This asymmetry would manifest itself in multiple ways, but there existed several characteristics that distinguished centre and periphery economies. Firstly, centre

¹⁷⁰ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 38.

¹⁷¹ See 2.

economies were oriented towards industrialisation while periphery countries were oriented towards agriculture and the production of primary commodities. Secondly, the centre experienced a much higher degree of monopoly power, particularly in the industrial wage area as a consequence of trade unions. Thirdly, the centre's orientation towards industrialised goods provided greater technological gains, which would go on to spur further innovation. Fourthly, the openness of periphery countries – so heavily dependent on the export of primary commodities – made them much more reliant on international trade compared to those in the centre: economies in the centre typically had a much stronger domestic market (a consequence of industrialisation and the subsequent unionisation of the workforce) which buffered demand in times of economic crises. Fifthly, the centre has a tendency towards cyclical instability which is then passed onto the periphery, a characteristic of the centre and periphery relationship which historically left the Argentine economy vulnerable as the British business cycle ebbed and flowed. The final distinguishing characteristic between centre and periphery countries is that the masses in periphery countries tend to suffer from a lower standard of living, due in part to the five other characteristics mentioned. Although the resurgence of *laissez-faire* economic ideas in the late twentieth century obstructed their inclusion into the mainstream of economic thought, the centre and the periphery are ideas that have never truly gone away. Indeed, they continue to play an important role in the economic discourse of modern Marxists, as well as in current theories of international trade and development, and in other intellectual theories on the left of the political spectrum.

If the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis accurately diagnosed the economic ills of countries in the periphery, then what was the cure? For Prebisch, the cure was a structural change in the economy, by shifting away from primary commodities towards manufactured goods through industrialisation. Wildly influential in Latin America, Prebisch's ideas were actualised into economic policy through a movement that became known as *Latin American structuralism*. The

movement was greatly indebted to the work of Prebisch and the other Latin American structuralists at CEPAL¹⁷² – the most notable example being the brilliant Brazilian economist Celso Furtado. Inspired by the Singer-Prebisch hypothesis, Keynesian economics, and arguments pertaining to infant industries, the Latin American structuralists were broadly in favour of an active industrial policy led by a strong state: one that subsidised and orchestrated the production of strategic substitutes, discouraged direct foreign investment, placed barriers (usually in the form of tariffs) to protect infant industries, and took action to maintain a strong currency so that manufacturers could import more capital goods. Also known as Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), this active and state-led industrial policy was already adopted by Argentina and Brazil spontaneously in the 1930s as a response to a vast decline in foreign sales.¹⁷³ However, it was not until Prebisch's *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems*¹⁷⁴ that ISI would be theoretically mapped out.

Prebisch was among the first thinkers to acknowledge the fundamental differences that made Latin America's economic situation unique. Though the region shared many similarities with the U.S. and Europe, Prebisch and his fellow structuralists believed there were fundamental historical, economic and institutional differences that would result in Latin America facing a unique path to growth and prosperity. The renowned political economist Albert O. Hirschman noted that it was in the 1940s and 1950s when “for the first time...a well-reasoned, indigenous doctrine”¹⁷⁵ for Latin American

¹⁷² Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), more commonly known in English as the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

¹⁷³ John Seahan, *Patterns of Development in Latin America: Poverty, Repression and Economic Strategy* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1987), page 83.

¹⁷⁴ See 8.

¹⁷⁵ Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress* (New York: Anchor Books, 1965), page 282.

development arose. This theory of Latin American uniqueness inspired the region's structuralists to jointly reject free trade and Ricardian trade theory, as well as neoclassical *laissez-faire* economics, in favour of state-fostered ISI.

The period of import substitution industrialisation in Latin America ended following the onset of “La Década Perdida” (“The Lost Decade”), leading many economists to conclude that state-fostered ISI had been a mistake. Indeed, given that the implementation of ISI in Latin America compares so unfavourably with the export-orientated industrialisation of the East Asian countries, it would appear at first glance that ISI was an abysmal failure. First glances can often be deceiving however: in truth the effectiveness of ISI in Latin America cannot be judged in black-and-white terms. It is wrong to label ISI a catastrophic failure – as many neoliberals have asserted since – that directly led to the 1982 debt crisis; the debt crisis was largely “a consequence of factors”¹⁷⁶ outside, and outside the control of, Latin America. In fact, ISI was initially successful; in response to the destabilisation of the global financial system caused by the Great Depression and World War Two, governments took advantage of the opportunities afforded in the tacit protection of opportune infant industries at home. Foreign competition was restricted by tariffs and quotas, local investment was encouraged through the use of credit and loans, public-sector spending stimulated domestic demand, and in some countries large state industrial plants were built to help the industrialisation process. From the 1950s to the 1970s, annual growth rates in Latin America hovered between five and six percent¹⁷⁷ – and the economic development of both Brazil and Mexico were hailed a “miracle.”¹⁷⁸ One decade later however, Mexico – one of the so-called “miracles” – would default on its debt and the region of Latin

¹⁷⁶ Thomas E. Skidmore, Peter H. Smith and James N. Green, *Modern Latin America*, 7th edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), page 369.

¹⁷⁷ Skidmore, Smith and Green, *Modern Latin America*, page 361.

¹⁷⁸ Skidmore, Smith and Green, *Modern Latin America*, page 361.

American underwent a deep economic contraction. The prescription of import-substitution industrialisation to the economies of Latin America appeared disastrous: Prebisch himself, a vigorous advocate of the program, swiftly distanced himself from the policy, noting the onset of “dynamic insufficiency” in the Latin American economies and the vital role that the “cost of import substitution” played in its development.¹⁷⁹ Ultimately, ISI failed to achieve economic growth on anywhere near the same scale as EOI in East Asia for a variety of reasons. While the policy worked in the short term, it faced numerous difficulties which would limit its success in the medium and long term: Latin American domestic markets typically suffered from oversaturation, higher production costs were passed onto consumers, and technological innovation was stifled rather than enhanced due to the emergence of firms with near-monopoly power. Even though one of the central goals of ISI was to limit import dependency, import dependency remained entrenched in the structure of Latin American economies, because production processes in infant industries required a substantial number of capital goods imports. With the notable exceptions of Brazil and Mexico, the fabled competitive economies of scale in Latin American industries never emerged. Sheltered by tariff walls and state subsidies, the region’s firms failed to achieve the same level of efficiency as international firms. Furthermore, the excessive concentration of resources for industry would actually worsen the performance of primary product exports in Latin America which, in addition to the limits on industrial exports, greatly damaged the region’s balance of payments and resulted in large-scale international borrowing. In short, after the initial low-hanging fruits of industrialisation – particularly in textiles and shoes – had been gained, Latin America still remained immensely dependent on imports. Rather than gaining greater autonomy, a new form of vulnerability had emerged: now Latin America needed costly capital goods, “90 percent of which had to be imported and paid for with the same low-

¹⁷⁹ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 453.

value exports.”¹⁸⁰ The prevailing consequence of this was a deepening trade deficit that threatened the means for greater industrial growth, as crucial supplies of imports were jeopardised. The economist John Sheahan asserts that the “central problems” of ISI were that it “fostered production methods adverse for employment, hurt the poor, blocked the possible growth of industrial exports, encouraged high-cost consuming industries while impeding vertical integration and accelerated multinational entry into domestic markets.”¹⁸¹ Additionally, the policy of ISI was far more applicable to the larger countries of Latin America – like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico – than the smaller ones, which suffered from a non-existent middle class and tiny local consumer markets. Consequently, they had little choice but to rely on specialising in the exportation of one or two primary product commodities.

When compared to the wild success of the “Four Asian Tigers”¹⁸² (which began their export-led industrialisation around the same time that the Latin American countries began their import substitution industrialisation), it would appear that the recommendation of state-fostered ISI is fundamentally damaging to Prebisch’s – and CEPAL’s – legacy. Despite successfully identifying the significant structural problems that plagued Latin American economies, the solutions that he and CEPAL proposed failed to eradicate those problems. Indeed, in hindsight they seem misguided – a judgment made by public opinion at the time resulting in CEPAL, such a force in the intellectual debates on Latin American development until the 1980s and Prebisch’s greatest institutional achievement, losing all of its considerable influence. Though harshly judged by their contemporaries, and more recently by neoliberal

¹⁸⁰ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 328.

¹⁸¹ Seahan, *Patterns of Development in Latin America: Poverty, Repression and Economic Strategy*, pages 86-87.

¹⁸² Michael Sarel, “Growth in East Asia: What We Can and Cannot Infer” *International Monetary Fund*, 1996

economists, for endorsing ISI instead of the comparatively more successful EOI, it appears history would judge Prebisch and CEPAL more kindly. For the *Cepalistas* had originally proposed export-led industrialisation as a suitable policy for economic development, but “barriers to Latin American access to U.S markets”¹⁸³ resulted in ISI being the second best of all available options. Export-orientated industrialisation just did not make sense for most Latin American countries, as many of them had already accumulated large nonconvertible reserves of foreign exchange from previous primary export booms in the past. They had enough trouble spending their already large foreign exchange reserves, without further increasing their exports. The transition from ISI to EOI in Latin America would have been plagued with difficulties: the performance of the region’s relatively productive imports meant that a significant shift in policy would have required a substantially greater income sacrifice to achieve world-competitive low wage levels via devaluation, a feat made near-impossible due to structural and political obstacles. When considered fully then, it appears that Prebisch’s and CEPAL’s push for ISI was not folly or foolishness, but rather the correct and rational response to the structural obstacles confronting Latin America in the industrialisation process. Moreover, ISI *was* a partial success in Brazil and Mexico – both countries have used ISI as a base on which to develop their manufactured goods exports. And though the most successful East Asian economies – as well as Mexico and Brazil – primarily pursued an export-led industrial policy, it was in addition to, rather than instead of, import substitution industrialisation.

Although the onset of the Latin American debt crisis may have marked the decline of CEPAL’s influence in the region, Prebisch’s work as its *de facto* leader for decades was consequential in

¹⁸³ E.V.K. Fitzgerald, “The New Trade Regime, Macroeconomic Behaviour and Income Distribution in Latin America” in Victor-Bulmer Thomas, ed., *The New Economic Model In Latin America and its Impact on Income Distribution and Poverty* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), page 51.

the history of Latin America's economic development. One of the central constituting parts of Prebisch's legacy was the role he played in transforming CEPAL into a transformative institution that would guide Latin American economic development for decades. The institution had to overcome numerous challenges during its prime years, nevertheless the work of Prebisch and other Latin American structuralists undoubtedly gave "reform-minded Latin Americans the confidence to shape their own economic strategies."¹⁸⁴ An outstanding achievement, given that Latin American decision makers had "long felt at disadvantage" when facing decision makers from the developed countries.

Prebisch's theoretical work was impressive; few economists can boast of wielding as great an influence on the economic thought of their generation as Prebisch did on the thinking of Latin Americans. However, Prebisch's economic ideas never achieved the same level of influence in the West as they did in his home region of Latin America. Though impressive, his work was not as revolutionary as that of John Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman. But to consider this a blemish on Prebisch's legacy would be harsh. When tasked with evaluating his overall legacy, his intellectual ideas are just one constitutive part. For Prebisch was not just a scholar: he was also an institution builder, and a thinker whose influence in the developing world was so profound he has been referred to by many as the "father of development."¹⁸⁵

One of the fundamental beliefs that drove Prebisch throughout his life was the idea of "historical moments"¹⁸⁶ – moments in which the timing of new concepts could transform mere organisations into powerful movements. Partly as a result of his personal political experiences and those of his country, Prebisch would come to believe

¹⁸⁴ Skidmore, Smith and Green, *Modern Latin America*, page 360.

¹⁸⁵ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 4.

¹⁸⁶ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 5.

in the power of a technocratic “elite”¹⁸⁷: a cadre of government officials selected on intelligence and merit that could guide the Argentine state during times of political crises. Fundamental to his belief in the power of institutions, this idea would permeate throughout his work in the three institutions that he would shape and lead: the Argentine central bank (Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, BCRA), the Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), and the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

Loosely inspired by the work of Sir Otto Niemeyer, a Bank of England director who “had a godlike reputation in banking and political circles in Buenos Aires,”¹⁸⁸ Prebisch played a crucial role in the successful establishment of the Argentine central bank. At the comparatively young age of thirty-three, he was tasked with designing the new institution and drafting the required legislation. In a departure from the advice Niemeyer had given to other Latin American central banks (which was proving unsuccessful), Prebisch’s central bank legislation was comprised wholly by his own vision of what was required for Argentina’s unique circumstances. It was to be the central actor in the country’s financial and banking system, with a diverse set of functions and far-reaching regulatory powers over monetary policy. Most importantly, Prebisch sought to institutionalise the Bank of England’s enviable autonomy into Argentina’s own central bank. The legislation was a roaring success, and Prebisch’s vision would result in a creation devoted “entirely to excellence”¹⁸⁹ – one that was unlike any other public sector institution in Argentina at the time.

It is impossible to write about the legacy of Raúl Prebisch without mentioning his influence in the field of international development. Wildly popular in Latin America, it was at UNCTAD, a

¹⁸⁷ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 40.

¹⁸⁸ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 97.

¹⁸⁹ Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901-1986*, page 100.

United Nations institution created in response to concerns about unequal exchange that troubled underdeveloped economies, where Prebisch's thesis of the centre and periphery would be extended outside the region to all underdeveloped economies, known then as the G77. During his time at UNCTAD, Prebisch worked tirelessly to build a UN institution that "had teeth."¹⁹⁰ It was at the first UNCTAD conference that '*Towards a New Trade Policy for Development*' (also known as the Prebisch report) was published. The central argument of the paper was characteristically Prebischian: a "trade gap"¹⁹¹ existed because the rate of economic development in poorer countries, which was primarily determined by the level of producer goods imported and by the level of aggregate investment in the economy, was limited by the unequal levels of exchange those countries experienced. To combat this, the report put forth a proposal for developed countries to commit, at minimum, one percent of GDP towards providing international aid, and to promote commodity agreements which would help protect the terms of trade for poorer countries. The idea of a trade gap, greatly inspired by the work of Prebisch, permeated throughout all of the early debates on international development and dominated the initial UNCTAD conferences.

Prebisch's status as a powerful international economist with clout certainly aided the cause of the G77, but his ideas appear to have failed to make a long-lasting impact on the economic development of underdeveloped countries. The trade gap theory has been widely contested, coming under severe criticism from a number of economic thinkers. The British development economist, P. T. Bauer, dismissed

¹⁹⁰ *Historiador escreve biografia de Raúl Prebisch, [online video], 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TI-w-oHRO-c>, (accessed 28th October 2015)*

¹⁹¹ Robert Bideleux, "The Political Economy of Latin America, 1950s-2010s: From 'Structuralism' (Alias 'Developmentalism' or 'Populism') To Neoliberal 'Shock Therapy' and 'Structural Adjustment' (The 'Washington Consensus') to 'Neoliberalism' (Alias 'Neo-Developmentalism' or 'Neopopulism')" *Swansea University* 2015, page 5.

the Prebisch report as “mere fiction” or worse – a piece of “political propaganda.”¹⁹² In his *Dissent on Development*, Bauer asserts that the UNCTAD view – essentially Prebischian at the time – on economic development was “wholly invalid.”¹⁹³ “Economic development,” Bauer writes, “is not simply or even largely a function of investment expenditure, least of all of investment expenditure.” Moreover, Bauer notes that “large-scale investment expenditure requiring large-scale imports is neither necessary nor sufficient for economic development.” He concludes that “high levels of economic attainment and rates of development” have often been attained “without being constrained by the level of imports,” citing Brazil, Mexico and Peru among others as examples of countries which have advanced economically without external help or payment difficulties. Furthermore, Bauer refutes the argument that external market conditions limited the imports to underdeveloped countries, because the UNCTAD literature supporting it ignored “rates of exchange, the level of prices and costs, and the flow of money incomes,” all of which are widely considered to be major determinants of the volume of imports and exports in an economy. Ultimately, the empirical evidence in favour of UNCTAD’s (and hence Prebisch’s) theory on international development and its obstacles suffered from “oversimplification.”¹⁹⁴ There is simply an extreme amount of heterogeneity, both in predominantly primary product producing countries and in the underdeveloped world more generally, that makes a one-size fits all evaluation of obstacles in economic development impossible. Just as Argentine business cycles could not be managed in the same way that they were managed in Europe, nor were the obstacles to development of one periphery country wholly the same as those of another. Nevertheless, Prebisch’s ideas on unequal exchange

¹⁹² P. T. Bauer, *Dissent on Development: Studies and debates in development economics* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1971), page 271.

¹⁹³ Bauer, *Dissent on Development: Studies and debates in development economics*, page 237.

¹⁹⁴ Bauer, *Dissent on Development: Studies and debates in development economics*, page 239.

would go on to play an integral role in the development of *dependency theory* and the *world systems theory*, as well as partially influencing other international development movements such as *End Poverty Now* and *Fair Trade*.

In a 2009 article titled ‘*Latin America’s Keynes*’¹⁹⁵, *The Economist* magazine noted the similarities in the legacies of Raúl Prebisch and John Maynard Keynes. The comparison is an apt one. Strong believers in the power of economic institutions and the role they can play in improving the wellbeing of society, both fell out of fashion amidst the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s. Following the 2008 financial crisis however, both thinkers have gained newfound relevancy as inequality has become a central political and economic issue. Like Keynes, Prebisch would find himself continuously frustrated by the chaotic nature of politics, and the extent to which political affairs would limit the influence he could exert on economic policy. At the BCRA, Prebisch sought to create a public institution that would be free from the malaise of Argentinian politics, yet he himself would be forced out of service by political forces. Rather than fortifying Argentina’s greatness and preventing economic decline he would be exiled, deeply reviled by those on both the right and the left. CEPAL, once so influential in Latin America, would be marginalised as a consequence of the rise of neoliberalism and the onset of the Latin American debt crisis. UNCTAD, far from being an institution “with teeth”, was ineffective at improving the terms of trade for underdeveloped countries; the divide between countries in the centre and those in the periphery remains. And yet, though he had his share of failures, it is hard to see how anyone could have fared better than Prebisch given the cards he was dealt. Far from Francisco Ecinas’s diagnosis of Latin America’s woes being the result of “weak character, habits, and values,”¹⁹⁶ the truth is that the region faced, and

¹⁹⁵ “Latin America’s Keynes”, *The Economist*

(<http://www.economist.com/node/13226316>, 28th October 2015

¹⁹⁶ Skidmore, Smith and Green, *Modern Latin America*, page 352.

continues to face, vast structural difficulties which, while not impossible to overcome, require a concerted effort of ingenuity and determination to resolve. Raúl Prebisch brought both ingenuity and determination in abundance, and while some of his plans may have gone awry, his role in reshaping Latin America economic thought is indisputable. Neither Marxist nor orthodox, Prebisch would inspire a generation of Latin American thinkers to shake off the chains of economic determinism, and to encourage them to find their way – a Latin American way – to fixing the problems that plagued the region. And while some of his economic ideas continue to fall in and out of fashion, his own legacy to future generations is a courageous mix of thought and ethics and action, applicable to all.

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Denver et al suggest that 'in recent years, constituency campaigns have played an increasingly significant part in elections' (2012, p.181). Analyse the continuing relevance of ground campaigning in the post-modern campaign environment.

Tyler Walsh – PO-234

A key activity of political parties in liberal democracies is to fight elections and, as the franchise was extended, parties developed strategies to attract the ever-increasing number of voters hence election campaigns grew in importance, particularly in Britain. Cutts, Webber, Widdop, Johnston and Pattie write that 'the nature and impact of constituency party campaigning in British general elections has been subject of much recent research'¹⁹⁷, thus this essay takes election campaigning to its core in order to debate the position of ground campaigning in Britain in the contemporary election era. Firstly, there will be a consideration of the three phases of campaigning in order to discuss the differing attitudes towards ground campaigning in an ever changing technological context. Then there will be an analysis of the relevance of the ground campaign in relation to the post-modern campaign environment in order to come to the conclusion that 'constituency campaigns have played an increasingly significant part in elections'¹⁹⁸

Election campaigns, rather than being static, have evolved over time as a result of a 'modernisation process rooted in technological and political developments common in many post-industrial societies'¹⁹⁹; this has led to the development of distinctive

¹⁹⁷ Cutts, D., Webber, D., Widdop, P., Johnston., R & Pattie, C. (2014). With a little help from my neighbours: Aspatial analysis of the impact of local campaigns at the 2010 British general election. *Electoral Studies*, 34, 216-231, p.216

¹⁹⁸ Denver, D., Carman., C & Johns, R. (2012). Elections and voters in Britain (3rd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.181

¹⁹⁹ Norris, P. (2000). *A virtuous circle: Political campaigns in postindustrial societies*. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, p.2

historical phases of campaigning, each dominated by a particular set of practices and organisational traits. The first campaign phase that is commonly referred to in literature is the *pre-modern* phase that developed in the late nineteenth century as a result of the expansion of the franchise. Lipset and Rokkan suggest that, during this period, electoral support for parties were based on stable social cleavages such as class, religion and region.²⁰⁰ Hence elections and campaigns were viewed as mechanisms to reinforce partisan support rather than win voters from opposition parties.²⁰¹ The campaign, therefore, reflected this view with Norris suggesting that it was based on a 'local-active' model in which campaign organisation was decentralised and human-intensive, constituency-orientated activities such as doorstep canvassing and local rallies were preferred.²⁰²

However, Dalton, Flanagan and Beck (1984) write that in the mid-twentieth century, there was a marked rise in dealignment as a result of socioeconomic developments thus parties adopted *catch-all* strategies to attract voters on a national rather than a local scale; this development has been coined the *modern* phase. In this phase, the campaign became centrally organised with parties employing professional campaign workers in order to make the most of the opportunities of the expansion of television, which had radically transformed party communications such as the advent of paid television advertisements, 'prime time' party broadcasts and controlled photo opportunities. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, some scholars have conveyed that the campaign has evolved as a result of the growth of the internet as well as the fragmentation of media outlets; these developments have facilitated new forms of interaction with voters and has been associated with the rise of the

²⁰⁰ Lipset, S.M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). *Party systems and voter alignments*. New York: Free Press. p.69

²⁰¹ Lazarsfeld, P.F., Berelson, B., & Gaudet, B. (1944). *The peoples choice: How the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign*. New York: Columbia University Press. p.89

²⁰² Norris, p.3

post-modern campaign era. Norris contends that the *post-modern* campaign is a ‘complex phenomenon’.²⁰³ However, Johnson-Cartee and Copeland define this phase as ‘media-age politics’ in which consultants have become ‘the new directors of...political drama’²⁰⁴ It is portrayed that there has been a professionalisation of the campaign which has resulted in parties utilising opinion polling and focus groups to engage with voters as part of the permanent campaign. Norris suggests that as a consequence, post-modern party campaigns have sought to incorporate both a *catch-all* national strategy with personalised constituency campaigns, as seen in the pre-modern era, in order to re-affirm party loyalties and attract potential voters in an era of dealignment.²⁰⁵

It has been seen that as a consequence of the evolution of technology, election campaigns have evolved to feature new and innovative party communication techniques; however one feature that has remained a consistent feature of campaigns is the use of ground-campaign activities. Nielsen writes that ground campaigning can be viewed as ‘personalised political communication’ as people assume the role of the media in delivering political communications and mobilising political support; ground campaign activities are often human-intensive and include door-to-door canvassing, delivering election literature, phoning voters and fundraising.²⁰⁶ How influential the ground campaign is has been subject to academic debate; although Denver et al suggest that ground campaigning was viewed as a ‘sideshow’ that made ‘no significant difference to election results’.²⁰⁷ Nielsen argues that it is ‘an important form of political communication’ as a result of the wide-ranging nature of the activities

²⁰³ Norris, p.148

²⁰⁴ Johnson-Cartee, K. S., & Copeland, G.A. (1997). *Inside political campaigns: Theory and practice*. Westport: Praeger Publishers

²⁰⁵ Norris p.7

²⁰⁶ Nielsen, R. K. (2012). *Ground wars: Personalised communications in political campaigns*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p.7

²⁰⁷ Denver et al. p.181

that the ground campaign encompasses.²⁰⁸ Therefore, the following section of the essay will attempt to clarify some of the arguments that appears in academic studies and will argue that in the *post-modern* campaign, ground campaigning plays a vital role in mobilizing support for parties in the grassroots that provides a platform for parties to build upon in the national campaign.

Pattie and Johnston contend that since the latter part of the twentieth century, much of the research literature has referred to a new orthodoxy that emphasises the relevance of ground campaigns;²⁰⁹ Denver and Hands make reference to the Michigan Model of voter identification and argue that, as a result of an erosion in the class cleavage resulting in a weakening of party identification, voters are more likely to be influenced by short-term factors such as local campaigns, thus concur that ‘party professionals at both regional and national level invest enormous efforts in constituency campaigns...that campaigning...in marginal seats can make all the difference’.²¹⁰ Such renewed efforts into ground campaigns can be seen in British elections and, in particular, in the 1992 general election. Denver and Hands, in their study of the 1992 general election, argue that strong ground party campaigns had the effect of increasing turnout by approximately 5 percentage points, which had a positive impact on the vote share of the parties that had an extensive constituency campaign. Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats, Denver and Hands show, out-performed the Conservatives in the campaign activity of distributing posters in marginals (Labour distributed an average of 4681 posters in marginals and the Liberal Democrats distributed 3663 compared to the Conservatives 1395) and this may have had a direct

²⁰⁸ Nielsen, p.7

²⁰⁹ Pattie, C & Johnston, R. (2009). Still talking, but is anyone listening?: The changing face of constituency campaigning in Britain, 1997-2005. *Party Politics*, 15(4), p.414

²¹⁰ Denver, D., & Hands, G. (1997). Challengers, incumbents and the impacts of constituency campaigning in Britain. *Electoral Studies*, 16 (2), p.521

impact on voter share in marginals, with Labour seeing an increase of two percentage points and the Liberal Democrats enjoying an increase of five percentage points.²¹¹ One may suggest that these figures are relatively insignificant in a national context, however Denver and Hands write that ‘figures of this size can often make the difference in winning and losing a seat’;²¹² although the Conservatives won the 1992 general election, the party lost 40 seats whilst Labour gained 42 seats and recorded a 3.6% swing. Hence, it can be argued that Labour (and to an extent the Liberal Democrats), through its emphasis on ground campaigning reduced the Conservatives’ parliamentary majority and helped the party lay a solid foundation to build upon in the 1997 general election, which it ultimately won by a landslide.

Fisher, Cutts and Fieldhouse augment the conclusions made by Denver and Hands in their study of the 2010 British general election. Fisher et al refer to a 2010 British Election Study post-election survey in which 37% of respondents suggested that they made the decision of which party to vote for during the campaign thus this conveys that, given the rise of the ‘long campaign’ seen in the *post-modern* campaign era, the ground campaign may be influential in assisting voters.²¹³ The model put forward in the study backs up this assertion by finding that higher levels of contact with voters at a constituency-level increased the chance of the voter affiliating themselves with a particular party; a predicted 71% of undecided Conservative-leaning voters who were contacted by the party in the ground campaign voted for the Conservatives again in 2010 (and those who were contacted but did not vote Conservative were less likely to vote Labour) as opposed to 52% who were not subject to campaigning.²¹⁴

²¹¹ Denver & Hands, p. 544

²¹² Denver & Hands, p.544

²¹³ Fisher, J., Cutts, D., & Fieldhouse, E. (2011). The electoral effectiveness of constituency campaigning in the 2010 British general election: The ‘triumph’ of Labour?. *Electoral Studies*, 30, p.816

²¹⁴ Fisher et al. p,825

As a result of a decline in partisan identification, short-term factors, as seen in the Michigan Model, may have a greater influence on voter choice and the voter, looking for heuristics in order to choose their vote preference may be influenced through a direct experience with a party (such as through face-to-face canvassing) changing an individual's perception of a party and its policies. It could be said, therefore, that the ground campaign still has a vital role in the *post-modern* campaign as it helps to both re-affirm existing party identification and increase levels of partisanship amongst *floating* voters and, as a result, may have resulted in the Conservatives gaining an advantage over Labour in the 2010 general election, seen by many academics as one of the closest general elections seen in decades.

Conversely it can be argued that, in the *post-modern* campaign era, the ground campaign is not relevant as a result of an emphasis placed upon the national campaign by the mass media, with Denver et al commenting that 'for most people, the national campaign is *the* election campaign'.²¹⁵ Worcester, Mortimore and Baines expand upon this view by referencing a BES study of the 2005 British General Election which suggests that only 21% of those surveyed were canvassed on the doorstep by party officials, compared to 68% of respondents of the same study who watched the leader debates.²¹⁶ Thus the research conveys that the parties, acknowledging the potential influence of the mass media, have adapted their campaigning techniques in order to appeal to the electorate en masse rather than focusing on specific constituency voters. Dean and Croft exemplify this view by suggesting that the platform of Blair's New Labour was of a PR-approach,²¹⁷ in which Blair utilised the dominance of the media seen in the *post-modern* campaign era in order to target

²¹⁵ Denver et al. p.180

²¹⁶ Worcester, R., Mortimore, R., & Baines, P. (2005). *Explaining Labour's landslide: The 2005 general election*. London: Methuen p.196

²¹⁷ Dean, D., & Croft, R. (2000). Friends and relations: long-term approaches to political campaigning. *European Journal of Marketing*, 35, pp.1205-1206

multiple audiences in order to succeed in attracting both party identifiers and dealigned voters to achieve electoral success; Dean and Croft make a reference to Schumpeter's view of the all-importance of image in party politics and contend that electoral campaigning is intrinsically linked to party image.²¹⁸ Thus this suggests that Blair, through Labour's election campaign, placed an emphasis on creating a positive media image for the Labour 'brand' rather than engaging in local ground campaigns. Fisher and Denver, in their study of ground campaigning in Britain, noted a marked drop in ground campaigning techniques used by Labour under Blair's leadership, with a mean index score of 116 in the 1992 general election when the party was led by Neil Kinnock, compared to 97 in the 2005 election under Blair. Thus this conveys the argument that the ground campaign is not relevant in *post-modern* campaigning as a result of the dominance of the national campaign in the mass media leading to an emphasis on national party image in order to attract voters in the centre ground,²¹⁹ resulting in the ground campaign becoming a less influential aspect of the political campaign; Horton and Wohl cited in Johnson-Cartee and Copeland put forward a theory that suggests that the voter now experiences a 'para-social' interaction with politics in that the voter feels that they have participated in the political process through the media rather than through direct contact with the system, such as through door to door canvassers.²²⁰

To conclude it can be seen that despite the evolution of political campaigns to incorporate technological advances and changes in voter behaviour, a constant aspect of campaigns has been the ground campaign. It has been argued that in the *post-modern* campaign era, the ground campaign has become obsolete as a result of

²¹⁸ Dean & Croft, p.1200

²¹⁹ Fisher, J., & Denver, D. (2009). Evaluating the electoral effects of traditional and modern modes of constituency campaigning in Britain 1992-2005. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 62(2), p.199

²²⁰ Johnson-Cartee and Copeland. p.8

the growth of the mass media which has distorted election campaigns to disproportionately focus on the national campaign; as Dever et al states, the national campaign ‘impinges most persistently and directly on their (the voters) consciousness as it is played out before their eyes’. ²²¹ On the other hand through the examples of the 1992 and 2010 British general elections, it may be argued that the ground campaign may still have a vital role to play in Britain as a result of dealignment within the electorate weakening party loyalties, thus influencing the parties into professionalising their campaign strategy in order to balance the focus on the national campaign with a personalised constituency ground campaign; as McKenna and Han write ‘the campaigns of the future..should..be about people’²²²

²²¹ Denver et al. p.180

²²² McKenna, E., & Han, H. (2014). *Groundbreakers: How Obama’s 2.2 million volunteers transformed campaigning in America*. New York: Oxford University Press. p.viii

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**Examine the Reasons Why Nuclear Tensions Between the USA
and the USSR fell during the period from 1962-1969.**

Barnaby West – AM-330

The nuclear tensions faced by both the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the 1960s were unprecedented and would continue to shape policy for decades after. To understand why tensions decreased during the 1960s we must first understand why they were so high to begin with. The era of the 1950s witnessed the peak of nuclear weapons testing from both sides, as the arms race developed so did the size of the bombs as well as the destructive effects to both the environment and amity between the two superpowers. The biggest ever recorded detonation was Russia's test of the Tsar Bomba in 1961 recorded at 57 megatons, 3,200 times more powerful than that of the Atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima by the U.S.²²³ This demonstrates the unbridled advancement of nuclear technology within only 15 years. Knowing that each side were in possession of devices of destruction undoubtedly escalated heightened tensions. Also in 1961, the Berlin crisis threatened to escalate tensions to unprecedented levels as the Soviet Union cut off West Berlin to the Rest of world. Washington responded with brinkmanship politics and threatened the use of nuclear weapons if West Berlin should be occupied. A similar heightening of tensions would be repeated during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 leaving both sides on the brink of a nuclear war which threatened to extinguish all life on earth. It is with this backdrop that this essay examines how tensions fell from 1962. Firstly, the shockwaves of the Cuban crisis will be analysed with focus on how both countries looked to abandon brinkmanship and focus on limiting the prominence of nuclear weapons in global politics. Secondly the effect of China joining the nuclear club in 1964 would give both the U.S. and the USSR a common objective of limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Finally, the essay will look at how further events

²²³ Gerard DeGroot, *The Bomb, A life*, RUSI Journal, Vol. 149, Issue. 3, June 2004.

during the 1960s in other aspects of the Cold War obstructed further advancement in reducing nuclear tensions.

The Cuban Missile Crisis is often remembered in the public mind as the culmination of early Cold War tensions in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union directly faced each other in a standoff that had the potential for worldwide catastrophe. However, little attention is given to the outcomes of the two-week stand off and what it meant for international nuclear policy. Experts such as Francis J. Gavin suggest that Cuba single handedly changed the course of nuclear politics. Gavin states that before Cuba, nuclear strikes seemed a viable option to resolve a crisis, such as those threatened over the Berlin crisis a year before.²²⁴ However, he follows on to say it became evident after Cuba that in a crisis nuclear superiority was of limited value, “The crisis is more likely to be determined by the balance of resolve.”²²⁵ Cuba was a watershed moment mainly because it demonstrated that diplomacy and composed reasoning was a more progressive alternative to brinkmanship politics, which had so much to lose. Furthermore, both the Berlin and Cuban crisis demonstrated that neither side were willing to implement their commitment to protect allies with nuclear force. This is revealed in a State Department report by Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, head of the National Security Council, which states- “It should also demonstrate that the Soviets are not prepared to risk a decisive military show down with the U.S. over issues involving the extension of Soviet Power.”²²⁶ Yuri Pavlov, Khrushchev’s interpreter throughout the crisis, agrees by suggesting that Soviet reassurance to Havana that in the event of U.S. invasion the USSR would provide a nuclear response was made without conviction. Pavlov writes, “It was no proof that Khrushchev had not learnt his

²²⁴ Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age*, (Cornell University Press: London) 2012, pp.66.

²²⁵ Ibid, pp.60.

²²⁶ Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, *Cuban Missile Crisis*, Doc. 80, 29th Oct 1962.

lesson; they had, but they needed to ‘climb down the tree’ without losing face and Soviet prestige.”²²⁷ Sources such as these unveil the relaxation in tensions by moving away from using the threat of nuclear weapons to bolster foreign policy.

The Cuban Missile Crisis undoubtedly startled both U.S. President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev by just how close the countries had come to all out nuclear war, “There seemed to be a new understanding between the two leaders which could point to a significant reduction in Cold War tensions.”²²⁸ One such outcome was the establishment of a ‘hotline’ between The White House and the Kremlin, so that in any future crisis, direct communication could be established between the two leaders.²²⁹ This was not merely a symbolic gesture designed to alleviate public tension. It would also have the practical benefits of reducing the time of communication between Washington and Moscow, which could prove vital in the event of a real world crisis. As the world stepped back from the brink of destruction it was hoped that East and West could find peaceful negotiations to their differences, many more liberal leaders in Washington and Moscow saw this as an opportunity to begin negotiating for nuclear test bans, non-proliferation and disarmament treaties. Khrushchev urged a beginning of negotiations to resolve the Berlin crisis and calls for the prospect of disarmament, in response President Kennedy wrote- “I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament (...) and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban.”²³⁰ Peter G. Boyle notes that from late 1962 to 1963 Kennedy changed his focus from military build up to

²²⁷ Yuri Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuba Relations, 1959- 1991*, (North-South Centre Press: University of Miami) pp.57.

²²⁸ Josephine W. Pomerance, *The Cuban Crisis and the Test Ban negotiations*, *The Journal of Conflict and Resolution* (pre 1986) Vol. 7. Issue. 3. 1 Sept 1963.

²²⁹ Andrey A. Kokoshin, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis in the Context of Strategic stability*. Working Paper, 2012.

²³⁰ Pomerance, 1963.

arms control.²³¹ What followed was the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT). Signed and ratified by both leaders and the UN in 1963 the NTBT banned the testing of nuclear detonations in the atmosphere, in outer space and under the sea. The NTBT was limited in its effects but “moreover, the first disarmament agreement in post war history had been signed, breaking the psychological deadlock in disarmament talks, improving considerably the overall atmosphere of U.S.- Soviet Relations.”²³² In addition, Spencer Weart suggests that by removing the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons meant that “out of sight was out of mind” resulting in a worldwide collapse of interest in nuclear warfare in all media during the 1960s.²³³ The NTBT demonstrated to both politicians and the public that diplomatic progress could be made regarding reducing the nuclear threat and that although rivals in ideology the two superpowers could find room for cooperation. Kendrick Oliver supports this theory, writing that while a nuclear test ban “will not by itself make a decisive contribution to the peace and security of the world, its value might lead to progression in other negotiations.”²³⁴ Rapoport agrees noting that the treaty also set the precedent for further treaties to be signed throughout the 1960s.²³⁵ These include cooperation on the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (1968) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, (proposed in 1967). It is easy to imagine that had early measures not been taken after the Cuban Missile Crisis the initiative might not have been seized for decades to come. Most importantly however, after Kennedy’s assassination the Test Ban Treaty allowed “President Johnson and his

²³¹ Peter G. Boyle, *American- Soviet Relations: From the Russian Revolution to the Fall of Communism*, (Routledge: London) 1993, pp.148.

²³² Ibid. pp. 148.

²³³ Spencer R. Weart, *Rise of Nuclear Fear*, (Harvard University Press: London) 2012, pp.151-152.

²³⁴ Kendrick Oliver, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate (1961-1963)*, (St Martins Press: New York) 1998, pp.175.

²³⁵ Anatol Rapoport, *The Big Two: Soviet-American Perceptions of Foreign Policy*, (Pegasus: University of Michigan) 1971, pp.191.

team to inherit the ‘little Détente’, which followed the Cuban Missile Crisis.”²³⁶

In 1963 State department official Robert Johnson filed a report on the future of the Peoples Republic of China’s (PRC) nuclear programme. In which Johnson concluded that China’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon would be a great threat not only to the U.S. but also to the wider Asian region.²³⁷ On 16th October 1964 this fear became a reality as the Communist state announced it had carried out its first successful nuclear detonation. China’s nuclear possession generated a new threat to the United States and its interests overseas, but more importantly it also greatly threatened the Soviet Union who despite being an ideological ally did not support China’s pursuit of joining the nuclear club. The USSR cut Beijing off from its nuclear program assistance in 1962 after a schism emerged between the two communist states.²³⁸ Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, Beijing had been a substantial critic of the easing of tensions between The USSR and the U.S. Accusing Moscow of “capitulating to American Imperialism.”²³⁹ For President Johnson in the U.S., a nuclear PRC’s support for North Vietnam against U.S. intervention made the prospect of a military escalation from a nuclear-armed country all the more real.²⁴⁰ The initial concern the superpowers had over China’s nuclear weapons was that it accompanied an aggressive, expansive foreign policy. China had already fought the U.S. in Korea and had attacked India in 1962.²⁴¹ Paired with this volatile foreign policy was the reckless

²³⁶ John Dumbrell, *LBJ and The Cold War, A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson*, ed- Mitchell B. Lerner, (Wiley- Blackwell: Chichester) 2012, pp.423.

²³⁷ William Burr & Jeffrey T. Richelson, *Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The U.S. and China’s Nuclear Programme 1960-1964*, International Security, Vol 25. Issue 3. pp.56.

²³⁸ Burr & Richelson, pp.68.

²³⁹ Ball, pp.106.

²⁴⁰ Gavin, 2012, pp.78.

²⁴¹ Gavin, 2012, pp.75

attitude in the use of nuclear weapons by Chinese leader Mao who made statements such as; “If the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while Imperialism would be raised to the ground and the whole world would become socialist.”²⁴² To the U.S. this made China seem un-deterrable and therefore more of a destabilising threat to worldwide security.

China’s pursuit of nuclear weapons provided the United States and the Soviet Union with a common enemy. United in wanting to protect their positions as the world’s two nuclear superpowers, it was decided that measures needed to be undertaken to prevent further nuclear advancements by China and the long-term threat of nuclear proliferation from emerging states. Averell Harriman hoped that the newly signed NTBT would make nuclear development harder for the Chinese. “If Moscow and Washington reached an agreement. Together we could compel China to stop nuclear development threatening to take out facilities if necessary.”²⁴³ The prospect of coordinated military strikes between the U.S. and USSR demonstrates a significant U-turn in the countries relations and is testament to how much nuclear tensions had faded in only a couple of years.

It was decided that the most effective way to tackle the prospect of China and other unstable countries from challenging both the U.S. and the USSR as nuclear powers was to provide legislation limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Murry notes that by the mid-1960s the means to acquire nuclear material was becoming more accessible for smaller countries.²⁴⁴ A list of less secure states including Brazil, Israel, Egypt, Argentina and Mexico were all candidates to start atomic weapons programs. Gavin builds upon this writing on the consequences this would have on U.S.- Soviet nuclear relations; “The dangerous but predictable nuclear stand-off between

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Burr & Richelson, pp.68

²⁴⁴ Gavin, 2012, pp.79

the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be replaced by an atomic weapons race including medium and small countries.”²⁴⁵ The main fear shared by the two superpowers was that if the seemingly small scale Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 had taken place with both sides having acquired nuclear weapons then it could escalate to a nuclear war.

The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) signed by the U.S., Soviet Union and over 40 other countries in 1968 vowed to limit the expansion of states with nuclear capabilities.²⁴⁶ The treaty bolstered Soviet-American nuclear relations and furthermore relieved tension, as it was the first agreement between the countries with the ambition of solving nuclear weapons acquisition. By signing the treaty both nuclear weapon states vowed not to assist non-nuclear weapons states in gaining nuclear armament, this shows that international security started to take precedent over geopolitical rivalries. Mallard concludes, “The NNPT was the one treaty that crowned a global expansion of treaties and covenants.”²⁴⁷ China, whilst actively rejecting conforming to the nuclear club did not sign the NNPT. Beijing saw the treaty as an unfair monopolisation by the U.S. and USSR and in November 1966 issued a statement of analysis claiming, “the treaty is absolutely unjust and unfair to the other countries of the world.”²⁴⁸ The PRC saw itself as the outsider nuclear power, fighting amongst the giants of the U.S. and the USSR on behalf of the smaller states. This is made apparent in a statement made by Chinese Head of State Liu Shaoqi after initial successful testing; “All oppressed nations and all peoples in peace loving countries have felt elated over the successful explosions of China’s first atom bomb as they hold the

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Gregoire Mallard, *Crafting the Nuclear Regime Complex (1950-1975) : Dynamics of Harmonization in Opaque Treaty Rules*. The European Journal of International Law Volume 25. Issue 2. 2014. Pp.448

²⁴⁷ Ibid, pp. 450.

²⁴⁸ Johnathan D. Pollak, *Chinese attitudes towards Nuclear Weapons, 1964-1969*, The China Quarterly Issue 50. 1972, pp.258.

view that they too now have nuclear weapons.”²⁴⁹ Beijing’s refusal to conform to the rule of the U.S. and the Soviet Union brought the two Cold War adversaries closer together by providing them a common security threat to manage instead of focusing on one another. While addressing the PRC nuclear policy and wider nuclear proliferation may not have directly reduced tensions, these did assist in diverting hostility away from the model of U.S.-Soviet rivalry whilst at the same time allowing further diplomatic cooperation to develop on nuclear issues.

It would be inaccurate however to assume that overall nuclear tensions between the U.S. and USSR enjoyed a stable decline throughout the 1960s. Firstly, there was significant resistance from hardliners on both sides against the passivity of nuclear relations following the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the U.S., right wing lobbies dismissed President Kennedy’s efforts in achieving the test ban treaty. These lobbies, like many conservative politicians placed importance on toughness and resolve, to them this demonstrated the best way of dealing with the Soviets.²⁵⁰ Republican nominee for President, Barry Goldwater exemplified in his rhetoric during his campaign, in which he spoke out against universal disarmament. He claimed there’s “a real prospect of an America unarmed and aimless in the face of militant Communism around the world.”²⁵¹ This demonstrates heightened tensions of the loss of U.S. nuclear superiority in the status quo. Similarly, Oliver writes that in the Soviet Union there was anger at how the Cuban Crisis was resolved, and the perception that the country was seen to make concessions, undermining national prestige.²⁵² This made the Soviets less eager to make further negotiations on the nuclear arms issue. As a consequence of

²⁴⁹ Ibid, pp.256.

²⁵⁰ Oliver, 1998, pp.136.

²⁵¹ Barry Goldwater, *Peace Through Strength*, Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol 30. Issue 24, 1964, pp.744.

²⁵² Oliver, 1998, pp.137.

Khrushchev signing the NTBT in 1963 and advocating peaceful coexistence with the West, many believe that these measures resulted in his coup by Soviet hardliners in 1964.²⁵³ The U.S. State Department Policy Planning Council also cast doubts over the Soviet leaders' acceptance of "the détente marked by the 1963 test ban."²⁵⁴

Throughout the 1960s the advancement in nuclear technological capabilities and strategies caused further reason for rising tensions. Thomas Schelling writes about the expansion of U.S. nuclear strategy during the 1960s, which had the potential to make nuclear warfare a more viable military option. "Massive retaliation as a strategic concept was dethroned in 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis but this evolved into a new strategy."²⁵⁵ These new strategies made up a 'flexible response' in the use of nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara wrote of implementing a 'counterforce strategy' in which in an attack, Soviet military and war efforts would be targeted in place of Soviet cities. "Live cities were to be appreciated as assets, as hostages, as means of influence over the enemy himself" bringing the enemy to terms.²⁵⁶ McNamara's departure from the traditional stalemate of Mutually Assured Destruction should not be underestimated. With this line of thought, nuclear warfare could prove strategically advantageous. In the Soviet Union technological progress had resulted in a build-up of long-range nuclear striking power of incontestable capability.²⁵⁷ The Post Khrushchev leadership greenlight such high quantities of these long

²⁵³ Richard Allen Schwartz, *The Cold War Reference Guide; A general History and annotated Chronology, with selected Bibliographies*. (McFarland & Company, Inc: North Carolina) 1997, pp.277.

²⁵⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States (1964-1968)* Vol 14: The Soviet Union. U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001, pp.384.

²⁵⁵ Thomas C. Schelling: *Controlled Response and strategic Warfare*. The Adelphi Papers, Vol 5. Issue 19. 1965. Pp.224.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pp.225.

²⁵⁷ Robert Malcolmson, *Beyond Nuclear Thinking*, (McGill-Queen's University Press: London) 1990, pp.40.

range missiles that by the late 1960s it was seen as easier to attack the U.S. rather than to defend its own cities.²⁵⁸

Finally, conflicts and instabilities in the broader environment of the Cold War renewed potential for nuclear warfare to still be a global threat. The U.S. conflict in Vietnam, which defined the Cold War in the 1960s, was one example of an escalating conflict. Although nuclear weapons were never considered to be used on the Viet-Kong, Tannenwald claims that they were considered should China enter the conflict. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded should Chinese intervention “occur on a basis of remotely resembling Korea, possibly the use of nuclear weapons at some point is why we have them.”²⁵⁹ Should the U.S. and China engage in a nuclear conflict, further concern was given to the role of the Soviet Union in such an event, Under Secretary of State George Ball wrote in a 1964 memo—“The best judgement is that the Soviet Union could not sit by and let nuclear weapons be used against China.”²⁶⁰ This concern worried President Johnson who was haunted by the fear of Soviet and Chinese intervention, which led him to conduct and lose a limited conflict in Vietnam rather than risk nuclear escalation.

One of the latter examples of renewed tensions in the 1960s came during the six day Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. In the conflict between Israel and Egypt, the U.S. and Soviet Union backed both sides respectively.²⁶¹ As Israel made territorial gains Kosygin threatened military action over the Leader’s hotline. Tensions were even more aggravated when President Johnson responded by moving the U.S fleet including aircraft carriers into Syrian waters. This can be seen as a relapse by both sides into brinkmanship politics between

²⁵⁸ Ibid, pp.41.

²⁵⁹ Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use*, International Organisation, Vol 53. Issue 3. Summer 1999, pp.194.

²⁶⁰ Ibid, pp.201.

²⁶¹ Dumbrell, 2012, pp.423

the two superpowers, which proved such a severe threat of nuclear escalation in the early years of the 1960s. However, as testament to how far nuclear relations had progressed between the two countries, tensions were quickly alleviated with the commencement of the Glassboro summit between the powers a few days later.

The issues discussed in this essay demonstrate a turbulent and unparalleled time in Cold War nuclear politics. In no other decade would there be such a shift in philosophy not only regarding nuclear weapons but also how both the U.S. and Soviet Union perceived each other entirely. Although fallout of the Cuban Crisis jumpstarted reform in nuclear policy and the reduction of tensions, this essay has highlighted that further events including China's acquisition of the bomb brought with it closer relations between the superpowers. However, reduction of tensions was not always guaranteed as the two sides clashed over seemingly unrelated conflicts, in which the prospect of nuclear escalation loomed in the background. On more than one occasion progress talks, which would greater, reduce nuclear tensions were often obstructed by hardliners and sacrificed in preservation of stature. The Glassboro Summit represents the culmination of the many achievements made regarding nuclear policy in the 1960s as both sides could now come together to negotiate nuclear treaties even in a time of heightened tensions.

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**A Critical Analysis of United Nations
Interventions in the 1990's:
Responsibility to Protect or Western
Imperialism?**

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a considerable rise in the regularity of internationalised intra-state conflicts requiring humanitarian military intervention. The United Nations (UN), accountable for enforcing and maintaining peace on a global scale has obtained the crucial responsibility of bringing such conflicts to a diplomatic conclusion. The 1990's, representative of the new era of securitisation and humanitarianism, proved to be the ultimate testing ground for the UN's ability to carry out their self-appointed obligations. I have therefore decided to analyse the crucial role of the UN within conflict-intervention throughout the 1990's and challenge the opponents of the use of force as an effective tool of peace enforcement. New challenges facing an intervening force, alongside the frequent necessity of effective foreign intervention are so often matched with themes of imperialism, neo-colonialism and Western voracity by the modern-day scholar, increasing the prerequisite for a clear analysis of the topic, of which I hope to produce by means of the following research. I will however, argue for the much-needed reconstruction of various aspects of UN procedures, particularly in the legal legislature and efficient use of military components currently deployed. This, I believe, will address the concerns voiced by critics of the UN and military-led interventions to portray the determined approach to follow the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) decorum, devoid of Western imperialistic characteristics.

1. Introduction

1.1 Defining Humanitarian Intervention

The subject of humanitarian interventions is a much-debated topic with numerous aspects worthy of in-depth analysis. Literature surrounding UN interventions is by no means limited. However, in contrast to existing works regarding interventionism, I will add to the limited research combining this focus with an analysis of the use of military force. Throughout my paper, I will focus on the legal and theoretical frameworks and how, despite cynical criticisms surrounding controversial actions of the UN, the technicalities reveal the legitimacy of a great deal more than is suggested. These will be used in conjunction with an examination of the application of humanitarian military interventions, from the planning stage to the implementation of such strategies. Firstly, however, humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era requires a comprehensive definition, giving to the dissimilarities of typified characteristics from Cold War and pre-Cold War definitions. Traditional definitions include; "Military force against another state when the chief publicly declared aim of that military action is ending human-rights violations being perpetrated by the state against which it is directed."²⁶² One must be sure to identify various faults with similar explanations, many of which are common within traditional views of the act of intervention. Firstly, as I will discuss in later chapters, the assumption that the players involved in combat are 'states' typifies the outdated supposition that the state is the foremost subject of security studies and sole perpetrator of military engagements. Contemporary definitions of intervention must note the rising occurrence of militant groups. For example, extra-state armed conflicts, involving a state and an armed group outside of said state rose exponentially in the

²⁶² Marko Marjanovic, '*Is Humanitarian War the Exception?*', Mises Institute, (2011), <<https://mises.org/library/humanitarian-war-exception>> [accessed, 15/03/2016]

Twentieth Century, typically carried out by a colony against its Empirical ruler, for instance the Algerian War of Independence with France 1954. Most common however are intra-state armed conflicts, also known as Civil Wars, fought between a government and non-state group residing predominantly within the state in question, such as the Yugoslav Wars of the early 1990's. Within Europe these grew in regularity following the breakup of the Soviet Union as the ideologically diverse populations within newly independent states struggled to form effective governments to fill the power vacuum.²⁶³ Another issue with the traditional concept of intervention regards the omission of non-forceful methods of intervention. Particularly common in the contemporary global setting, where geo-political economy influences governmental policies more than ever before, various sanctions are imposed upon states and groups to bring an end to human suffering through indirect means. Typically, these sanctions imposed by the UN during the 1990's included comprehensive monetary embargoes, changing in the latter half of the decade to "more limited measures such as arms embargoes, travel restrictions, and asset freezes."²⁶⁴ Despite the significance of such measures, I will be focusing on military-based policies throughout my work, however for the purpose of definitions, economic interventions must certainly be encompassed. As for humanitarian military interventions, these are short term operations with a principle focus on ending human suffering through the use of force. This often leads to the debate of a military humanism; an oxymoron as suggested by Adam Roberts, or a necessary means of obtaining peace?²⁶⁵ This, I believe, is dependent on the way in which the intervention is carried out, from the motives

²⁶³ Marie Olson Lounsbery, *Civil Wars: Internal Struggles, Global Consequences*, (University of Toronto Press, 2008), pp. 20.

²⁶⁴ Barbara Oegg, 'Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Third Edition', *Peterson Institute of International Economics*, (Washington, November, 2007), pp. 132.

²⁶⁵ Francis Abiew, 'Assessing Humanitarian Intervention In The Post-Cold War Period: Sources Of Consensus', *International Relations*, 14.2, (1998), pp. 62.

for action through to the way in which enforcement services hand over to peacekeeping forces. Controversy over UN interventions throughout the 1990's occurred when these humanitarian and political motives are blurred, as we witnessed in Somalia in 1993. Such criticisms erroneously argue that in place of a moral obligation, the UN interventions of the 1990's reflects the re-emergence of Western imperialism, that is, a system of territorial domination and subordination of political, ideological, economic and social practices, with an imperial centre and periphery.²⁶⁶ What exactly dictates whether an intervention is a success or not will be analysed, however put simply, a humanitarian military intervention will save more lives than are lost.

2. The Golden Age of Humanitarianism

2.1 The evolution of security threats

The 1990's and the end of the Cold War marked the creation of evolutionary threats to the security of states and their populations. Perceptions of security as an "essentially contested concept" have adapted since the 1990's as a result of the new threats challenging individual and international security.²⁶⁷ As Samuel Huntington predicted;

"In this new (post-Cold war) world the most pervasive, important and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. And the most

²⁶⁶ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (Vintage Publishers, 1994), pp. 9.

²⁶⁷ Walter Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concept', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Volume 56, (1956)

dangerous cultural conflicts are those along the fault lines between civilizations.”²⁶⁸

The accuracy of Huntington’s work cannot be doubted, the fall of the Soviet Union certainly led to an increase of inter and intra-state conflicts, particularly across third world nations in regions such as Africa and the Middle-East, leading to the increased need for humanitarian interventions. This supports the work of Mary Kaldor in suggesting the era of novel security threats represents a transition within warfare, from traditional conflicts to *New Wars*, whereby the conventional deployment of military force between two states in an open confrontation is no longer the norm.²⁶⁹ The use of identity politics to fight for a group of characteristically and ideology similar individuals against another therefore represents a significant new security threat to the international community. Conflicts of this nature were common within the 1990’s and required the intervention of UN forces to instil peace and reduce human suffering. The significance of these motives is key to understanding why humanitarian military intervention is required in such conflicts. Unlike the conventional battlefield objectives of states, the physical, territorial gains over an opponent are no longer the primary intentions of militant groups and will not, therefore, bring an end to a *new war*. This transfer from fighting for the state to fighting for ideologies also depicts the decline of national patriotism, as argued by Keith Suter.²⁷⁰ The development of the ‘global consumer culture’ and introduction of micro-nationalism; the patriotism to a group or ethnicity within a state decreases patriotism and increases globalisation; a considerable threat outlined within the 2006 German White Paper. The interconnectivity of cultures, identities and ideologies subsequently distributes the security threats of an individual or group and projects them on a

²⁶⁸ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the remaking of World Order*, (Simon & Schuster, 2011), pp. 28.

²⁶⁹ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, (Cambridge: Polity, 2012)

²⁷⁰ Keith Suter, *Global Order and Global Disorder: Globalization and the Nation-state*, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), pp. 52.

global scale. A successful response, it is claimed, must include the application of defensive strategies on an international scale.²⁷¹ An example of this is the Yugoslav Wars throughout the 1990's. Due to globalisation and the scattering of ethnicities following the breakup of the Soviet Union, ethnic groups within each nation were considerably diverse, with many minority groups combining to form a highly multi-cultural state. Therefore, the ethnically motivated conflicts of a single state would soon spread across borders where similar confrontations would take place between minority groups, putting what President Clinton called "militant nationalism" into a disparaging practice.²⁷² The Bosnian War for example could well have spread across neighbouring Balkan states also encompassing Serbian and Croatian minorities. Following the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, 37% of Serbian origin resided in Bosnia, 32% within Montenegro, Croatia 5% and Serbia 66%, thus any confrontation involving Serbians within former Yugoslavia had devastating potential to spread.²⁷³ Without decisive intervention within Operation Deliberate Force, the possibility of a northward escalation into Central and Eastern Europe would certainly be credible, leaving a very late UN intervention little hope of success. This is supported by Wayne Thompson's research, outlining the support from many of Europe's leading intellectuals for humanitarian military intervention in Bosnia for the fear of further humanitarian crisis, not for the imperialistic aims of Western nations.²⁷⁴

²⁷¹ Federal Ministry of Defence, 'White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr', Defense White Papers and National Security Strategies, (Germany, Federal Ministry of the Defence of Germany, 2006), pp. 5.

²⁷² Jason Edwards, *Navigating the Post-Cold War World: President Clinton's Foreign Policy Rhetoric*, (Lexington Books, 16 Dec 2008), pp. 73.

²⁷³ Joseph Hobbs, *World Regional Geography*, (Cengage Learning, 13 Mar 2008), pp. 147.

²⁷⁴ Wayne Thompson, *Western Europe 2014*, (Rowman & Littlefield, 24 Jul 2014), pp. 141.

One overshadowing, yet positive evolution of security studies from the 1990's is what Costas Douzinas labels the "new moral order", in which human rights are prioritised at the expense of the sovereignty of a state.²⁷⁵ This led to the introduction of the 'human security' approach. Suggestions of an alternative approach were present even from 1968 following Robert Kennedy's proposal;

"there is another kind of violence in its way as destructive as the bullet or the bomb. This is the violence of institutions; indifference, inaction and slow decay. This is the violence that afflicts the poor... this is the slow destruction of a child by hunger, and schools without books and homes without heat in the winter."²⁷⁶

This was projected by the UN's "paradigm shift" following the 1994 UN Human Development Report outlining the security threats of the new era, with greater focus on the moral obligations of the international community to the security of the individual.²⁷⁷ This "revolution of moral concern"²⁷⁸ modifies the referent object of security accordingly to reflect the threats faced in the post-Cold War era. Consequently, intervention in Bosnia was regarded as fundamental in order to prevent mass ethnic cleansing, as seen in Rwanda as a consequence of non-intervention. Despite strongly opposing the practise of humanitarian military interventions for various explanations, Richard Falk argues that the alteration from "geopolitical interventionism in the direction of support for

²⁷⁵ Costas Douzinas, 'Humanity, Military Humanism and New Moral Order', *Economy and Society*, 30.2, (2003)

²⁷⁶ Michael Sheehan, *International Security – An Analytical Survey*, (Lynne Rienner Pub, March 15, 2005) pp. 77.

²⁷⁷ Brauch, pp. 101.

²⁷⁸ Michael Ignatieff, *The lesser evil; Political ethics in an age of terror*, (Princeton University Press, 2004)

humanitarian claims to alleviate human suffering” represents a “welcome development.”²⁷⁹

The rise of human security and consideration for the individual’s wellbeing over state sovereignty is reflected by the UN’s moral obligations to protect. Operations throughout the 1990’s reflect this process which ultimately led to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine introduced within the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). This outlined the responsibility of firstly the state and secondly the international community to prevent, react and rebuild.²⁸⁰ Thus when a state government fails to protect its population, the international community, represented by the UN are permitted to carry out military interventions. The new threats of the post-Cold War era therefore represent a transformation of state to international wars, from nationalism to moral obligation, and from imperialism to the Responsibility to Protect.

2.2 The Evolution of humanitarian interventions

Following the conclusion of the Cold War, humanitarian military interventions reflect a reformed inclination from international organisations such as the UN to intervene to protect the human rights of civilians at risk of suffering. Perez de Cuellar outlines these developments in a speech made at the University of Bordeaux in 1991; “we are clearly witnessing what is an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the

²⁷⁹ Richard, Falk, ‘The Complexities Of Humanitarian Intervention: A New World Order Challenge’, *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 17(2), (1996)

²⁸⁰ World Federalist Movement, ‘*Responsibility to Protect: Engaging Civil Society*’, The Report Of The International Commission On Intervention And State Sovereignty (ICISS), <<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/R2PSummary.pdf>> [accessed 14/04/2016]

name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents.”²⁸¹ The issue of sovereignty has been widely contested, and is often used by restrictionist scholars such as Noam Chomsky, arguing that aside from collective and self-defence, there can be no exception for military intervention.²⁸² Restrictionism argues for the ‘vital interests of states’ to support the claim that UN interventions throughout the 1990’s reflected policies of imperialistic intentions.²⁸³ Conversely, the most significant change in the evolution of humanitarian interventions is the willingness to put human security before state sovereignty. For example, throughout the 1980’s the UN was helpless in conflicts such as Northern Ireland, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Salvador and Nicaragua due to the unwillingness of disputants.

A significant reflection of the changing nature of interventions comes from the reformed practise of humanitarianism from the intervening UN forces. The highly volatile, politicised nature of post-Cold War conflicts challenged the UN’s commitment to “impartiality, neutrality and independence.”²⁸⁴ Offering humanitarian aid to civilians within a conflict could also often mean unintentionally offering aid to one or more groups involved in the fighting due to the changing combatants within conflicts. Increased civilian participation in conflicts to overthrow a national government or defeat a competing armed militia creates an impossible scenario for UN humanitarian aid workers, who must differentiate between civilian and combatant. Nevertheless, the delivery of humanitarian aid and support for international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO’s) illustrates the commitment to the moral obligations of the international community, rather than imperialistic motives. The payoff for a successful intervention, as Bass argues is very minimal. Considering the

²⁸¹ Abiew pp. 1.

²⁸² Anthony, Arend, *International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the U.N. Charter Paradigm*, (Routledge, 2014), pp. 106.

²⁸³ Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*, (London: Pluto Press, 1999)

²⁸⁴ Michael Barnett, ‘Humanitarianism Transformed’, *Perspectives on Politics*, 3.4, (2005), pp. 724.

paradigmatic case for a successful UN intervention in Bosnia in 1995, working with local actors and complying with UN legitimacy, President Clinton has not consequently had the intervention attached to his name. Whereas an unsuccessful intervention would carry a much heavier burden on the leading military officials involved.

3. Legal and Theoretical Perspectives

3.1 Legal framework

The United Nation's new found intolerance to human suffering and human atrocities began to reflect the norm of the post-Cold War policy towards intervention. This was expressed through both legal and moral reforms and reflected by the considerable increase of military-led operations. As James Pattison records, the UN issued the use of military force 56 times between the years 1990 and 2000, compared to just 22 times throughout the entirety of the Cold War.²⁸⁵ This can be attributed to the reconceptualization of security threats when referring to the relevant chapters of the UN Charter. In this case, the key article prohibiting the deployment of military interventions is Chapter 1: Article 2(7) in which it states; "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."²⁸⁶ Nevertheless, it then makes clear of the exception for anything that can be defined as a matter of "international peace and security" under Chapter VII.²⁸⁷ As previously discussed, threats to 'international peace and security' were revolutionised from the early 1990's, thus justifying considerably more military interventions

²⁸⁵ James Pattinson, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)

²⁸⁶ The United Nations, 'The UN Charter',

<<http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/>> [accessed 08/04/2016]

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

leading to the statistics of Pattison's research. To further support my argument, I believe Christopher Greenwood's summary of the crucial prioritisation of UN principles suitably outlines the legal legitimacy of UN humanitarian military interventions;

“the law on humanitarian intervention has changed both for the United Nations and for individual states. It is no longer tenable to assert that whenever a government massacres its own people or a state collapses into international anarchy international law forbids military intervention altogether.”²⁸⁸

If the late 20th Century tragedies of South Vietnam, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Northern Iraq and Rwanda have taught the international community anything, it is the need for legal reform regarding the right to intervene. Thankfully from the 1990's; the Golden Age for humanitarian intervention²⁸⁹ and the expansion of security threats, legitimacy for intervention encompassed such criminal acts, thus preventing further human suffering.

With such a broad spectrum of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, justifications provided by the UN for the numerous interventions throughout the 1990's have subsequently caused vast opposition on legal grounds. Even from within the UN, members such as China and Russia often use their right to veto a resolution such as military intervention, leading to other international organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Association (NATO) carrying out operations without the consensus of the UN Security Council (UNSC). This was seen in 1999 when a UN resolution to carry out aerial bombardments of Serbian strategic positions was

²⁸⁸ Christopher Greenwood, 'Is there a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?', *The World Today*, 49.2, (1993), pp.40.

²⁸⁹ Richard Falk, '*Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum*', Global Policy Forum, (July 14th, 2003), <<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26032.html>> [accessed, 08/04/2016]

vetoed by their political ally, and permanent member of the council; Russia. Therefore, the humanitarian military intervention in Kosovo from NATO forces is deemed illegal under international law. Chomsky, a leading restrictionist, argues that the Bosnian and subsequent Kosovo conflicts were in fact civil wars, and not campaigns of mass ethnic cleansing as argued by many leading scholars.²⁹⁰²⁹¹ This would of course, imply collective guilt over the atrocities, thus mitigating the illegality claims of the UN's intervention. However, was it not Serbia that instigated conflicts with Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and ultimately Kosovo? These were carried out under General Milosovic, whose extreme nationalistic views pursued a determination to achieve a "greater Serbia" which could be achieved "only through a horrible war and in blood."²⁹² The extensive human suffering; 350,000 total deaths, 74% of which were caused by Serbian forces represent a crisis no morally aligned state could ignore, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the failures of the international community during the Rwandan genocide.²⁹³ Therefore, the responsibilities of the UN to protect individuals from threats to human security clearly encompass the victims of atrocities in Mogadishu and Srebrenica.

The legal framework of humanitarian military interventions is certainly difficult to summarise. The flexibility of clarification surrounding the UN Charter's policy on the use of force leads to

²⁹⁰ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A short history*, (Pan Macmillan, 2002)

²⁹¹ IWPR, Genocide Conviction for Serb General Tolimir, (13 December 2012), <<http://iwpr.net/report-news/genocide-conviction-serb-general-tolimir>> [accessed 08/04/2016]

²⁹² Ian Black, 'Milosevic tried to build Greater Serbia, trial told', The Guardian, <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/02/warcrimes.milosevictrial>> [accessed 08/04/2016]

²⁹³ **Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, 'JUSTICE REPORT: Bosnia's Book of the Dead.'** (June 21, 2007), <<http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/rdn5.pdf>>

differing interpretations of legality from one scholar to the next. Essentially, the pivotal concept remains the act in which a threat to security is substantial enough to legitimise intervention, thus prioritising the victims over the sovereignty of the state. Fernando Tesón argues that those states that fail to protect the “natural rights of its citizens” lose their sovereignty, and thus become susceptible to a legitimate international intervention.²⁹⁴ I certainly agree that the primary focus of the UN should be the individual rather than the sovereignty of the state, of whom, as Tesón suggests, hold questionable authority over their population, thus legitimising an intervention in the hope of ensuring the security of the individual.²⁹⁵

3.2 Theoretical framework

Theoretical perceptions of humanitarian military interventions developed significantly from the end of the Cold War, with a significant focus on a new found sense of morality within the legitimacy debate. Key schools of thought including Realism, Marxism, Cosmopolitanism and Constructivism have all expressed varied opinions on the UN’s use of force to obtain peace during the 1990’s, all of which will be analysed to support the argument for the application of military operations to pursue peace. Comprehension of the theoretical framework allows us to understand, as J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane argue; that “our common human nature generates common moral duties – including, in some versions, a right of humanitarian intervention.”²⁹⁶

²⁹⁴ Fernando Tesón, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and Morality*, (Transnational, 1997), pp.15.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Robert Keohane and J. L. Holzgrefe, *Humanitarian Intervention: ethical, legal and political dilemmas*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003)

The RtoP doctrine highlighted and expanded upon theoretical concepts such as natural law and common morality, both of which became prevalent in the policies of the UN towards the end of the Twentieth Century. Both classical and neo-realists view the use of force and military power as a necessary factor for achieving security in an international system characterised by anarchy. This policy of *realpolitik* is therefore engaged by all major states to pursue peace, but also national interests. Therefore, the realist approach to military intervention, similar to the counter-restrictionist approach, does outline potential dangers and issues surrounding state motives. However, the “omnipresent threat of war” requires the ability to impose the use of force to maintain regional security.²⁹⁷ Despite an inherent opposition to liberally motivated democratic wars associated with territorial, economic or political gain, the 1990’s did present examples of the UN’s use of force deemed necessary by prominent Marxists. The 1999 East Timor conflict, involving East Timorese pro-integration militias and the newly independent civilians represents an oppressive act of violence justifying international military intervention. Noam Chomsky, a leading Marxist quoted;

“In one month, this massive military operation murdered some 2,000 people, raped hundreds of women and girls, displaced three-quarters of the population, and demolished 75 percent of the country's infrastructure.”²⁹⁸

This supports the need for a UN response to the internal affairs of a state, should the circumstances present a severe threat to human life, successfully carried out in East Timor by an Australian-led UN peacekeeping force. Within Marxist theory, state-centric conflicts, the second level of Kenneth Waltz’s analysis are built upon characteristics such as political authority and patriotism. It is the latter of which Hans Morgenthau argues reflects man’s ‘ineradicable lust’ for transforming

²⁹⁷ Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory’, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18.4, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 615-628.

²⁹⁸ Noam Chomsky, *Radical Priorities*, (AK Press, 2003), pp. 72.

“love for country into imperialism.”²⁹⁹ Therefore, the distinct move away from state-centric conflicts following the Cold War also represents a shift away from policies based on imperialism.

Cosmopolitanism and post-Cold War humanitarian military interventions share the common interests of defending human rights and the protection of civilians against murderous governments. It also challenges the decisions for not intervening in conflicts of oppression and genocide such as Rwanda and Bosnia prior to UN intervention.³⁰⁰ Theoretical support for humanitarian intervention is not uncommon amongst any theoretical school, however Cosmopolitanism offers significant ideas on the necessity of such operations as Bobbitt concludes; “Support for humanitarian military intervention is premised on the widespread feeling that the exercise of military force has been both possible and urgently needed to stop grave humanitarian crimes.”³⁰¹ This can be used to legitimise international action within Somalia from 1991, possibly the most controversial of all post-Cold War UN interventions. During the political chaos of the early 1990’s, Somalia descended into a deadly civil war in which the destruction of agriculture and livestock halted the nation’s food production. The subsequent famine and drought led to the death of around 300,000 civilians and 500,000 internally displaced persons (IDP’s).³⁰² This set the conditions for widespread criticism towards the lack of UN action in preventing and reacting to such a humanitarian disaster, resulting in Operation Restore Hope, led by the United States. From a theoretical and moral perspective, the legitimacy of the intervention is unprecedented. The situation in Somalia by 1992 clearly constituted a humanitarian crisis caused by

²⁹⁹ Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics*, (University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 194-95.

³⁰⁰ Phil Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History*, (Penguin, 2002), pp. 414-67.

³⁰¹ Robert Fine, *Cosmopolitanism*, (London, Routledge, 2007), pp. 79.

³⁰² Ken Rutherford, *Humanitarianism Under Fire: The US and UN Intervention in Somalia*, (Sterling, Kumarian Press, 2008), pp. 38.

the widespread clan conflicts from within, thus requiring the action of a neutral, international force such as the UN to bring aid to the civilians. The controversy behind the UN intervention lies with the practise of further military activities by the US forces, not the theoretical framework of the decision to intervene. Centred around ideas of identity and how one state's perception of another manifests the 'norm' in international relations, constructivists such as Martha Finnemore argue that Somalia represents a conflict in which the US, as the principle intervener, had little to no strategic or economic gains to be made.³⁰³ This is supported by Luke Glanville, leading to the belief that "the decision to intervene was motivated by genuine humanitarian concern for the suffering Somalis as much as any other factor."³⁰⁴ Evidently the constructivist approach, along with the various other primary theoretical frameworks interpret the issues of security and state insecurity in contrasting ways, ultimately justifying the legitimacy of humanitarian military interventions in their own ways. The opposition regarding the use of force is largely the responsibility of controversial methods employed by UN forces to obtain peace, these will be analysed within the following chapter. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework surrounding the often necessary use of force to carry out the moral responsibility to protect, as Ajaj argues, has never enjoyed as much legitimacy as it does today.³⁰⁵

4. Motives and Means of a Successful Intervention

4.1 Motives behind a humanitarian military intervention

³⁰³ Martha Finnemore, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization*, 52(4), (1998), pp. 887-917.

³⁰⁴ Luke Glanville, 'Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention', *International Affairs*, 77(1), (2001), pp. 113-128.

³⁰⁵ Ahmad Ajaj, 'Humanitarian Intervention: Second Reading of the Charter of the United Nations', *Arab Law Quarterly*, 7(4), (1993), pp. 215-236.

Significant criticism of UN humanitarian interventions on the basis of imperialistic undertones surrounds the contentious issue of what drove the decision to partake in a military intervention. Analysis of international motives must encompass the legal and moral frameworks to accurately critic any motivation to intervene. For example, Tariq Ali and Noam Chomsky argue that US interventions are deficient of legality due to underlying geo-political goals, rather than the preservation of human life and international peace and security of which, according to the UN Charter would justify the use of force in international law.³⁰⁶ Conversely, the evolution of the Just War doctrine counterparts the establishment of effective motivations for intervention. The various aspects of the concept are divided into two categories; *Jus ad Bellum*; the motivations behind the use of force, and; *Jus in Bello*; the means of the force used. The seven tenets found within the first category outline the requirements for the use of force to be considered 'just'. I will therefore align the motives of the UN prior to their decision to allow NATO intervention in Bosnia from 1992-95 to the seven tenets of *Jus ad Bellum* to support the decision to intervene. Firstly, is the need for right intention. Members of the intervening force, particularly the US had little to gain from the intervention, besides from reducing the flow of refugees through Europe there can be little arguments outlining imperialistic motives, particularly following the continued dedication of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to preserve the peace years after the culmination of the conflict. Second, is the need for a just cause. Following the recognised independence of Bosnia on April 6th 1992, a crowd of 50,000 unarmed Bosnians of all ethnicities gathered to embrace their independence, and were fired upon by members of the Serbian military and para-military groups. The first Sarajevo massacre would be replicated time and time again over the following two years,

³⁰⁶ Noam Chomsky, *A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor, and the Standards of the West*, (New York, Verso, 2001) and Tariq, Ali, *Masters of the Universe? NATO's Balkan Crusade*, (New York, Verso, 2000)

undeniably reflecting a just cause for international action to commit to their responsibility to protect principles in 1995. Next is the requirement for legitimate authority, given by the UN Security Council Resolution 816. Military intervention must also be the last resort. This was certainly the case with Bosnia, so much so that former US ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman suggests; “the refusal of the Bush administration to commit American power early on was our greatest mistake of the entire Yugoslavian crisis.”³⁰⁷ Declaration of operational aims must also be declared prior to intervention, these were aforementioned within the UNSC Resolutions 758 and 819 that can be readily accessed online.³⁰⁸ Proportionality of the military input to the outcome of intervention must also be considered. In the Bosnian example, the damage of an ethnic cleansing campaign under Serbian General Milosovic therefore outweighs the damage of two weeks of aerial campaigns on Serbian military positions, the details of which will be analysed in the following chapter. Finally, the probability of success must be significant enough to initiate the use of force. The UN’s authorisation was followed by a swift but heavy eleven-day campaign which resulted in the signing of the Dayton Accords. Again, the methods of which success was achieved will be analysed within the following chapter. With reference to the Just War doctrine, I believe the UN’s intervention in Bosnia from 1992-95 represents the appropriate use of force in correlation to the Responsibility to Protect principles.

4.2 The role of national interests in the decision to intervene

The role of national interests provides the greater part of anti-interventionists argument on the motives of UN members precluding a humanitarian intervention. If one were to take a neorealist’ view on

³⁰⁷ Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers*, (New York: Times Books, 1996), pp. 22.

³⁰⁸ United Nations, ‘*Security Council Resolutions*’,
<<http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>>

international relations such as that of Waltz, the role of national interests is paramount for a state to maintain influence in the self-help international system in which we live.³⁰⁹ I disagree with the neorealist view, however I do believe that the contemporary UN system for permitting the use of force allows for states to define what constitutes a threat to security, thus allowing for national interests to play a role in the decision to intervene. For example, some European states such as Spain, Portugal, Belgium and France were clear in emphasising their individual concerns regarding the Balkans conflicts. The continuing flow of refugees from former Yugoslavia across Europe would destabilise the region, therefore intervention would not only provide humanitarian assistance to those in the conflict zone, but also address the security concerns of intervening states.³¹⁰ Contrary to Chris Brown's argument that unless "the intervening states are pure at heart"³¹¹ a military intervention is considered an act of imperialism, Michael Walzer insists that "a pure moral will does not exist in political life," and therefore the presence of national interests should not criminalise actions ultimately seeking humanitarian resolve.³¹² Understandably, any intention for a UN intervention carried out where the primary motive is to preserve national interests rather than the continuation of Douzinas' 'new moral order' concept should be strongly vetoed for the preservation not just of human security, but

³⁰⁹ Jonelle Lonergan, 'Neo-Realism and Humanitarian Action: From Cold War to Our Days,' *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, (2011)

³¹⁰ Allen Sen, 'Kosovo, and the Case of the Free Riders: Belgium, Canada, Portugal, and Spain', in Albrecht Shnabel and Ramesh Thakur, *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Intervention, and International Citizenship*, (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2000)

³¹¹ Chris Brown, 'From Humanized War to Humanitarian Intervention: Carl Schmitt's Critique of the Just War Tradition', in Louiza Odysseos, *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt*, (London, Routledge, 2007)

³¹² Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, (New York: Basic Books, 2006), pp. 26.

also of the UN's standing in the international community. Conversely, it is argued that states within the UN must share an element of self-interest in a potential intervention in order to justify the deployment of its forces at a significant cost, financially and potentially in human lives.³¹³ This was evident in the case of Rwanda, in which the distinct lack of national interests arguably led to a failure to intervene. Nevertheless, the ICISS accepts that in today's world of *realpolitik*; "mixed motives, in international relations as everywhere else, are a fact of life"³¹⁴, however; "the primary purpose of the intervention...must be to halt or avert human suffering."³¹⁵ This argument is reflected within Aidin Hehir's analogy of the charity dance;

"A person attends a fundraising dance in aid of a local homeless charity because they wish to meet their friends, and enjoy themselves, and because they know that doing so helps homeless people. The fact that this person's motivation for attending the dance was not purely, or even primarily altruistic, does not mean, many would argue, that this was not a humane act, as it had positive humanitarian consequences."³¹⁶

This addresses the question posed by Alex Bellamy; should we define the legitimacy of an intervention by the "ostensibly humanitarian outcome" or by the "humanitarian motivations of the interveners?"³¹⁷ I believe that although national interests can certainly be addressed

³¹³Nadège Sheehan, *The Economics of UN Peacekeeping*, (Routledge, 25 Jul 2011), pp. 24.

³¹⁴ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), pp. xii.

³¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 36.

³¹⁶ Hehir, pp. 153.

³¹⁷ Alex Bellamy, 'Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention', *Journal of Military Ethics*, 3(3), (2004), pp. 217.

during the intervention, humanitarian motives should ultimately be placed at the forefront of the UN's objectives, with any additional benefits, as experienced in Bosnia, providing further motivation to commit to a peaceful resolve when the operation proves difficult. This, I believe, was followed accordingly by the UN throughout the 1990's in order to commit to the ever increasing responsibility to the response and protection against threats to human security. This is accurately summarised by Hehir in his introduction to humanitarian intervention; "if an intervention is motivated by non-humanitarian reasons, it can still count as humanitarian provided that the motives and the means do not undermine a positive humanitarian outcome."³¹⁸

4.3 Means by which the United Nations intervened during the 1990's

Similarly, to the motives of UN interventions during the 1990's, the means by which their objectives are pursued can also be examined to determine its legality. As examined within Chapter 2, the UN's 'paradigm shift' regarding security threats is observed in many different ways, thus creating a complex classification system for the appropriate and proportionate use of military force. Put into an applicable perspective, what is considered a threat to human security and thus moderating a military intervention to one person, may not be the same to another, making the use of force unlawful. However, the Just War doctrine can again offer some consideration to the required aspects contributing to the legitimacy of UN interventions, thus *Jus in Bello* can be applied to relevant UN interventions of the 1990's. The first condition outlines the need for discrimination between aggressors and non-combatants when directing military operations. The UN's willingness to take "appropriate and necessary means"³¹⁹ combined

³¹⁸ Hehir, pp. 172.

³¹⁹ United Nations General Assembly, 'World Summit Outcome Document', (2005), pp. 31,

with the use of heavy artillery and aerial bombardment tactics generates controversial yet predictable results. Civilian deaths and damage to civilian property will “inexorably flow” from the use of such tactics, however in the case of humanitarian intervention, this certainly has a strong case for justification.³²⁰ Walzer’s ‘double effect’ concept offers reconciliation and legitimacy to the intervener if their use of force results in civilian deaths, so long as the intent was legitimate in accordance to the *Jus ad Bellum* doctrine.³²¹ The force used should also be proportionate to the threat faced, requiring the minimum military action possible to carry out the objectives set by the UNSC. For example, the civil unrest within East Timor following their independence in 1999 between the local population and Indonesian-backed militia groups led to UN Resolution 1264. The subsequent arrival of 11,000 international troops, under the title International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) dispelled the militia groups from the island after only six weeks and without any major confrontation.³²² The resistance to use aerial campaigns, or sea-borne artillery as experienced from earlier conflicts represents a proportional use of force in order to protect the security of civilians. The final requirement is the ‘Just Conduct’ of the combat operations. This details the necessity to obey international laws governing the use of force throughout the intervention.³²³ As outlined within Chapter 3, the legality of UN interventions throughout the 1990’s, despite various critical assessments, does not represent actions of an imperialistic organisation with ulterior motives.

<[http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/world%20summit%20outcome%20doc%2002005\(1\).pdf](http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/world%20summit%20outcome%20doc%2002005(1).pdf)> [accessed 28/04/2016]

³²⁰ Ola Engdahl, *Law at War: The Law as it was and the Law as it Should be*, (BRILL, 2008), pp. 205.

³²¹ Walzer, pp. 153-156.

³²² David Horner, ‘Making the Australian Defence Force’, *The Australian Centenary History of Defence*, Volume IV, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 9.

³²³ Hehir, pp. 24.

Some regard the act of killing in the name of humanity an impossible contradiction to the values of modern civilisation. Geoffrey Robertson, labelling this as the ‘Guernica paradox’ poses the question; “When can it be right to unleash terror on terrorists, to bomb for human rights, to kill to stop crimes against humanity?”³²⁴ However, the use of force has been a necessity in achieving two major objectives of UN military interventions throughout the 1990’s; assistance of the delivery of emergency aid and the targeting of perpetrators of violence. The means by which they accomplished these objectives were dictated on a case by case basis, however the presence of a military force, whether as simply a deterrence to potential threats or actively seeking to destroy military targets has proved indispensable in various circumstances. Examples of non-combat military interventions includes the delivery of aid in Mogadishu to the malnourished Somalian population, the insertion of supplies via air drops to the mountainous regions of Bosnia and Kosovo and the construction of camps to provide temporary shelter for refugees and IDP’s during all interventions of the 1990’s.³²⁵ Any suggestions of imperialistic motives regarding such undertakings would therefore be irrational and illogical. Similarly, the requirement for offensive military capabilities is crucial not just for the protection of the civilians under threat, but also to enable NGO’s such as Oxfam and the Red Cross to carry out their roles within conflict torn regions. The motives and legality of methods deployed, of which I have examined throughout this paper is reflected throughout all UN interventions of the 1990’s, albeit with varying success. One must remember that every case is different, from the geographical limitations restricting certain methods of military intervention, to the complex political sphere surrounding the UN Security Council and its decision to intervene. It is therefore important to consider the

³²⁴ Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes Against Humanity*, (London, Penguin), pp. 402.

³²⁵ Taylor Seybolt, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions For Success And Failure*, (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 103.

conflicting views of academics as an inexorable reflection of the variances of contemporary schools of thought.

5. Consequences of non-Intervention

Despite the UN's role in 'developing international norm' towards internationalised intra-state conflicts through an increase in military interventions, the 1990's also saw examples of a devastating non-intervention policy. David Hollenbach makes reference to the biblical commandment; "Thou shalt not stand idly by thy neighbour's blood"³²⁶ when discussing the responsibility of international players such as the UN to act in order to save lives. The hesitancy to intervene where limited national interests could be served can, to a large extent, be attributed to the disastrous US peacekeeping efforts in Somalia from 1993. Following a just UN intervention in 1992, the following US-led operations went far beyond the initial, humanitarian aims of the UNSC, culminating in the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993 and the deaths of 18 servicemen.³²⁷ The subsequent 'Shadow of Somalia' resulted in a Western policy of non-intervention in regions which did not serve national interests.³²⁸ The subsequent reluctance was exposed only a year later, when over 800,000 members of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu tribes were slaughtered during the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, with inadequate prevention and response measures from the international community. This non-interventionist approach has been described by some liberals as "condemning people to death"

³²⁶ David Hollenbach, '*David Hollenbach on the Consequences of Not Intervening During Genocide*', Berkley Centre, available at <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zR-yMdGdYJY>> [accessed 29/04/2016]

³²⁷ Mark Bowden, '*A Defining Battle*', Philadelphia Inquirer, (16th November 1997), available at <<http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/nov16/rang16.asp>>

³²⁸ Howard Adelman, *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, (Transaction Publishers, 2000), pp. xi.

through an excessively politically correct methodology.³²⁹ Critics of the RtoP doctrine argue that the increased acceptance of military interventions represents the re-emergence of Western imperialism within the UN. However, the critical failures of Rwanda demonstrates that the enduring issue of what Hehir labels ‘inhumanitarian non-intervention’ remains ever present.³³⁰ In order to carry out the new model of humanitarianism, the UN must not experience the same inability to react accordingly, and uphold the Responsibility to Protect. Nevertheless, the UN’s intervention in Bosnia showed the international community that lessons had been learned, and the use of force to protect the rights of repressed civilians was still very much a liable option, as Francis Abiew argues; “not to meet the challenge of Bosnia would have been a profound failure of collective will and an abdication of moral responsibility by the entire international community.”³³¹ This, one could argue, also contributed to the swift response of the UNSC regarding the need to intervene in East Timor and Kosovo.

It is important to remember that there have, and will always be situations where non-intervention is of course the correct procedure for the UN. The issue here lies in the UNSC’s perception of what constitutes a worthy, legitimate vindication for the use of force whereby the RtoP doctrine must be applied. For example, recollection of the original definition of a humanitarian intervention noted within Chapter 1 presents the phrase; “ending human rights violations.”³³² However, despite contradicting the moral status of the definition, the violations would have to be on a significant enough scale to warrant a humanitarian military intervention. Should the UN intervene where the violations are of a limited severity across an inconsequential scale,

³²⁹ David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*, (London, Vintage, 2002)

³³⁰ Hehir, pp. 251.

³³¹ Abiew, pp. 69.

³³² Marjanovic, ‘*Is Humanitarian War the Exception?*’

those suggestions of imperialism would certainly hold some credibility. Overall, the concept that “not intervening can be as great a risk as intervening” has ultimately been learned and applied by the UNSC following 1994 as a means of delivering their RtoP accountabilities, but must now be universally acknowledged by those advocates of purely non-forceful means.³³³

6. Recommendations

This final chapter will outline what I believe to be the three principle areas of reform needed from the UN in order to address the common concerns of the international community and amend the overall repute of the Security Council, which following a challenging, revolutionary post-Cold War period highlighted various aspects in much need of modification. Firstly, I believe the conditions set within Article 51 of the Charter permitting the use of force only “if an armed attack occurs”³³⁴ is in much need of modernisation. Due to the nature of contemporary threats, the self defence strategy is no longer a plausible approach. For example, once an international terrorist organisation, arguably the greatest military threat of our generation, has carried out an attack, they will merge back into civilisation with no recognisable territory or population, making an effective retaliation extremely difficult, as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks. Similarly, the magnitude of harm should also be accounted for.³³⁵ The threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s) to cause “untold human

³³³ Shadi Hamid, ‘*Not Intervening Can Be as Great a Risk as Intervening*’, New York Times, (16th November 2015),

<<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/05/18/iraq-bad-intelligence-or-a-lesson-in-bad-policy/not-intervening-can-be-as-great-a-risk-as-intervening>> [accessed, 29/04/2016]

³³⁴ The United Nations, ‘*The UN Charter*’

³³⁵ John C. Yoo, ‘*Force Rules: UN Reform and Intervention*’, Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, (2005), pp. 650, <<http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/1372>> [accessed, 30/04/2016]

suffering...for generations to come” supports the argument.³³⁶ Why should a nation wait for such destruction, either to its own population or another’s before intervening? The *ex-ante* vs *ex-post* argument is not a revolutionary concept, the Caroline Test was recognised following the Nuremberg Tribunals of 1945, outlining support of any necessary, proportionate act of pre-emptive self-defence. However, the “glacial speed” at which the UN responds to a crisis presents the second necessary rectification; the legal reform permitting unilateral humanitarian military interventions.³³⁷ As discussed within Chapter 3, under current legislation a military intervention must receive approval from the UNSC prior to deployment, without which, any action taken becomes illegal under international law. However, due to the veto power of permanent UN members it is very difficult for an intervention, specifically from a Western democracy to achieve such approval. States such as Russia and China remain very anti-intervention for “ideological and self-interested reasons”³³⁸, as shown in 1999 during calls for action in Kosovo. This offers an excellent example of an illegal but legitimate intervention where despite a lack of UNSC approval, humanitarian action was successfully accomplished. As argued by Daniele Archibugi; “if humanitarian action can be successful at halting egregious violations of human without having the proper legal basis, why should we care whether an intervener has the legal right to intervene?”³³⁹ This has been successfully displayed through India's intervention in Bangladesh,

³³⁶ Advisory Opinion, ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’, *International Court of Justice*, (July 8th, 1996)

³³⁷ Annelie Wambeek, ‘*Humanitarian Military Intervention: Assessing the Need for Revision*’, *E-International Relations*, (May 12th, 2015), <<http://www.e-ir.info/2015/05/12/humanitarian-military-intervention-assessing-the-need-for-revision/>> [accessed 30/04/2016]

³³⁸ Chu Shulong, ‘China, Asia and Issues of Intervention and Sovereignty’, *Pugwash Occasional Papers: Intervention, Sovereignty and International Security*, 2.1, (2001)

³³⁹ Daniele Archibugi, ‘Cosmopolitan Humanitarian Intervention is Never Unilateral’, *International Relations*, 19.2, (2005), pp. 225.

Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, Tanzania's intervention in Uganda, and of course NATO's intervention in Kosovo. I do not believe that the ability to veto UN resolutions should be removed, I do however believe the protection of human rights and the international community's responsibility to protect has a much higher priority and should always be pursued under just, necessary motivations and means. Finally, I would recommend the redefinition, or at least a standardised definition of a security threat vindicating a humanitarian military intervention. As aforementioned within Chapter 3, perceptions on what exactly constitutes a threat to international peace and security is often contradicted, causing disagreements on the decision to intervene. This is particularly common between the United States, Russia and China. In order to prevent another failure similar to that of the League of Nations, members of the UN must come to an agreement over intervention legitimacy. Whether either of these three reforms will achieve any form of ascendancy over the upcoming decades will be interesting to see. Nevertheless, one must consider the fact that "Mass starvation, rape and suffering will reappear as global threats, and humanitarian intervention will continue to smoulder on the public policy agenda."³⁴⁰ So too then, will the controversies surrounding intervention. I therefore believe that these issues will soon be addressed, and with the correct application of thought, implemented to achieve utmost efficiency and accountability to the RtoP doctrine.

Conclusion

Humanitarian intervention and the use of force has, and will always remain a contentious issue for the international community, this much has certainly been evident within my research. I have analysed the significance not just of producing a standardised

³⁴⁰ Neil Macfarlane, Caroline Theilking and Thomas Weiss, 'The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?', *Third World Quarterly*, 25.5, (2004), pp. 986.

definition of humanitarian interventions, but also of challenging and critiquing existing definitions. The individuality of interventions throughout the 1990's is reflected through the continuous adaptations to the UN's approach to these contemporary threats to the peace. I have outlined the prominence of globalisation and the human security approach adopted by the UN in coming to an understanding of why these threats occur and why the international community has become so obliged to act on their moral responsibilities. The legal and theoretical framework surrounding humanitarian military interventions is very much based on individual perceptions of if, and when morality should be placed above legality. International law also reflects the ever present role of state sovereignty, what I believe should be placed well below the role of human suffering in legitimising the use of force from international actors. Nevertheless, it is evident that the use of force is becoming progressively acceptable, so long as the motivations are just and the methods deployed are lawful. The foremost argument from those scholars arguing that interventions of the 1990's reflects a period of imperialistic re-emergence regards the self-centred motives, geopolitical motives of those states deploying military force. However, as I have ascertained within Chapter 4, the presence of national interests does not subside the humanitarian intentions to protect the security of those in need of protecting. The use of force is applied in varying forms, nevertheless, the democratic system in which military objectives are set prevents any act of illegitimacy. The strength of the UN in applying both the *Jus ad Bellum* and *Jus in Bello* concepts is somewhat undermined by examples of non-intervention. This was the case in Rwanda in 1994 when the use of force was not applied, what resulted was the worst genocide since the Holocaust. This strengthens my argument that the use of military force is crucial in preventing any further loss of human life, so long as the crimes committed are representative of a just cause for intervention. The failures of Rwanda are addressed within my recommendations chapter as support for unilateral interventions and the need for legal reform. The criticisms faced by the UN, and the Security Council in particular have been analysed and challenged

within my work to provide evidence of the necessity for military interventions. For example, despite a very public restrictionist stance, Noam Chomsky's position holds little credibility in the contemporary setting where the approach to security threats has been significantly re-evaluated. This also supports those operations deployed throughout the 1990's in accordance with the UN's Responsibility to Protect approach, not as some argue, for imperialistic motivations.

Overall, my work will benefit those in search of a coherent analysis of the 1990's as an era in which the UN's Responsibility to Protect obligations were first applied within a new, challenging context. This has also been applied in correlation with the use of military force to successfully install peace to a region or conflict. In a humanitarian crisis, the use of force, or at least the credible threat of force is required, without which, protection is unlikely and the conflict is likely to endure.³⁴¹ The future of military humanitarianism must be approached with a continuation of the moral concern applied within the 1990's but without the criminalisation of legitimate action, thus providing the need for further research on appropriate legal reform concerning humanitarian military interventions.

³⁴¹ Thomas Weiss, 'RtoP Alive and Well after Libya', *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol 25(3), (2011)

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